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ABSTRACT
This thesis reports on the results of case studies on how management control systems 
(MCS) operate in two Indonesian autonomous universities. The study is motivated by 
the lack of management accounting research in Indonesia in specific and in the 
developing world in general. The aim of the study is to provide understanding on how 
the operations of management controls in the two institutions are shaped by changes in 
their institutional environments. A change in an organisational status (e.g. from 
government to autonomous) constitutes a change in the institutional template of the 
organisation which is likely to impact on the MCS. The Indonesian higher education 
sector is currently being deregulated in response to both internal and external pressures. 
Despite this, there is little evidence on how MCS function to support the new 
organisational status of the higher education institutions.
This thesis filled the gap in the literature by exploring the impacts of the change of the 
universities’ status on MCS. It thus investigates how MCS operate in response to the 
reforms and to other institutional factors. To achieve the aims of the study, the thesis 
uses a longitudinal case study approach. Data were collected using a triangulation 
approach that combines data from three main sources namely, interviews, observations 
and document analysis. The analysis is informed by the new institutional sociology 
(NIS) theory (Powell and DiMaggio, 1983). However to address the limitations of NIS, 
the analysis also examined the interplay between institutional, intra-organisational 
power relations, and competitive forces.
This thesis highlights a number of empirical findings. First, pressure from the 
government as the biggest fund provider is the primary source of MCS change in the 
universities. Despite the reality that the universities now operate as autonomous 
institutions, they are still influenced by external forces, especially from governmental 
institutions such as Directorate General of Higher Education and Finance Ministry (for 
example, in the preparation of budget). Second, national and organisational cultures also 
have been identified to be influential in the decision to adopt new systems (including 
MCS) in the universities. Third, this study reinforced the opinion that the willingness of 
an organisation to conform with rules and requirements is not only for reasons of 
efficiency, but also may be necessary to increase its legitimacy, resources and survival 
capabilities. Fourth, this study also revealed that the complex and varied institutional 
factors confronting the organisations increased the use of informal controls. Overall, the 
thesis makes significant contribution to the literature on management controls in the 
developing world and in the higher educational environment.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background of Research
A Management Control System (MCS) is the systematic use of management accounting 
information involving social, cultural, political, and economic dimensions in order to 
plan, monitor, detect and correct unintentional performance errors and intentional 
irregularities in an organisation’s activities to ensure that its activities conform to its 
plan and that its objectives are achieved (Macintosh, 1994; Berry et al., 1995; Chenhall,
2003). MCS change has attracted the attention of researchers in recent years (see Hoque 
and Hopper, 1994; Cobb et al., 1995; Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Bums and Vaivio, 
2001; Granlund, 2001; Salas, 2001; William and Seaman, 2001; O'Connor et al., 2004). 
The reasons for MCS change identified in these studies include deregulation, the 
business environment (e.g. competition, legislation, regulation, and financial markets), 
new technological development, influence from professional accounting bodies, 
administrative and social control, organisational structure, organisational capacity to 
leam, an organisation’s independence, an organisation’s size, and influence from the 
native and corporate culture.
One area where change is currently taking place in Indonesia and in other developing 
countries is the higher education sector. The education sector is imperative for the 
success of a nation. Education represents one of the facilities available to improve a 
person’s abilities and skills, so the quality of human resources will depend upon the 
quality of the people’s education. The importance of education is reflected in the 
Indonesian 1945 Constitution and State Broad Line Policy stating that education is the 
right o f every citizen aiming to promote the intellectual life o f  the nation. Hence, access 
to knowledge plays a key role in the improvement of the socio-economy of a nation and
becomes a major source of competitive advantage (Bloom, 2002). As Gie, the Chairman 
of the National Development Planning Board (BAPPENAS) (Kompas, 27th January
2004), said:
“The education sector plays an important role in raising a nation’s 
dignity. Education development cannot succeed unless they are 
supported by the implementation o f a good management system and 
good teaching concepts in the institution. ”
To enhance the contribution of the education sector, the Indonesian government has 
deregulated and reformed its national education, including its higher education sector 
(Susanto, 2000). In 1999, two Indonesian public universities -  Didik University and 
Ajar University -  were transformed from state universities to a legal entity, to become 
autonomous, self-regulating institutions. As autonomous, self-regulating institutions, 
these universities are responsible for maintaining the quality and standards of their 
education process. They must also show full public accountability.
The universities have been selected to function as "guides" in Indonesia’s move toward
greater autonomy for the other public universities in the other cities. If the universities
are successful in implementing their autonomous status, other state universities will also
be transformed into “autonomous universities”. BAPPENAS in the area of education for
2005 is to initiate the application of campus autonomy in a number of other state
universities. On the interest shown by State Universities (PTN) to become autonomous
universities, the Director General of Higher Education (Dikti) at the National Education
Ministry (Depdiknas), Satryo (Kompas 08-10-03), said that:
“There are 10 PTNs which have proposed themselves to become PTN with 
BHMN (State-Owned Legal Board) status by 2005. ”
This research explores the impacts of the deregulation of the higher education sector 
on management control systems (MCS) in the two Indonesian national universities
2
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that have so far been deregulated. It investigates how MCS operate in response to 
deregulation and to other institutional factors. Deregulation which changes autonomy 
constitutes a change from one institutional template to another. More explanation 
about the backgrounds of the universities can be obtained in Chapter Five of this 
study.
1.2. Statement of Problem and Research Questions
Although deregulation of higher education has been the subject of much discussion, 
little research has been done in terms of changes in management controls as a result of 
the deregulation, especially in Indonesia and the developing world. Most of studies on 
the influence of deregulation on MCS in an organisation are focused on the experiences 
of Australia and other developed countries (see Meek and Wood, 1998; Crebert, 2000). 
As a result, Susanto (2000) argues that not many people in Indonesia especially, 
including the academic circle, fully understand the concept of university autonomy, 
which leads to various opinions and actions with a negative nuance. Even though some 
PTNs (State Universities) have expressed their readiness to operate the university 
autonomously, they argue about the lack of information available on how to manage and 
govern the new university (Susanto, 2000).
This study examines how MCS operate in autonomous universities in Indonesia. The 
study is necessitated by the lack of research on this topic. Hence, to achieve the aims of 
the study, six main research questions are investigated1, which are:
1. What changes occurred in MCS in the universities in response to the 
deregulation of the Indonesian higher education sector?
1 Discussions o f new institutional theory, including institutional and competitive isomorphism and 
organisational power relations, which form the basis o f the research questions, are provided later.
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2. How did pressure from the government and other organisations upon which the 
universities depend (coercive isomorphism) influence the operations of MCS in 
the universities?
3. How did the universities adopt certain MCS practices in an attempt to model 
themselves on other successful organisations (mimetic isomorphism)?
4. What are the influences of professional bodies and national and organisational 
cultures on MCS practices in the universities (normative isomorphism)?
5. How is MCS in the organisations shaped by the interplay between institutional 
and market forces?
6. How is MCS in the organisations shaped by the interplay between institutional 
forces and organisational power relations?
1.3. The Aims and Objectives of the Study
The desire to discuss this topic arose from the ever-increasing deregulation activities 
that have been taking place worldwide and, more evidently, within Indonesia. In today’s 
educational system, university deregulation is a very important issue: it is a major 
activity within the educational system, especially in Indonesia. As has been stated 
before, many countries have already or are going to change their state university 
systems to make them autonomous.
In Asia, there are some countries such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, and Indonesia who have reformed their higher education institutions 
(Minxuan, 1998; Lee, 2001; Couturier, 2003; Ma, 2003). Even other non-Asian 
countries such as the Czech republic (Svecova, 2000) and Australia (Meek and Wood, 
1998; Crebert, 2000) have also deregulated their higher educational sector. China 
reformed its higher educational sector over a decade ago. Presently, most Chinese state 
universities have to generate more than 50 per cent of their own income (Ma, 2003).
_r.„,—   iniroaucnon
The Malaysian government has allowed local universities to borrow money, to enter 
into business ventures and to set up companies, and has raised students’ tuition fees 
(Couturier, 2003).
This study will be an important step towards analysing and providing a better 
understanding of the .process and implications of university reform in Indonesia 
especially and less developed countries (LDCs) in general. The research will have 
policy implications for the government, academics, professionals and civil society in 
Indonesia and in other developing countries. The study is also intended to provide a 
better understanding of the role of management control systems (MCS) in Indonesia.
The study will focus on the experience of the Indonesian higher education sector for 
several reasons. Firstly, from an examination of the literature, it is clear that even 
though university sector reforms in Indonesia and in other parts of the world are 
increasing, only a few studies have been conducted on the impacts or outcomes of such 
regulations in these countries. Examples of this type of research are Watts (1996), who 
examined budgetary practices across Australian Tertiary Institutions since the demise of 
the binary systems in 1988, and Meek and Wood (1998), who explored 36 Australian 
publicly-funded universities to determine what, from the senior managers’ perspective, 
are considered to be the main issues and problems regarding the universities’ operation 
after the reforms. Even though a review of previous literature found some published 
journals that explore the effect of higher education deregulation in Australian 
Universities, no published research has been found on the effect of the deregulation on 
accounting controls in other countries, especially in Indonesia. Furthermore, an 
examination of the literature found that a majority of studies on management control 
systems in LDCs were also only focused on state-owned enterprises, family-owned
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businesses, and privatised companies (see Ansari and Bell, 1991; Hoque and Hopper, 
1994; Hoque and Hopper, 1997; Alam, 1997; Rademakers, 1998; Uddin and Hopper, 
2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2002; Hopper et al., 2003a, 2003b; Uddin and Hopper, 2003).
Secondly, conducting the study in Indonesia will assist the research process since the 
researcher is able to speak the same language as the agents. Thirdly, Indonesia is one of 
the major countries to have implemented the IMF’s economic reforms, which have 
subsequently led to deregulation of the higher education sector. Furthermore, Indonesia 
has unique characteristics necessitating such a study. Indonesia is a very important 
country for a number of reasons. The economies of Southeast Asian countries, and 
Indonesia in particular, are among the fastest growing in the world. Indonesia is an 
important country geopolitically and economically. From a strategic point of view, 
Indonesia commands a large amount of space in that part of the world. Economically, it 
is a destination country for large investors such as the USA and Japan.2 Apart from that, 
with a population of more than 225 million, Indonesia has become a favourite country 
for traders from around the world (US Department of State, 2001).
The main objectives of the study are to:
(1) Examine changes in the higher education sector in Indonesia
(2) Investigate how management accounting controls operate in autonomous 
universities in Indonesia
(3) Examine any perceived changes in management accounting controls after the 
deregulation
(4) Investigate the impacts of institutional factors on management controls in the 
universities
2 http://www.indoindians.com/vis_info.htm
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1.4. Structure of the Thesis
Figure 1.1 below presents the outline of this thesis, which is divided into twelve 
chapters, each of which is described briefly below.
Topic
Chapter 9 - MCS before Autonomy Chapter 10 - MCS After Autonomy
Chapter 6 - Research Methodology
Chapter 11 - Discussion
Chapter 12 - Summary
Chapter 4 —Theoretical Framework
Chapter 1 - Introduction to the Thesis
Chapter 5 - Background o f Indonesia
Chapter 2 - Literature Review on MCS Chapter 3 - Literature review on MCS in public sector
Chapter 7 - Changes in the Institutional Environment and Proposition
Chapter 8 - Background o f Indonesian Higher Education and Organisations
Chart 1.1: Structure of the Thesis
Chapter One, the introduction to the thesis, presents four sections which present 
background to the research, a statement of problem, research questions, the aims and 
objectives of the study, and an explanation of the structure of the thesis.
7
introduction
This study has two chapters that review the previous studies on MCS. The first chapter 
is Chapter Two, which outlines the literature reviews and which is divided into three 
sections. In the first part, the definition of management accounting control system 
(MCS) is explained, followed by a discussion of MCS changes to inform readers of the 
specific reasons why an organisation would reform its management control systems. 
The third section provides a discussion of the activity of MCS in less developed 
countries (LDCs). This section is useful to explain to the reader how organisations in 
LDCs practise MCS, including formal and informal controls, and also what factors 
influence the practice of MCS in an organisation in LDCs.
The next literature review chapter, Chapter Three, provides details of the activity of 
MCS in the public sector, especially in the higher educational sector. The first sections 
of this chapter provide an explanation of external environments and budgeting systems 
in the public sector. The second section provides a review of the studies and published 
articles concerning higher education institutions. This section includes a discussion of 
the factors that influence the day-to-day activities of universities in LDCs, how 
universities practise their MCS, and also the relationship between the systems and 
organisational power relations.
The theoretical framework of the thesis is provided after the literature review chapters 
in Chapter Four. The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the 
justification for using institutional theory as the theoretical framework for this doctoral 
research. This section compares the institutional and contingency theories. It is followed 
by a discussion of the relevance of the new institutional theory in offering an 
opportunity to explore the process of change in MCS in the universities. This is then
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linked with reviewing the old and new institutional theories and looks at their relevance. 
This section further discusses institutional isomorphism, which are coercive, mimetic 
and normative isomorphism. In the section three, this study reveals the shortcomings of 
the new institutional theory to provide a more complete explanation of MCS change. 
The discussion includes how to solve these shortcomings through interplay between 
institutional theory, power and market forces. The fourth section is a review of the use 
of institutional theory in MCS research.
Chapter Five provides background to the external environment of the two studied 
universities to support the discussion in this study. The first section describes the 
background of the Indonesian population. The next section describes the history of 
Indonesia. This section is followed by an explanation of the Indonesian legal system. 
The fourth section describes the culture of Indonesian society, and continues with a 
section that explains the labour force in the country.
Chapter Six describes the research methods and comprises five sections. The first
section explains the research paradigm assumptions. The second section reviews the
research methodology of this study and the justification for the use of qualitative
research as the research methodology. The next section reviews the case study
approach, including the advantages and disadvantages of case studies and the use of the
approach in MCS research. The fourth section describes how the study approaches data
collection, including interviews, documentary/archival records, selection of
organisations and participants. The next section describes how the author undertook the
%
fieldwork in the two universities in Indonesia.
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Chapter Seven explains the background of Indonesian higher education. This chapter is 
divided into three sections, beginning with a first section that explains the higher 
education reforms in Indonesia, including the definition of autonomy and the factors 
that influence the Indonesian government’s decision to reform the Indonesian 
universities. This section is followed by a section that describes the advantages of 
university autonomy. The next section consists of the propositions of this study.
Chapter Eight explores the background of the education system in Indonesia and the 
background of the researched organisations. This chapter is divided into three sections, 
the first of which explores the education system in Indonesia, including its structure and 
history, the higher education system, and also performance and problems in Indonesian 
higher education. The second section gives the background of Ajar University followed 
by the background of Didik University.
Following on, Chapters Nine and Ten present the research findings obtained from 
observations in the field study. An explanation of MCS activities before autonomy in 
1999 is provided in Chapter Nine, while Chapter Ten provides an explanation of MCS 
activities after autonomy. These chapters explore how the MCS have been used in the 
two organisations.
This is then followed by a discussion of the findings in Chapter Eleven. This chapter 
explores the change process of the management control systems and why the new 
systems exist in the two studied organisations using the theoretical framework provided 
in Chapter Four.
10
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The final chapter of the thesis, Chapter Twelve, provides a section on the conclusions of 
the study. The first section summarises the findings in this thesis. The next section 
describes the knowledge contributions provided by this study, which are discussed. The 
final section provides a further discussion on the strengths and limitations of the study 
and presents recommendations for future research.
11
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CHAPTER TWO 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS (MCS):
A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses the existing literature concerning the roles of management 
control systems (MCS) in organisations, which is important in order to provide the 
foundations to identify and understand MCS in order to study the organizations in this 
study. The literature review presents the research that has already been conducted on the 
public sector’s MCS, more specifically, in higher education institutions. It develops an 
understanding of and identifies the research area to which the study will contribute. In 
addition, the literature review identifies limitations in the existing literature, and thus 
provides a justification for the current study.
This chapter is divided into four parts. After introducing the chapter, part two discusses 
the definition of Management Control System (MCS), followed by a review of the 
literature on MCS change to inform readers of the specific reasons behind an 
organisation’s decision to reform its management control systems. The third section 
analyses the activity of MCS in less developed countries. This section is useful in 
explaining how organisations in LDCs practise MCS, including formal and informal 
controls. This part also discusses the factors that influence management accounting 
practices in LDCs, which should be recognised by all accounting scholars in order to 
make the accounting techniques effective. The final part of this chapter provides a 
summary of the chapter and identifies the justifications for the thesis.
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2.2. The Definition and Features of Management Control System (MCS)
Over the past years, a number of researchers (such as Evans and Bellamy, 1995;
Modell, 1996; Otley, 1999; Lind, 2001) have examined the operation of MCS in 
organisations. These studies have provided further understanding of the role of MCS in 
their organisational context.
A management control system has an important function in modem industrial
organisations (Otley and Berry, 1998). It refers to the systematic use of management
accounting information involving social, cultural, political, and economic dimensions in
order to plan, monitor, detect and correct unintentional performance errors and
intentional irregularities in a firm’s activities to ensure that its activities conform to its
plan and that its objectives are achieved (Macintosh, 1994; Berry et al., 1995; Chenhall,
2003). Euske and Riccaboni (1999) consider MCS as a way to control the internal
interdependencies (e.g. relationship between management and workers, and between
working units in the organisation) and external interdependencies (e.g. relationship with
the society and state). Ansari and Bell (1991, p.4) consider control in an organisation as:
“all. organisational arrangements, formal and informal, designed to 
accomplish organisational objectives. It includes formal structure, 
operational controls, rewards, budgeting, planning and other similar 
activities. ”
An organisation can use MCS information to scan its environment and identify any
changes in the industry and in the strategy of competitors in order to survive - from any
threats such as substitute products and services, the nature and intensity of competition
within the industry, and the bargaining power of suppliers and customers -  and succeed
in a competitive market (Mia and Clarke, 1999). The use of MCS information can also
promote an organisation’s performance by providing feedback on the implementation of
plans and the completion of jobs that helps managers to improve their performance, as
feedback allows them to identify and correct errors, and reduce task uncertainty by
13
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providing relevant information or cues. With its capability to provide information for 
control, coordination, performance, evaluation, and for motivating managers, MCS is a 
useful tool to help managers to manage their organisation in an effective and an efficient 
manner. Mia (1993) concludes that the result of this system should (i) promote effective 
managerial decision making, (ii) lead to an improvement in managerial performance 
(i.e., accomplishment of managerial role), and (iii) job satisfaction (i.e., satisfaction with 
the current job).
The control process involves a series of steps, which are: make plans, perform in pursuit 
of those plans, monitor actual performance, compare actual performance with planned 
performance and identify any areas that are ‘out of control’ (feedback), and finally take 
steps to establish control (Woolf and Tanna, 1988). Otley (1999) argued that MCS is 
very beneficial for managers since it provides them with information that is useful for 
performing their jobs and for developing and maintaining viable patterns of behaviour 
in their organisations.
Furthermore, previous MCS literature (such as Evans and Bellamy, 1995; Modell, 1996; 
Otley, 1999; Lind, 2001) has discussed different features of MCS. Figure 2.1 below 
summarises some of the features of MCS that have been examined by the researchers. 
The figure below also shows that every organisation may apply different features of 
MCS.
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- Cost control systems 
-Rewards
- Operational measures
- Performance targets
- Informal controls
Modell (1996)
- Financial and non- 
financial Measurement 
-Timeliness
- standard o f  performance 
evaluation
- Rewards
- Budgetaiy Control
TM-E V A 1 
- Balanced scorecard
Otley (1999)Lind (2001)
- Performance evaluation 
techniques
- Line item budgeting
- Programme budgeting
- Activity Based Costing
Evans & Bellamy (1995)
MCS
Figure 2.1: Some features of management accounting and control systems
Lind (2001) presented a case study of a Swedish company that changed their control 
system because they implemented World Class Manufacturing (WCM) by discussing 
financial and non-financial measurement, the time the information was delivered, the 
standard of performance evaluation including budget and previous performance 
standard, reward systems, and visibility, which were closely connected to explain how 
the department manager and all the shop managers can observe and control the unit’s 
operations.
Modell (1996) discussed implementation control systems in district and specialist 
clinics in Sweden, and found that the clinics have different control systems. In terms of 
cost control systems, he found that district clinics are evaluated on targets reflecting the 
financial surplus or deficit they generate. They use budgets and establish revenue and
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time utilisation targets for employees. The clinics use these targets to decide pecuniary 
rewards. Modell (1996) further found that it is difficult to find adequate measures 
reflecting the operations carried out by specialist clinics: such formal targets are not 
established in these clinics. At these clinics, communication and information sharing 
generally takes place on a more informal basis and is less concerned with financial 
issues than at the district clinics. As a result, pecuniary rewards do not exist at the 
specialist clinics.
Evans and Bellamy (1995) discussed the use of performance evaluation in the 
Australian public service industries. They argued that assessment of performance in 
service industries is more complicated than the manufacturing industries. In the paper, 
they explained that the performance evaluation process in the Australian public sector 
has been limited to line item budgets (inputs) which bear no relationship to either the 
activities (processes) or the performance (outputs) of the participants. However, as the 
result of budget cuts, the government in Australia has worked to improve performance 
measures by introducing Activity-Based Costing (ABC) because the process of ABC 
brings benefits to the organisation, forcing management to consider the drivers that 
affect costs.
Otley’s (1999) paper developed a framework for analysing the operation of 
management control systems structured around five issues that relate to objectives, 
strategies and plans for their attainment, target setting, incentive and reward structures, 
and information feedback loops. He tested the framework against three major systems 
of organisational control, namely: budgeting, economic value added, and the balance 
scorecard.
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2.3. Management Control System Change
Drawing on previous studies (such as Hedberg and Jonsson, 1978; Johnson and Kaplan, 
1987; Argyris and Kaplan, 1994; Bromwich and Bhimani, 1994), Granlund (2001) 
concluded that accounting systems are difficult and slow to change, despite significant 
changes in the operating environment of organisations which put tremendous pressure 
on accounting to change. However, Granlund (2001) argued that an organisation would 
be more to choose to continue to develop its management accounting practices than to 
give in to the resistance to the intended changes.
As a result, in recent years, many organisations have experienced significant change to 
their organisational design, environments and technology. Several researchers (see 
Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Cobb et al., 1995; Granlund and Lukka, 1998; Bums and 
Scapens, 2000; Bums and Vaivio, 2001; Granlund, 2001; Salas, 2001; William and 
Seaman, 2001; O'Connor et al., 2004) have investigated management accounting control 
systems change. These studies have identified antecedents to management accounting 
change, including the business environment (e.g. competition, legislation, regulation, 
and financial markets), deregulation, new technological development, influence from 
professional accounting bodies, administrative and social control, organisational 
structure, organisational capacity to learn, an organisation’s independence, an 
organisation’s size, and influence from the native and corporate culture.
Granlund and Lukka (1998) analysed forces that cause convergence and divergence in
management accounting practices around the world, and their study offers a good
source of the main drivers of management accounting change. They argued that it is
necessary to study the historical development of an organisation, the way the
organisation and its management control systems developed, as well as the process of
transformation that they have gone through.
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Hoque and Hopper (1994), Collier (2001) and Modell (2001) argued that organisations 
depend on support from their external environment (e.g. government) for their survival 
and continued operation. As has been argued by Modell (2001) and Collier (2001), the 
role of the state, through legitimating processes, is powerful, and organisations 
(especially public sector institutions) need the support of governments, since their 
operations are regulated by the government, and the institutions are dependent on 
government for the acquisition of resources to support purposive activity. Modell (2001) 
identified the influence of central government in the implementation of management 
accounting systems by noting that there is growing dependence of Norwegian 
healthcare institutions on central government, caused by the increasingly centralised 
control of funding. A regulatory environment limits diversity by prescribing standards 
across the organisations in the same industry, which includes prescribing a financial 
reporting standard, budgeting process, and human resources practices (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1997; Granlund and Lukka, 1998). However, regulation also 
inspires changes in an organisation’s strategy, structure and process (Conway et al., 
1994; Meek and Wood, 1998). These research findings have been supported by Hoque 
and Hopper (1994) who concluded that the wider social, economic, political and 
institutional contexts influence the way management control systems operate in public 
sector organisations.
Libby and Waterhouse (1996), Laitinen (2001) and Williams and Seaman (2001) 
identified the size of an organisation as an important factor influencing MCS change. 
They argued that the relationship between size and administrative change is significant 
and may act as a driver to change in MCS. They add that larger firms may have 
additional resources to innovate, modify, upgrade or replace existing systems.
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Organisations with more resources have better opportunities for learning, thus making it 
easier for management accounting change to take place. Therefore, an organisation that 
has invested in a large number of accounting personnel may respond to changes in or 
challenges arising from their environment by changing their MCS (Libby and 
Waterhouse, 1996). However, Libby and Waterhouse (1996) also argued that 
bureaucratisation also increases with size and may act as a deterrent to MCS change.
Bums and Vaivio (2001) argued that advances in information technology have driven 
innovation and change in the collection, measurement, analysis and communication of 
information within and between organisations. This has been facilitated in particular by 
such technologies as enterprise resource planning systems, e-commerce, the Internet, 
electronic data interchange and electronic meetings.
In addition to the changes inspired by training and education programmes from several 
leading international bodies such as the Chartered Institute Management Accountants 
(CIMA), the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA), and the Certified 
Public Accountants (CPA) (Bums and Vaivio, 2001)3, MCS change has also been 
influenced by donor institutions such as the World Bank (WB), the Asian Development 
Bank (ADB), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), especially in developing 
countries in Asia and Africa (Udin and Hopper, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2002). This 
change is necessary due to the financial over-dependence of these countries on donor 
institutions. As a result these institutions have become major drivers for change in 
LDCs. Through conferences, workshops, educational programmes and professional 
publications, information is exchanged about what practices are appropriate in what
3 They also point out, as an example o f the influence o f a professional body on management accounting 
change, that, in the UK, the Chartered Institute o f Management Accountants (CIMA) has revamped its 
examination curricula to include subjects apparently more in keeping with the future role o f a 
management accountant -  e.g. systems and project management, organisational management and strategy.
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circumstances for the practitioners. Hence, different organisations, employing 
individuals with similar educational backgrounds, interests and contacts, become more 
similar in their need for informational support and, consequently, in the types of 
systems they consider acceptable.
The importance of professional bodies in management accounting systems change has 
been studied by Carpenter and Feroz (2001): their study about the use of Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) in four US state governments found that, if 
they are not active in professional associations, accounting bureaucrats may miss the 
educational process that is believed to be an important factor leading to early adoption 
of GAAP.
There are also both direct and indirect pressures from trans-national institutions (e.g. the 
European Union (EU) agreement, the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreement, and the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO)) on firms to change their management practices to be 
consistent with the mandates of the institutions (Grandlund and Lukka, 1998). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argued that the trade and professional associations also 
reduce organisation heterogeneity through the issue of, for example, standards and rules 
of conduct among the organisations in the same industry.
Granlund (2001) investigated MCS change in a large Finnish food manufacturing 
enterprise (Foodco) and observed several forces and factors that inhibited MCS change 
in the organisation. One of these factors was the economic situation, including the 
intensity of competition (Salas, 1992; Libby and Waterhouse, 1996; Mia and Clarke,
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1999; Granlund, 2001; Laitinen, 2001; O’Connor et al., 2004) and severe financial 
situation (Salas, 1992; Granlund, 2001).
Miller (1995), in his book that compares the management of change in twenty 
universities in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom, stated that the ‘market’ has 
been an increasingly important concept in the changing of organisations’ management, 
especially in higher education institutions, for many years. Based on the study of Yakou 
and Dorweller (1995) on the chief accounting officers of British, French and US 
organisations, Libby and Waterhouse (1996) hypothesised that competition provides an 
incentive to change management accounting control systems. Libby and Waterhouse 
(1996) further hypothesised that the MCS change is higher for firms operating in a more 
highly competitive environment where understanding costs and measuring performance 
are keys to survival. Mia and Clarke (1999) further explained that market competition 
creates turbulence, stress, risk and uncertainty for companies so that organisations in 
many countries are continuously revising their management accounting systems in 
response to the threats and opportunities in the competitive environment in their 
country.
Laitinen (2001) investigated management accounting change in 93 small Finnish 
technology firms, concluding that management accounting systems that help 
management in large organisations to identify directions for future action may be 
ineffective in small technology companies, and the probability of a company’s survival 
is sensitive to the intensity of competition and cost efficiency. He then concluded that 
there are different expectations for management accounting changes from four types of 
organisations. The first is the stable and conservative organisation that has little or no 
pressure or motivation to change management accounting systems to improve; second,
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the change-oriented organisation that is forced to change and improve its management 
accounting systems to compensate for a large negative effect, especially because of high 
competition; third, the performance-contented organisation that has no real motivation 
to change its management accounting system since there is no competition; fourth, the 
discontent, resourceless organisation that adapts its management accounting systems 
although it has a low motivation for change and is acutely resource-constrained because 
this organisation has high competition with a shorter customer relationship.
Apart from the market reforms that consequently increase competition, Salas (1992) and 
Granlund (2001) also identified severe financial situation as being one of the most 
important economic/financial factors affecting management accounting change in the 
companies they studied. For example, Salas (1992) found that the management 
accounting practices in Spanish organisations have been influenced by the late 1970’s 
economic crisis.
Granlund (2001) further argues that the professionalisation of business-oriented 
management accounting personnel (possibly because of university education) creates 
the potential for modernisation of the management accounting system with enhanced 
relevance and strategic management support. The changes have also come about as a 
result of institutional factors such as the imitation of other companies’ practices and the 
use of consultants who market global solutions for managerial problems.
Kostova and Roth (2002) examined the adoption of new organisational practices by 
subsidiaries of a multinational corporation (MNC) and argued that the institutional 
profile of a host country may affect the adoption of a new practice at a foreign 
subsidiary. First, they found that in MNC subsidiaries, when the headquarters are
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relatively powerful, the direct effect of the local institutional environment may be 
somewhat constrained. For example, none of the foreign units of the MNC they studied 
had adopted a quality management practice before the headquarters’ initiative, even 
though the practice was not new in a number of recipient countries. This finding is 
similar to that of Granlund and Lukka (1998), who concluded that reforms in the 
divisions’ or subsidiaries’ management accounting is initiated by the headquarters or 
parent company.
Second, Kostova and Roth (2002) argued that the adoption or choice of a new practice 
is through individuals in the subsidiaries that have been influenced by their cognitions 
and beliefs, which in turn have been shaped by the external institutional environment in 
which they operate. Cobb et al. (1995) found in their study that all the accountants and 
managers of the multinational banks that they studied agreed that environmental 
pressures were the primary reasons for many of the changes, but that internal factors 
were also important, where the influence of individuals as change agents was 
particularly significant in their case study. Modell’s (2001) study highlights the large 
influence of managers proactively designing and implementing systems for performance 
measurement in the context of recent reforms within the Norwegian public health 
sector. This implies that individuals do not just accept any form of accounting system 
within the organisations. Granlund (2001) found that accounting systems largely 
involve human factors. Management accounting control systems are passive tools 
designed to assist a manager’s decision making. However, individuals are active agents 
involved in constructing and interpreting management control systems (Preston, 1991). 
In other words, people are not passive objects but rather they are active agents capable 
of altering their own environments as well as destinies (Held, 1980). An organisation is 
a social system which consists of a collection of individuals who create a sense of social
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order, shared culture, a history, a future, and a value system (Cooper, 1981). Zucker 
(1987) and Scott (1995) argued that individuals are assumed to be approval-seeking, 
susceptible to social influence, and relatively intractable creatures of habit and 
traditions.
It is very useful to analyse organisational cultures and the way in which they are 
created, kept alive, modified, used and destroyed (Cooper, 1981). Grindle (1997) stated 
that organisational culture is a useful concept for explaining the difference of 
management activities between organisations. Culture provides an interpretation for 
organisational participants of their own situation and impels them to action. In the 
process of organising their activities, organisational participants represent, enact and 
thereby create their situation and purposes (Preston, 1995). Language is important to 
create the social interaction among individuals in the organisation in order to use 
management control systems.
Granlund (2001) identifies further obstacles to the change process, including scarce 
financial and human resources, complex existing technology systems, organisational 
routinisation, conservative organisation culture, failure to secure legitimacy for the 
changes in the general turmoil of transformation, fear of an increasing workload for 
accountants, and limited management support.
Although the explanations above have been primarily concerned with the external 
organisational environment that influences MCS change (i.e. the broader social, 
economic and political institutions of the organisational field and also the society in 
which the organisation is located), Bums and Scapens (2000), however, argue that we
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also have to recognise the internal factors within the organisation (i.e. rules, routines, 
and power relations) to discuss the change.
Bums and Scapens’ (2000) study describes an institutional framework to explore the 
complex and ongoing relationship between actions and institutions, and demonstrates 
the importance of organisational routines and institutions in shaping the process of 
management accounting change. The framework is grounded in the duality of action 
and institutions, which means that even though institutions shape behaviour, institutions 
are themselves the outcome of the actions of members of the organisation. Hence, Bums 
and Scapens (2000) concluded that management accounting change has to be 
understood in terms of the behaviour of individuals and groups within the organisations. 
They also found that it is important to recognise the role of power in processes of 
change because power (such as hierarchical power and the power of a strong individual 
personality) can be used to introduce new management accounting systems. However, 
they add that power relations between individuals in an organisation can be mobilised to 
resist such new management control systems. Chapter Four will provide a more in- 
depth description of the use of power in processes of change and the interplay between 
power and institution.
2.4. Management Control Systems in Less Developed Countries (LDCs)
This review will be focused on research on management accounting controls in those
countries that can be classified as less developed countries (LDCs). The aims are to 
evaluate the roles of management accounting control in LDCs and also to examine the 
influence of environmental conditions in these countries on accounting control. Less 
developed countries, also known as Third World or developing or emerging economies, 
are the countries that do not belong to the developed economies such as Japan and most
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Western countries (Wallace, 1990; Hopper et al., 2003a). Less developed countries are 
mostly found in East Europe, Asia, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands and Africa (see 
the 2003 World Bank Report, “World Bank List of Economies”, to find a list of 
Developing Countries).
A growing number of articles on accounting practices in LDCs have been published in 
leading Western accounting journals over the past decade (see Maschmeyer and Ji- 
Liang, 1990; Wallace, 1990; Gray and Kouhy, 1993; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Scapens 
and Ben-Ling, 1995; Jones and Xiao, 1999; Ji, 2000; O’Connor et al., 2004; Sulaiman et 
al., 2004). Most of these studies are joint research projects that combine knowledge 
from academics from Western and developing countries. This collaboration is designed 
to prevent many of the problems that could be faced in these studies, such as linguistic 
and cultural problems (Abdul-Rahman et al, 1997). By having both “native” and “non­
native” on the joint research project, the project will be able to identify unique 
expressions of culture in an accounting/control system and the role of that system in the 
culture (Ansari and Bell, 1991).
Even though accounting research in LDCs has increased steadily over the years, very 
few studies have focused on management accounting issues in organisations in the 
context of these environments. Some major studies on management accounting in LDCs 
include Ansari and Bell (1991), Hoque and Hopper (1994), Rezaee and Szendi (1995), 
Uddin and Hopper (2001), Tsamenyi et al. (2002) and O'Connor et al. (2004): these are 
empirical studies on management accounting controls in countries such as Pakistan, 
Ghana and Bangladesh.
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Ansari and Bell (1991) conducted a longitudinal field study on organisational controls - 
including planning, organisation, operational control, rewards or incentives, and 
budgeting - in a Pakistani family-owned food company during the period from 1967 to 
1989. Hoque and Hopper (1994) investigated the operation of management control 
systems in a large nationalised jute mill in Bangladesh by interviewing 141 managers 
and public officials to understand how control operated and also to explain the factors 
influencing the work of system of control. Tsamenyi et al. (2002) investigated the 
budgeting process in the context of Ghana by collecting information from 
questionnaires and interviews with forty-eight managers in four large-scale 
organisations. The authors examined the participation of the managers in the 
organisations in budget decisions and the use of budget as a planning and control 
device. Uddin and Hopper (2001) conducted an intensive case study on management 
accounting including accounting controls in a Bangladeshi privatised soap company. 
They examined shop-floor controls, operational controls, formal structures, and 
accounting practices after the company had been privatised. O'Connor et al. (2004) 
explored the influence of the adoption of "Western" management accounting control 
practices by China's SOEs: this study used a survey instrument for data collection from 
82 Chinese SOEs.
In addition, Abdul-Rahaman et al. (1997) and Hopper et al. (2003a) reviewed the 
previous literature on different management accounting issues in LDCs. Hopper et al. 
(2003a) reviewed 57 articles from leading accounting journals from the UK, the USA, 
Canada, and Australia from the 1970s to 1999. This study evaluated the issues, 
methodologies, theories, and conclusions raised by previous management accounting 
research in LDCs. Abdul-Rahaman et al. (1997) reviewed English-language accounting 
journals over twenty-five years starting from the year 1970. This review examined the
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literature on internal reporting and financial decision making, external reporting and 
accountability, accounting and financial management for specific development projects, 
and theory development in public sector accounting and financial management.
More recently, organisations in LDCs have increased their use of management 
accounting control (O’Connor et al., 2004). However, studies on accounting 
development in LDCs (Rahaman et al., 1997; Jones and Xiao, 1999; Hopper et Al., 
2003a, 2003b; O’Connor et al., 2004) have argued that most accounting practices in the 
LDCs are significantly based on importing theories and techniques that have been 
developed in the Western world, particularly the UK and USA. The main objectives of 
these adoptions were to improve decision making and to increase the performance 
accountability of the LDCs’ organisations (see O'Connor et al., 2004). Moreover, Ansari 
and Bell (1991) argued that the imported theories and techniques have been applied in 
the LDCs without taking into account specific features of the local environment.
Researchers such as Abdul-Rahman et al. (1997) suggested that generalising accounting 
systems in the developed and less developed countries is inadequate. Perera (1998) 
found that LDCs experience some problems in adopting Western accounting systems 
because of the different characteristics of developed and less developed countries. 
Wallace (1990) reviewed the literature on accounting in developing countries and 
described LDCs as having a different structure of business and society from developed 
countries (e.g. in terms of history, population, society, culture, religion, and economic 
and political systems), and as a result LDCs would need to develop along different lines. 
This statement has been supported by Hopper et al. (2003a), who argued that the failure 
to recognise the differences between developed and less developed countries can cause 
the imported accounting techniques to be ineffective. Kantor and Roberts (1995) studied
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financial reporting practices in selected Arab countries and found differences between 
these developing nations and the developed nations in terms of the relative emphasis on 
income measurement. Developed nations consider income determination to be of prime 
importance since the majority of businesses are privately owned, while in developing 
countries this is not the case, because government ownership is far more dominant.
The other significant issues concerning management accounting control systems in 
LDCs (see Scott and Troberg, 1976; Jones and Xiao, 1999; Rahaman and Lawrence, 
2001; and Tsamenyi et al., 2002) are: the lack of fully trained accountants; accounting 
information is not utilised for internal management purposes; there is a lack of 
legislation relating to accounting and auditing standards and procedures; and accounting 
information is not available or is available but not in the proper form. Jones and Xiao 
(1999) argued that the acute shortage of qualified accountants in LDCs has led to 
questionable, uneconomic, or improper management decisions being made by 
organisations without proper accounting data and appropriate interpretation. Tsamenyi 
et al. (2002) also found similar results: they found that there were only minimal 
attempts made to gather information from the departmental and branch managers during 
the development of the budget because of the lack of requisite skills among the 
management accountants to develop financial aspects of the budget on their own.
2.4.1. Formal and Informal Controls in LDCs
Jaworski (1988) conceptualized two broad classes of control, which are: firstly, formal 
control, consisting of high levels of output and process control; secondly, informal 
control, including high levels of professional and cultural control. Formal control within 
an organization includes budgeting, performance measurement, incentive systems and 
other administrative roles. Informal control mechanisms can be adopted as laws, norms, 
ethics, etiquette, and customs, which all control and thus define behaviour. Informal
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processes are designed to achieve organizational objectives. However, Jaworski et al. 
(1993) concluded that formal and informal controls can be used at the same time.
Previous studies on MCS in LDCs (such as Hopper and Berry, 1983; Ansari and Bell, 
1991; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Dean, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2004b) showed that 
controls in organizations in LDCs can be achieved either through formal or 
informal means. As a result, it is important to review the literature on formal and 
informal controls. This study’s aim is consistent with many previous studies that have 
also discussed formal and informal functional roles in the studied organisations in 
. LDCs.
Sulaiman et al. (2004) found that the use of budgets as a planning, control and 
performance evaluation tool (to enable managers to make more informed decisions) in 
selected LDCs such as India, Malaysia and Singapore remains high. To support their 
study, they reviewed studies from Ghosh and Yoong (1988), Ghosh and Chan (1996), 
Abdul Rahman et al. (1998), Joshi (2001) and Sulaiman et al. (2002). Ghosh and Chan
(1996) found that 97 per cent of the 109 studied companies in Singapore reported the 
use of budgets to evaluate performance; Ghosh and Yoong (1988) found that 97 per cent 
of 64 multinational firms and 93 per cent of 110 local firms in Singapore used budgets; 
Abdul Rahman et al. (1998) reported that 98 per cent of 48 Malaysian enterprises used 
budgets, and 40 per cent of this 98 per cent used budgets as performance evaluation 
tools; Joshi (2001) found that all 60 large and medium-sized firms in India used budgets 
for planning day-to-day operations and cash flows, 93 per cent of the companies used 
budgets for controlling costs, and 91 per cent of the companies reported that they used 
budgets for planning their financial position.
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Previous management and accounting research in LDCs (such as Hopper and Berry, 
1983; Ansari and Bell, 1991; Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Dean, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 
2004b) have demonstrated that culture and social relations are instrumental in the 
management of the LDCs’ organisations. Hence, the studies show that informal control 
is very important in the Asian and Indonesian context as MCS were formed on the basis 
of socio-cultural relations. The studies have also revealed that there are complex and 
turbulent situations in the environment of organisations in LDCs (such as the 
continuation of using old laws and regulations; and the acceptance of the national and 
organisational cultures) which force the managers in the LDCs to rely on informal and 
social controls, since the use of informal controls is more effective than the use of 
formal controls. Thus, while the studies found that some form of formal management 
control exists in the LDCs’ organisations, in practice the strong influence of culture and 
social relations in the organisations has thus made formal management controls less 
relevant.
Ansari and Bell (1991) and Uddin and Hopper (2001) found another important feature
of management control in LDCs, which is the fact that family and personal relationships
play a strong role in the activities of the companies they surveyed. This family control,
which is normal in most of the LDCs, often becomes apparent because the company is
owned by family (Hopper et al., 2003a). Studies in family-owned businesses by Ansari
and Bell (1991) and Uddin and Hopper (2001) found that accounting and control
systems in the companies they studied became the personal fiefdom of the family. To
explain this family control of organisations in LDCs, Hopper et al. (2003a) stated:
“Controls become informal and arbitrary i f  not direct or family control 
and personal relationship becomes important rather than formalised 
relationship. Families, friend or clan come first in their decision making, 
as a consequence o f it, formal rules and regulations are often being 
superseded for meeting societal, familial or friendly demands.”
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In their study, Ansari and Bell (1991) provided an example of the influence of the 
family in their case organisations. They found that three brothers held three top 
management positions in the organisation; executive and lower level positions in the 
company were filled by members of the extended family; there was reliance on respect 
to the family “hierarchical” structure in appointing a chairman; and the brothers 
appointed as controller and treasurer a long-time family friend who lacked any 
qualifications.
In addition, Ansari and Bell (1991) discovered that the studied organisation did not have 
internal controls of the type common in the west. There is thus no separation of the 
controllership function from the treasury function in the organisation. An individual 
performs multiple tasks, from cash collection, bill payments, bank deposits, up to 
bookkeeping.
Hoque and Hopper’s (1994) study in a Bangladeshi jute mill, and Alam’s (1997) study 
in two Bangladeshi state-owned enterprises, put forward similar arguments that the 
wider social, economic, political and institutional contexts govern the ways 
management control operates in the studied organisations. Their studies revealed a 
number of significant factors to assist in understanding how management control 
operated. First, the organisations operated in competitive and regulated environments; 
they had little authority over their operational activities, and head office and the 
sponsoring ministries were prominent in organisational planning and control. Secondly, 
the accounting system in the mills was mainly a response to external legitimacy. 
Thirdly, budgeting was not a dominant mode of control in the organisations since the 
budgeting system was created to comply with head office and state requirements.
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Fourthly, the managers used a variety of informal/social control mechanismd to cope 
with the complexity and uncertainty around the mills.
2.4.2. Factors That Influence Management Control Systems in LDCs
Several factors have been identified as influencing developments in management
accounting control systems in LDCs. This section will discuss the influence of these 
factors on management accounting control practices in LDCs.
Colonial influence is one of the major factors that shape accounting development in 
LDCs (Perera, 1989; Wallace, 1990). Countries which were once colonies (for example, 
during the British colonial period) often adopt the accounting systems of their former 
colonial masters. Thus, Perera (1989) argued that former British colonies in particular 
have adopted British accounting traditions in order to fulfil the requirement of the 
British Administrative.
It may be useful to analyse organisations as political systems (Cooper, 1981). The 
environments in most LDCs are turbulent and organisations in these countries face 
uncertain environments with respect to markets, resource constraints, operations, 
politics, industrial relations, state interference and the demands of aid agencies (see 
Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Jones and Xiao, 1999). These uncertain environments in most 
LDCs have been identified to have consequences for management control systems. 
Hoque and Hopper (1994) found that the abovementioned factors rendered extant 
control systems ineffective in the eyes of organisations’ managers.
The People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) is an example of a developing country that has 
experienced changes in economic and political environments that have implications for 
management accounting control systems (Jones and Xiao, 1999). Jones and Xiao (1999)
33
u»H/ & (// i n w
and O'Connor et al. (2004) undertook studies of the development of management 
accounting in China. These studies analysed the background to the adoption of Western 
management techniques in some Chinese organisations. In the year 1979, the Chinese 
government began to implement its open door policy, which enabled the importation 
and adoption of Western management accounting techniques. A reduction in 
government intervention (e.g. because of privatisation) and an increase in foreign 
investment are examples of economic transition in China. These bring freedom for 
enterprises to adopt Western management techniques. Hence, many enterprises in 
developing countries need to develop new management accounting practices from 
Western countries and loosen their centralised controls in order to meet the needs of 
economic reform and international trade (Ji, 2000; Hopper et al., 2003a).
O'Connor et al. (2004) also argued that the change in accounting control practices in 
China was a response to an increasingly competitive environment, and also influenced 
by institutional factors such as joint venture experience and stock exchange listing. 
Jones and Xiao (1999) and O'Connor et al. (2004) also added that the main objectives of 
the transformations in the country’s management control systems were to improve 
decision making and to increase performance accountability. Perera (1989) argued that 
the majority of multinational companies which operate in developing countries that use 
Western accounting systems in their daily activities are only concerned with how to 
make money and have little concern for the local needs of the host countries.
Hopper et al. (2003a, 2003b) also argued that it is more effective for organisations in 
LDCs to import Western methods due to the lack of resources to design management 
accounting systems consistent with indigenous cultural or economic principles. 
International accounting firms, professional bodies (e.g. the International Accounting
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Standards Committee / IASC), and educational institutions have also been effective 
vehicles for transferring Westem-style accounting systems to the LDCs (Perera, 1989; 
Hopper et al., 2003b). For example, Ji (2000) noted that immediately after China 
introduced its open door policy, the government in Beijing sent a number of accounting 
scholars and students to industrial countries to learn advanced accounting techniques 
and theory. This occurred because education systems in China are still incapable of 
generating enough fully-trained accountants, even though management accounting is 
widely taught at all levels of higher education and further education and is a main 
subject in professional accounting examinations (Jones and Xiao, 1999).
However, in contrast to the management practices in developed countries, organisations 
in LDCs experience greater informal procedures in their day-to-day management 
activities. Decisions relating to recruitment, rewards, financing and strategic issues are 
often made in cognizance of social and cultural factors. For example, Ansari and Bell 
(1991) and Uddin and Hopper (2001) found that management practices in LDCs were 
based on the culture and belief of the individuals in the organisations. Hence, in their 
study, Ansari and Bell (1991) found the appointments to management positions in the 
studied company were not based on qualifications but more on a cultural preference for 
trust: this preference for trust was the basis for the company appointing a long-time 
friend of the owner of the company as controller and treasurer. Furthermore, this 
cultural preference for trust also leads to the lack of separation of duties between control 
functions and treasury.
In addition, Ansari and Bell (1991) added that the belief of the participants in separating 
their business risks in other countries because of their country’s condition, and their 
willingness to increase their family’s status and privilege as a respectable, industrial
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family, influenced the strategic planning decisions to build a packaging material plant 
and acquire an ice cream plant, and also the decision for geographical expansion to the 
UAE. Perera (1989) explained the reason for the use of informal procedures in day-to- 
day management in LDCs another way: he stated that business managers in many 
developing countries are not likely to have a formal education and training in 
management, which means that they are not likely to be professionals.
2.5. Summary of Chapter
One of the fundamental findings of this chapter is that it is necessary for researchers 
who study management control system change in an organisation to recognise a number 
of environmental / external factors (such as: economic, social and political climate, 
industrial relations, competition, and government regulation) and internal factors (such 
as individual behaviour and organisational power relations) that may affect the 
management control system in an organisation. In recent years, many organisations 
have experienced significant change in their organisational designs, competitive 
environments, and information technologies. This period has also seen the adoption of a 
corporate style of management among universities, as one example of public sector 
institutions.
The abovementioned literature further concluded that there are differences of
management control systems between the developing nations and the developed nations.
For example, in organisations in LDCs, culture and social relations are instrumental in
the organisations’ management. The evidence from this literature review also found that
management accounting in general, and management accounting control systems in
particular, within organisations in LDCs have not received much attention from
academics. The majority of the literature on accounting has been designed to deal with
the problems of Western countries and some of the studies are not relevant to the
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conditions and problems of developing countries because of the unique environmental 
conditions in these countries (Perera, 1989).
In addition, the literature study by Abdul-Rahaman et al. (1997) found that in the area of 
management accounting in developing countries, where a lot of work has been done, 
empirical studies are still lacking. They argued that the reason for this lack of empirical 
studies is that most researchers are often non-residents of the countries and thus face the 
linguistic and cultural problems which have become notorious in social science research 
into developing countries. On the other hand, a suggestion could be made from the 
review of the literature above, that to improve the quality of accounting practices in 
developing countries, the countries’ accounting systems would require research studies 
relevant to the local needs and specific features of the environments in the individual 
countries, including its historical, economic, socio-cultural and political environment. 
Further summary about some previous studies on management and accounting practices 
in LDCs organisations can be found in Appendix 2.1. at the end of this thesis.
Finally, the literature review above revealed that the majority of authors have studied 
the MCS in isolation. This thesis will address this gap by studying the MCS as part of 
an interrelated control system. The next chapter provides a further review of previous 
literature that describes management control systems in the public sector.
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CHAPTER THREE 
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS (MCS)
IN PUBLIC SECTOR ORGANISATIONS:
A REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
3.1. Introduction
This chapter is the second part of the literature review. It discusses literature related to 
management control systems (MCS) in public sector organisations. This review is 
important as the foundation to identifying and understanding MCS in the public sector 
in general and in the higher education sector in particular in order to study the 
universities in this study.
This chapter is divided into four parts. After this introductory section, the second part 
describes details of the activity of MCS in the public sector, including an explanation of 
the use of line-item budgeting and activity-based budgeting in the public sector. The 
two budgeting systems were chosen because of their existence in the research site. The 
third section provides details of a literature review of the studies and published articles 
in higher education institutions research. This section includes a discussion of the 
factors that influence universities’ day-to-day activities, a discussion of university 
reforms in many countries, how universities practise their MCS, and also the 
relationship between the systems, and organisational power relations. The final part of 
this chapter provides a summary of the chapter and identifies the justification for the 
thesis.
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3.2. Management Controls in Public Sector
3.2.1. External Environment of Public Sector
There are many studies on the public sector that have discussed organisational control 
either in developed countries or less developed countries. Researchers such as Smith 
(1993), Evans and Bellamy (1995), and Llewellyn and Tappin (2003) have discussed 
management control systems in public sector organisations in developed countries. 
Smith (1993) gave an outline of the performance review process in the United 
Kingdom’s National Health Service. Llewellyn and Tappin (2003) explored the growth 
of strategic planning in a particular area of the public sector -  the national parks. Evans 
and Bellamy (1995) discussed performance evaluation in the Australian public sector.
Studies on public sector accounting in developing countries have been published by 
Dean and Pugh (1989), Abdul-Rahaman et al. (1997), and Grindle (1997). Dean and 
Pugh (1989) explored the use of budgeting systems in governmental organisations in 
five developing countries. Abdul-Rahaman et al. (1997) reviewed the literature 
published in English-language journals over the previous twenty-five years. Grindle
(1997) explored evidence from 29 organisations studied in a six-country comparative 
research project.
Other studies (Hirshhom, 1989; Collier, 2001) have discussed differences between 
public and private sector management and concluded that both serve different sets of 
stakeholders, leading to a conflict of interests in both sectors. Public sector institutions 
have a multiplicity of stakeholders, which are resource providers (for example 
government), public interest groups, customers, and the clients of the organisations. The 
private sector serves customers and shareholders; public sector managers need to 
consider the demands of their users, such as society as taxpayers. The overall aim of 
financial control in the public sector institutions is to ensure that the government obtains
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Parliamentary authority for what it wishes to spend and that the government only spends 
money on objectives approved by the Parliament. In the public sector, decisions are 
made for political and not financial reasons. Tests of management competence are also 
for political reasons, not financial. From the view of budget characteristics, budgets in 
the public sector are published to be critiqued and discussed by society, while private 
sector budgets are closed to the public because they are company secrets.
In the case of a university as a part of the public sector, Coy and Part (1998) argued that 
a university’s published financial statements or annual reports are used in different ways 
by its stakeholders. They provide examples of this by saying that students, including 
their parents or sponsors, may use the information to argue about the fairness of tuition 
fees charged in relation to operating costs, while academics may use this information to 
see how resources are allocated between faculties to enable them to secure their 
interests (for example, job security). Through adherence to formal managerial strategies, 
the public sector has become less driven by the individual aspirations of professionals 
and also, potentially, more rigid and standardised (Llewellyn and Tappin, 2003).
Smith (1993) identified four particular problems in public sector and not-for-profit 
organisations’ control systems that were not found in the private sector, which are: 
firstly, the difficulty of securing a consensus as to what the output and objectives of 
such an organisation should be; secondly, the difficulty of measuring such output and 
the eventual outcome of public sector intervention; thirdly, the difficulty of interpreting 
any output and outcome measures that can be developed; fourthly, the difficulty of 
persuading citizens to take any interest in performance measures.
40
t  i i c n e w  uj j h l o  j m  rublic  Sector Organisations
Public sector organisations perform poorly in many countries (Grindle, 1997). For the 
last decade, the global trend seems to be for public sector reforms, which have occurred 
in several countries. Several governments (for UK experiences, see Grindle, 1997; 
Cooper, 2004) have adjusted public sector institutions that have suffered a “legitimacy” 
crisis. Within management research, the question of efficiency and effectiveness in 
public enterprises has formed the focus of attention for many years. Hence, as happened 
in the private and not-for-profit sectors, quality and accountability have become focal 
issues in the public sector.
There are some background reasons as to why public sector organisations perform 
poorly in many developing countries, which are poverty, economic crisis, corruption, 
and political instability, and these afflict some countries so much that basic conditions 
of security and order have disappeared; states have literally collapsed and, along with 
them, the organisations charged with carrying out routine and development-oriented 
functions (Grindle, 1997). Gujarathi and Dean (1993) adds that public sector 
management in developing countries also faces difficulties in recruiting and retraining 
qualified accountants. For example, they argue that almost all accounting and financial 
management positions in the public sector in Papua New Guinea were filled by non­
graduate accountants. Gujarathi and Dean (1993) also found reasons for the acute 
shortage of qualified government accountants, which are: salary differential between 
private and public sectors, inadequacy of training personnel and facilities, poor job 
environment and lack of opportunities for growth.
Llewellyn and Tappin (2003) in their research found that politicians desire more control 
over the professionals that dominate public services whilst wanting to make them more 
responsible for outcomes. However, public services must now provide transparency in
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order to secure on-going funding from government bodies and to manage their
legitimacy crisis (Coy and Pratt, 1998; Llewellyn and Tappin, 2003).
Moreover, part of the reforms, other studies (for example: Hood, 1995) have argued that 
across the world, public-private partnerships are now seen as inevitable and are 
becoming the “new global paradigm” in order to allow for increasing investment in 
public services. An example of public sector reform is the experience of Britain under 
the premiership of Margaret Thatcher in the early 1980s. An example of a public-private 
partnership was given by Llewellyn and Tappin (2003), who discussed private sector 
sponsorship with the establishment of named company Chairs in universities. Belgium 
also experienced a situation where many of the Belgian non-profit and public sector 
organisations have encountered a number of financial accounting changes over the last 
ten years (Christiaens, 2000). Public sector organisations in Belgium, such as hospitals, 
local government, health service insurance, pension funds, universities, and 
education/schools, have reformed their traditional cash accounting towards business­
like accrual accounting. These reform programmes in developing countries are normally 
a pre-condition of donor institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) for funding in the countries (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Uddin 
and Hopper, 2003; Tsamenyi et al., 2003).
3.2.2. Budgeting Systems in Public Sector
This sub-section examines two popular budgeting systems, which are line-item and 
activity-based budgeting (see Anthony and Young, 2003). These two systems were 
chosen based on their existence in the research sites.
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3.2.2.I. Line-Item Budgeting
Traditionally, non-profit and public sector organisations, including higher education 
institutions, have used line-item budgets to allocate resources (see Dean and Pugh, 
1989; Perrin, 1989; Drury, 1996). Dean and Pugh’s (1989) book discusses government 
budgeting in five developing countries - India, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Sri 
Lanka - and found that the first three countries used line-item budgeting years ago in 
their government budgeting systems. Dean and Pugh (1989) found that the use of line- 
item budgeting in less developed countries reflected some of these characteristics: 
stressing control rather than planned development, and money outlay rather than 
objectives; and it was expressed in terms of the things on which money was spent. They 
further argue that many governments or organisations use line-item budgets as an 
approach due to its simplicity and because it is less time consuming than the other 
available methods.
Perrin (1989) and Anthony and Young (2003) suggested that line-item budgeting is not 
descriptive because every budget simply provides one line of information for each kind 
of income and expenditure. This system occurs in an organisation when resources are 
allocated according to expenses elements such as categories of consumables (e.g. office 
supplies) and other running expenses (e.g. wages, fringe benefits, rent, travel expenses, 
and telephone expenses).4 Budget planning starts by using the organisation’s historical 
costs. The focus of the budgeting process is on the anticipated changes to last year’s 
figures because of inflation and the request for those new or expanded activities that the 
managers seek to pursue. In other words, Innes and Mitchell (1995) explained that line- 
item budgeting requires only small increases or decreases in the financial resources 
allocated. When line-item budgets are compared with the actual expenditures, line-item
4 For further explanation on line item budgeting, see Henley et al. (1989), Drury (1996), and Anthony and 
Young (2003).
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budgets provide a basis for comparing whether or not the authorised budgeted 
expenditure has been exceeded or whether under-spending has occurred. Note that data 
for the current year and for the previous year are included to indicate how the proposed 
budget differs from current spending patterns (Drury, 1996).
However, many studies (such as: Dean and Pugh, 1989; Perrin, 1989; Innes and 
Mitchell, 1995; Anthony and Young, 2003) pointed to the weaknesses of the traditional 
budgeting systems including line-item budgeting. Dean and Pugh (1989) argued that 
line-item budgeting failed to answer questions such as: (1) What are the government’s 
objectives for each subdivision of the budget? (2) How do different parts of the budget 
relate to each other and to the fulfilment of the government objectives? (3) How do the 
budgeted figures relate to longer-term plans? (4) What is government expecting to 
achieve with the budgeted money? (5) How does cost relate to expected achievement?
Hence, such line-item budgets fail to identify the costs of activities and the programmes 
to be implemented. In addition, compliance with line-item budgets provides no 
assurance that resources are used wisely, effectively or efficiently in financing the 
various activities in a non-profit organisation (Drury, 1996). Similarly, Anthony and 
Young (2003) criticise the use of line-item budgeting since it is particularly troublesome 
when top management seeks to identify inefficiencies and waste. Moreover, this 
budgeting system can encourage the practice of spending up to the budget in the last 
few months, to prevent future cuts.
3.2.2.2. Activity-Based Budgeting
Governments in many countries, including developing countries, are now trying to 
ascertain “what” and “how well” their public organizations and programmes are doing
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in providing services and products to their citizens (Dean and Pugh, 1989; Mardiasmo,
2003). Answering these questions will permit decision makers to make better choices. 
As has been discussed above, the line-item budgeting systems fail to do this. Hence, to 
answer the questions, governments are developing and implementing activity-based 
budgeting (ABB) for their units as one way of moving away from such a system (Innes 
and Mitchell, 1995; Babbini, 1999). An example of the use of ABB is seen in a 
phenomenon in the Indonesian public sector, which experiences a high demand for 
accountability (Mardiasmo, 2003). This demand was indicated by the programme of 
privatising State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), the conferral of autonomy by the 
Government upon regions in Indonesia, and the change of status of Public Universities 
into State-Owned Legal Boards (BHMN).
Activity-based budgeting is a technique that links the budgeting process to
organisational strategy and develops a budget based on activities and process,
particularly for those involved in creating value in the product or for the customer, 
rather than in functional areas (Connoly and Ashworth, 1994; McLemore, 1997; 
Babbini, 1999). Anthony and Young (2003) argued that the system focuses on 
programmes and programme elements that represent the activities for which the funds 
are to be spent. It starts by analysing the products or services to be produced, what 
activities are required to produce these products or services, and what resources need to 
be budgeted to perform these activities (Innes and Mitchell, 1995). In other words, 
McLemore (1997) argued that ABB focuses more on results (i.e. output) than on input 
(i.e. resources). Compared with traditional budgeting, including line-item budgeting, 
Babbini (1999) found that senior management have to face the rather more difficult task 
of making resource prioritisation decisions based on customer demand rather than 
starting with the existing budget to build a new budget.
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With the characteristics of ABB that have been explained above, many studies (such as 
Connolly and Ashworth, 1994; Anthony and Young, 2003) have revealed many benefits 
of the system, such as: firstly, effective implementation of the organisation’s business 
vision, strategy, objectives and plans which permit senior management to match 
spending with measures of each activity’s planned outputs; secondly, effective 
communication of objectives both ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ throughout the 
organisation; thirdly, the optimum allocation of scarce resources across the business 
consistent with the agreed objectives and plans; fourthly, a focus on continuous 
improvement initiatives and oii the things the organisation must do well if it is to be 
successful in achieving its future vision; and finally, a high degree of management 
commitment to achieve or manage against the agreed budget since the system permits a 
decision maker to judge the appropriate amount of resources for each activity.
McLemore (1997) argued that the above advantages can be achieved by adopting the 
activity-based budgeting tools along with implementing steps such as training and 
educating employees, analysing strategy, establishing planning guidelines, forecasting 
workload, proposing interdepartmental improvement, proposing activity improvement, 
selecting improvement options, and finalising the budget.
3.3. Research in the Higher Education Sector
3.3.1. External Environment of Universities in Less Developed Countries
Over the past decade in particular, a veritable wave of external environmental shocks
have been impacting on universities’ strategic focus, finance, and modus operandi in 
developed or developing countries (Lee, 2001; Mohamedbhai, 2002; Parker, 2002). 
Changes in the management control of public sector organisations for the last two
46
. -  -  ........................m x uuuv oecior urganisations
decades have also impacted on the activities of universities. Governments, especially in 
developing countries, are realising that they cannot finance the existing demand for 
higher education and have reduced their funding levels to the universities.
Mohamedbhai (2002) argued that the reluctance of governments to fund higher 
education was also influenced by the stand taken by some donor agencies that 
developing countries derive maximum economic benefits by channelling their funds 
into the primary and secondary education sectors rather than the higher education 
sector, leaving the latter eventually to fend for itself. He added that the economic 
situation in most less developed countries is such that the governments are unable to 
provide the additional funding required to further expand the public tertiary education 
sector. Both Mohamedbhai (2002) and Parker (2002) argued that universities in many 
Western countries have undergone a change in their strategic focus, core values and 
modus operandi as corporate entities that practise business principles such as quality 
management, quality and promoting revenue-generation by seizing the opportunity to 
capture the market in developing countries. Mohamedbhai (2002) further added that 
there are two main methods used to . achieve this market presence, which are firstly, 
delivery through their physical presence in the host country (e.g. by establishing a local 
branch or a satellite campus or by using a local partner), and secondly, delivery of the 
course with the provider remaining in their own (foreign) country to the students in the 
developing country (e.g. international distance education and e-leaming).
3.3.2. Reforms in Higher Education Institutions
Reform in higher education institutions has become an important issue and has been 
taking place worldwide (see Chapter One). There are several studies (such as: Watts, 
1996; Meek and Wood, 1998; Aijing, 1999; Crebert, 2000; Christiaens, 2001; Lee, 
2001; Parker, 2002; Ma, 2003) that have discussed reforms in higher education
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institutions. Christiaens (2001) examined an important accounting reform in Belgium 
universities mainly from a technical accounting practice point of view. Lee (2001) 
discussed the impacts of the recent higher education reforms on universities and the 
academic profession in Hong Kong and Singapore and the ways that the future 
development of the university sector is affected by these reforms and policy changes. 
Parker (2002) critically examined some of the dimensions of the major changes in scope 
of activities, structures, processes and relationships in Western universities, reflecting 
on the spectrum of environmental forces and internal resource pressures that have begun 
to transform many aspects of university governance core activities, stakeholder 
relationships and academic work. Ma (2003) discussed reform in Chinese universities, 
such as change of the institutions to become private institutions and the merger of 
institutions. In his study, Ma (2003) stated that many Chinese higher education 
researchers have observed that the Chinese higher education system has changed a great 
deal and many changes are shaped and reshaped by market needs.
Research concerning management and accounting systems change as an impact of 
university reforms within the Australian universities has been an important topic for the 
past few decades. There are many studies (such as: Watts, 1996; Meek and Wood, 1998; 
Crebert, 2000) in Western published journals that describe management and accounting 
practices in Australian universities after the Dawkins reforms in 1988. Meek and Wood 
(1998) stated that the Australian university reforms occurred as a result of criticisms 
about the management and governance in Australian higher education that focussed on 
the perceived inefficiencies of institutional structures, the apparent slow and 
cumbersome decision-making processes, and the lack of managerial competencies.
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Watts (1996) added to the above explanation that major changes in the Australian 
higher education context were preceded by a period of crisis that began in the 1980s and 
followed by mergers that were designed to increase efficiency. The literature review by 
Crebert (2000) concluded that reforms of the sector were also influenced by the 
government policy in 1981-1991 that forced the Australian universities to adopt the 
public service model that was characterised by the principles of economic rationalism, 
performance measurement, management training, programme evaluation, and public 
accountability.5 Watts’ (1996) arguments6 further contended that these government 
initiatives increased public accountability and reporting, together with the requirement 
that universities developed mission statements, strategic plans, equity plans, resource 
management plans, capital management plans and the strategic management of 
university resources and internally developed budgeting (p.56).
Meek and Wood (1998) and Crebert (2000) further argued that since the Dawkins 
reforms, the universities’ administration has moved towards highly centralised 
administrative structures. The structures are strongly hierarchical, allowing for little 
input from the lower levels to policy formulation or planning processes, even at the 
level of action planning. Further explanation of management and accounting system 
changes as an impact of reforms can be obtained from the explanation below.
Christiaens (2001) noted reforms in institutions from cash accounting to accrual 
accounting. The author presented a general view of the • empirical outcomes of the 
accounting reform from cash accounting to accrual accounting and its merits focusing 
on eight universities and their annual accounts. The focus is on the concept of the 
reformed academic accounting legislation and on the empirical outcomes of
5 For a more in-depth explanation, see p.73 o f the Crebert (2000) study.
6 Based on the studies o f Dawkins (1987) and Gallagher (1994)
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implementation based on an examination of annual accounts supplemented with 
interviews. An important issue is the mixing up of the traditional budgetary accounting 
system with the new financial accounting system, which is primarily transferred from 
business accounting. The empirical examination reveals that there are a lot of 
accounting problems in the area of the reformed regulations as well as in the accounting 
practices and that the comparability of the annual reporting is not guaranteed even after 
years of experience. Christiaens (2001) further revealed that the compliance with 
reformed regulations in the eight studied universities is rather poor. He found some 
contradictions with the accounting reforms. He argued that this finding has a lot to do 
with the lack of a conceptual accounting framework behind the reforms.
Aijing (1999) in his study argued that when the Chinese universities were still operating 
under the old system (before being reformed), all of the higher education institutions in 
the nation were controlled and managed by the government. All of the financial 
expenditure for higher education came from the government, making a very heavy 
financial demand on the government, which was usually unable to meet the needs of the 
individual universities. There were frequently contradictions between the government’s 
financial supply and the universities’ demand.
According to Ma (2003), the practice of merging universities led to some structural 
change within universities. He found that mergers brought change in the organisational 
structure from a two-level model (university and department) to a three-level model 
(university-college-department). There are now faculties or divisions, which mainly 
take care of some academic activities, but have no administrative power. Another 
change to the organisational structure is that the university administration has “macro­
level” control, such as setting up the policies and long-term developmental objectives of
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the university, while the colleges or schools perform the function of real academic 
administration. After the internal structural change, most of the universities are now in 
the process of curriculum reform to provide students with general education rather than 
specialised education, and such programmes are already under experimentation in some 
universities.
In the face of financial stringency, the limited resources provided by the governments in 
some countries forced the universities to become more prudent in spending public 
money and to avoid resource wastage (Lee, 2001; Parker, 2002). An example of a 
limited resource from government has been shown by Parker (2002), who stated that 
universities in Australia now earn up to 50% of their total revenue from non­
government sources. As a result, Lee (2001) found that the limited resources brought 
the researched universities to the idea of corporate enterprises in the business sector, 
which is entrepreneurialism. The universities have to search for other sources of income 
apart from government grants, such as social donations, corporate and industrial 
sponsorships, spin-off company profits, and tuitions fees from market-oriented 
programmes at sub-degree, undergraduate and postgraduate levels including 
international student recruitment (Lee, 2001; Parker, 2002).
Lee (2001) also found that university education reforms resulted in the managerial class 
in universities now being responsible for allocating financial resources by top-slicing 
and on-line budget approaches and for taking charge of quality reviews and staff 
appraisals, while faculty deans and department heads now have more discretionary 
powers to make decisions with regard to financial and personnel matters. He added that 
management by result and performance is now the norm for universities in most 
countries. The managerialisation of the universities in his study gives rise to the fact that
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everyone is held responsible for his or her achievement and outcome in terms of 
teaching, research and services. Rules and regulations are institutionalised to ensure that 
academics are working in line with the goals of transforming their universities into 
world-class higher education institutions.
The same statement has also been made by Parker (2002) in his study by concluding 
that in the universities, decision making has become more driven by senior executive 
command, strategic initiatives have been imposed upon faculties and divisions, and 
despite rhetoric to the contrary, revenue generation has been derived from school-level 
activity while a large proportion of resulting revenue inflows have been diverted to 
strategies, subunits and projects directly controlled by the senior executive. As a result, 
these executive leaders often become overwhelmed by their workload and disconnected 
from the academic and administrative community they supposedly lead.
Parker (2002) stated two different kinds of university management, different as the 
result of environmental changes. The first management style is traditional university 
management by layers of academic committees, which have problematical features such 
as slow decision making and prevarication, unclear lines of responsibility and 
accountability, resistance to change, and protection of strategic opportunities. The 
second is the transformation of the traditional system to become a professionalised 
managerial system of university governance, imported from the private sector, offering 
the prospect of a faster, more flexible decision-making process that could break through 
inherited and decaying university power structures and resource abuses. In the area of 
staff remuneration, Lee (2001) found that university reform brought a new remuneration 
system in the universities, consisting of a basic salary and other components that relate 
to performance, responsibilities and market value. For basic pay, there are no automatic
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annual increments, which are instead converted to performance-based increases. In 
addition, the universities also introduced a more rigorous system of performance 
assessment and evaluation.
3.3.3. Research in Management and Accounting in Universities
Research of management and accounting systems within the universities has been an
important topic for the past decade, as is shown by the growing number of studies in the 
topic area. For example, studies from Salancik and Pfeffer (1974, 1977), Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1974), Pfeffer and Moore (1980), Comway et al. (1994), Evans and Bellamy 
(1995), Watts (1996), Goodwin and Gouw (1997), Coy and Pratt (1998), Crebert 
(2000), Thomas (2000), Angluin and Scapens (2000), and Cullen et al. (2003) all 
provide several explanations of the management and accounting practices in the 
universities in some developed / Western countries (e.g. Australia, New Zealand, United 
Kingdom, and United States).7
A host of papers (for example see Evans and Bellamy, 1995; Meek and Wood, 1998; 
Crebert, 2000) have been written investigating management and accounting practice, 
primarily in Australian universities. Meek and Wood (1998) and Crebert (2000) 
discussed the impact of the university reforms of 1988 on the activities of Australian 
universities. Meek and Wood (1998) conducted a survey of the governance and 
management of all 36 Australian publicly-funded universities to determine what are 
considered to be the main issues and problems regarding the universities’ operation after 
the reforms from the perspective of senior managers.
7 Pfeffer and Salancik (1974); Salancik and Pfeffer (1974, 1977) and Pfeffer and Moore (1980) used 
quantitative research to discuss the topic, while Coy and Pratt (1998) used a case study.
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As explained by Meek and Wood (1998), in accordance with the regulations before the 
reforms took place, plans for the higher education sector were carried about by a 
number of federal and state commissions and boards. After the reforms, each Australian 
university has a new governing body that has more than 20 members8 and which has the 
legal powers and responsibility to manage the institution. Deans of faculty in particular 
are now considered very much a part of management and are usually appointed rather 
than elected (Meek and Wood, 1998).
Coy and Pratt (1998) explored the political influences on. annual reporting by the 
universities in New Zealand in the context of developing accountability. They report in 
their study that the universities have modified existing structures in order to satisfy 
these accountability and governance concerns to secure government finding and also to 
ensure that they continue to receive community support.
Meek and Wood (1998) found that the majority of executive officers believe that 
academic tenure prevents the university from setting new directions, whilst deans are 
about equally divided and most of the Heads of Department responded that tenure does 
little to constrain the setting of new directions. Other researchers (such as: Comway et 
al., 1994; Nelson et al., 1998; Crebert, 2000) have investigated the use of strategic 
planning in a higher education context. Comway et al. (1994) conducted exploratory 
research to discover the extent to which the new universities and colleges in the UK are 
aware of market orientation in their strategic planning processes. This study found that 
almost half of the higher education institutions implied a customer orientation in their
8 Meek and Wood (1998) considered the governing body, which is considerably larger than boards of 
directors o f corporations with budgets of comparable size. The members o f the governing body are: 
members nominated by government (usually in a minority); members elected by (i) a graduate body such 
as convocation, (ii) staff, academic and non academic, (iii) students, (iv) one or other or both Houses of  
Parliament; co-opted/elected by council/senate/board of Governors itself; and ex officio (for example, 
Vice-Chancellor, heads o f selected government departments, etc).
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planning. As a result, they concluded that many higher education institutions in the UK 
are not adequately prepared to respond to the increasingly competitive force in their 
environment. Hence, the authors of the study advised that the institutions would have 
successful strategies if they could understand the needs and wants of customers in the 
market in order to deliver the right goods and services effectively.
Cullen, et al. (2003) explore the potential use of the balance scorecard in higher 
education institutions. They construct a balance scorecard for a faculty of management 
and business at a mid-ranking UK university. They argued that even though the balance 
scorecard has a successful application within private and public sector organisations, it 
has rarely been applied in the university sector context.
Crebert (2000, see pp.73-76) conducted a small pilot study in Griffith University 
(Australia) to identify the academic view of the university’s plans that have been 
implemented since the university reforms. Some significant findings emerged from his 
study, which states that the university’s approach9 affected the articulation of plans and 
may have contributed to the reality that not all staff in the university were aware of the 
purpose of strategic planning in the university and hence, the strategic plans had little 
effect on aligning the strategic direction of the school. Moreover, Crebert (2000) also 
found that the heads of schools felt excluded from the production of the university’s 
vision and mission. He found that it is important for the plans at all levels to be 
cohesive, and communicated or articulated to make the plans effective.
Watts (1996) examined some of the changes in budgetary practices in Australian 
universities since the introduction of the university reforms in 1988. Coy and Pratt
9 Schools in the university were required to provide their business plans before they had developed their 
strategic plans, because of time constraints. In some cases, the business plans preceded both school and 
faculty strategic plans.
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(1998) used a case study from a university to provide an explanation of the relationship 
between political power and accountability in New Zealand’s universities. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1974); Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) studied the power of subunits in a large, 
Midwestern state university in the USA and described the university’s decision making 
as a political process and explored the use of power in the university’s organisational 
decision making.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1974); Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) found that subunits of a 
university have significant power over the university as a central administration to affect 
the organisational decision making and, particularly, resource allocations within 
organisations. This argument, that the subunits most able to cope with an organisation’s 
critical problems and uncertainties acquire power, is supported by Salancik and Pfeffer 
(1977). They also added that power is used by the ones who have it to enhance their 
own survival through control of scarce critical resources, placement of allies in key 
positions, and the definition of organisational problems and policies (p.4).
Pfeffer and Moore (1980) examined the determinants of power and budget allocations 
on two campuses of a large, American state university system and replicated the 
findings of Pfeffer and Salancik (1974). Thomas (2000) used experience from two UK 
universities to explore the implication of the use of formula-based systems for the 
power and influence of strong forces (e.g. key senior managers) within the institutions. 
His study demonstrates that micro-political activity and sub-unit power remain 
significant influences within devolved formula-based systems.
Salancik and Pfeffer (1974, 1977), Pfeffer and Moore (1980) and Coy and Pratt (1998) 
hypothesized that the power of the departments in their studied universities is highly
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correlated with the department’s ability to provide two important resources, which are
grants and contracts and student enrolment, that are critically needed by the institution.
Pfeffer and Moore (1980) further argued that another source of power is national
visibility and research reputation.10 With national prestige and reputation, the subunits
have an ability to obtain funds from outside grants and contracts, while the subunits
with heavy student demands for courses would be able to obtain funds from these
students.
The studies above agree that the powers the units have are the main determinants of a 
unit’s ability to attract or resist the institution’s decisions. For example, Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1974); Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) found that departmental power was related 
to budget allocations in a university. Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) argued that in pursuit 
of the relationship between power and resource allocation, subunit power accrues to 
those departments that are most instrumental in bringing in or providing resources 
which are highly valued by the total organisation.
Pfeffer and Moore (1980) examined the determinants of power and budget allocations 
on two campuses of a large state university system. They explained the importance of 
these resources - outside grants, contracts and student enrolment - for most state 
universities by noting that while grants and contracts have been used to support 
graduation educate and research programmes as well as for the overheads generated, 
student enrolment is an important resource because the university budget allocations are 
based at least partly on student enrolment. Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) concluded that 
the utilisation of subunit power in organisational decision making has been limited by 
internal interdependence among subunits and external constraints and contingencies.
10 Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) found no effect o f the national prestige o f departments on power.
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This argument has also been made by Salancik and Pfeffer (1977), that power is shared 
in an organisation because no one controls all of the desired activities in an 
organisation. Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) further argued that public universities have 
more external constraints than private universities and the newer or less prestigious 
universities have less power relative to external agencies (for example, government 
agencies as legislatures).
3.4. Chapter Summary
The literature review above found that public sector managers perceive little 
participation from the management in the budgeting process. Government has a greater 
influence in this respect through participation in the process. In the public sector in 
LDCs, budgets are enforced by headquarters and the state. The literature revealed that 
reforms in the public sector have moved the public sector institutions in many countries 
from line-item budgeting to activity-based budgeting. The literature also found that 
ABB has more advantages compared to the line-item budgeting.
The chapter looked at previous accounting research in many Western and LDC 
industries and the review of the literature noted that academics have not paid much 
attention to the management and accounting practices in higher education institutions in 
Western or LDC environments: there are only a small number of published papers in 
this field. As presented in Table 3.1, below, most of the studies were focused on 
Western influenced higher education institutions, such as in the United Kingdom, USA, 
Australia and New Zealand. The majority of them were conducted using quantitative 
research approaches such as a survey, which allows for the findings to be generalised. 
However, this approach does not permit an in-depth understanding of how and why 
particular issues exist. In contrast, unlike the majority of the studies that have been
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reported in this section, this thesis uses qualitative studies (e.g. case study) to investigate 
how and why the MCS were designed and operated in the two studied universities and
also to get a better understanding of the issues.
Author Research Method Country of Study
Salancik and Pfeffer (1974, 1977) Quantitative study USA
Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) Quantitative study USA
Pfeffer and Moore (1980) Quantitative study USA
Evans and Bellamy (1995) Qualitative study Australia
Watts (1996) Qualitative study Australia
Goodwin and Gouw (1997) Quantitative study New Zealand
Covalevski and Dirsmith (1988a) Qualitative Study USA
Coy and Pratt (1998) Qualitative study New Zealand
Meek and Wood (1998) Quantitative study Australia
Crebert (2000) Quantitative study Australia
Thomas (2000) Qualitative study UK
Angluin and Scapens (2000) Quantitative study UK
Table 3.1: Published papers in management and accounting practices in higher education institutions
As has been stated before, while most of the previous studies in this area were set in 
Australia, the UK, the USA or New Zealand, few were found to be conducted in less 
developed countries, especially Indonesia. The majority of the studies on management 
control systems in LDCs were also only focused on state-owned enterprises, family- 
owned businesses, and privatised companies (see Ansari and Bell, 1991; Hoque and 
Hopper, 1994; Hoque and Hopper, 1997; Alam, 1997; Rademakers, 1998; Uddin and 
Hopper, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2002; Hopper et al., 2003a, 2003b; Uddin and Hopper, 
2003). Hence, this study will contribute to the relatively small number of studies on the 
development of management accounting control systems in less developed countries, 
especially in higher education institutions in these countries. Further summary about 
some previous studies on management and accounting practices in higher education 
institutions can be found in Appendix 3.1. at the end of this thesis.
The next chapter provides an explanation of the theoretical framework used in this 
thesis to guide data collection and make sense of the research findings.
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1. Introduction
Chapter Three has provided the reader with a description of MCS in the public sector 
and more specifically the higher education sectors. This chapter discuss the theoretical 
framework used in this study. A theoretical framework is very important as a guide for 
research. This study draws on new institutional sociology / NIS (Powell and DiMaggio, 
1991) as a theoretical framework to explain management accounting change in the two 
Indonesian autonomous universities. NIS has been adopted in prior accounting studies 
(Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Oliver, 1991; Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Sherrer and 
Lee, 2002).
The aim of this chapter is to present the main theoretical assumptions underlying the 
study and the justifications for the choice of the theoretical framework. Following this 
introduction to the chapter, there are three further sections. The first section provides the 
rationale for the choice of institutional theory as the framework for this study. It 
highlights the differences between two of the major strands of thinking about 
organisations, which are contingency theory and institutional theory (Geiger and Ittner, 
1996). The second section introduces the theory used in this study, which is new 
institutional sociology (NIS). This section includes a discussion about institutional 
isomorphism, which consists of coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism.
It is followed by a discussion of the shortcomings of NIS. The discussion in this section
highlights two issues, which are firstly, the interplay between institutional forces and
power and actors' interest-based behaviour, and secondly, the interplay between new
institutional and market forces. The next section introduces the use of idioms of phrase
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in this study in order to drive the explanations of this study. The sixth section introduces 
the use of institutional theory in accounting research in general and management 
accounting control research in particular. This section gives a brief review of earlier 
accounting studies that adopted New Institutional Sociology (NIS). The final section 
provides a conclusion to the chapter.
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4.2. Justification for Using Institutional Theory
Two of the major strands of thinking about organisations are contingency theory and 
institutional theory (Geiger and Ittner, 1996). Geiger and Ittner (1996) claim that 
contingency and institutional theories can explain the design and use of cost accounting 
systems in government agencies.
A central principle underlying contingency theory is that there is no best type of 
organisational practice (including systems of management control) that can be effective 
for all organisations, which contrasts with other research domains within the field of 
management that have been devoted to uncovering organising principles that apply 
universally to all types of organisation (Otley, 1980; Alam, 1997; Young et al., 2001). 
Otley (1980, 1999) and Alam (1997), in the theoretical frameworks in their studies, 
contend that the design of an appropriate accounting and control system, in the view of 
contingency theory, is dependent on the specific circumstances or situations in which an 
organisation finds itself. In other words, according to contingency theory, managers 
should strive to achieve a fit or alignment among the key elements of their 
organisation’s operating environment and its internal design (Wang et al., 2004).
Moreover, the theory assumes that organisations generally are capable of adapting to 
changing environmental conditions: if an organisation encounters changes in key 
elements of its operating environment, the organisation will also need to change its 
internal design lest its performance suffer. As such, the theory views organisations as 
being highly rational entities capable of and willing to make internal changes to achieve 
a technical fit between environment and design in pursuit of optimal performance 
(Young et al., 2001).
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Contingency theory argues that the effectiveness of an organisation’s structure depends 
on a number of contingency factors, such as the impact of environmental complexity 
(e.g. price competition from competitors, availability of materials), the type of the 
organisation’s technology, the size of an organisation, the attributes of the 
organisation’s structure and its information systems, and the type of technology used 
within the organisational structure (Alam, 1997; Birkinshaw, 2002; Chenhall, 2003). 
According to some researchers (Otley, 1980; Young et al., 2001), contingency theory 
assumes that managers in organisations react rationally in response to organisational 
threats or changes, which means that the design of an organisation and its subsystems 
must “fit” with the environment. This theory ignores the fact that managers may act 
politically or pursue agendas which circumvent rational responses to the environment.
This study does not adopt contingency theory as a theoretical framework for several 
reasons. Contingency theory has an objectivist approach that ignores two issues that 
may be important for an understanding of organisations and the role of management 
accounting within them. Cooper (1981) divided the issues into two parts, which are: 
firstly, cognition, culture and symbols are important elements of organisational life; the 
second issue is that organisations may develop complex rationalities and rationalisations 
for their actions, especially when they are interacting with a rapidly changing 
environment (p. 193). In other words, contingency theory ignores how individuals 
influence the organisational strategy. Contingency also ignores the socio-political 
aspects of organisational life and the ways in which these impinge on organisational 
practices (Otley, 1978, 1980). Contingency theory sees management control systems as 
passive tools designed to assist a manager’s decision making, while institutional theory 
sees management control systems as more active (Chenhall, 2003). Weil and Olson
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(1989) argued that organisational research must bring in the perceptions and attitudes of 
stakeholders who shape organisational behaviour.
Bourgeois (1984) criticised contingency research for failing to lead to a clear causation 
between contingency factor and structure. He indicated that contingency theorists hold 
that strategy leads to structure but fail to consider reverse causation, i.e. that structure 
leads to strategy. Spekle (2001) also argued that contingency theory models tend to be 
partial in that they focus on elements of control systems, such as budgeting, rather than 
addressing the full set of control devices.
As has been shown in the preceding section, under contingency theory, system design 
(including management control systems) in an organisation is constrained by situational 
factors and depends on the ability of management to find the best fit. However, this is 
not applicable to the universities participating in this study because the universities in 
this study have adopted accounting systems, including management control systems, 
regulated by government and have no alternative other than these systems. This concept 
is supported by the work of Carpenter and Feroz (2001), who argued that in the public 
sector, where statutes often dictate the choice of accounting methods, interest- 
maximising accounting bureaucrats may not independently have the political influence 
or organisational power necessary to change the accounting practices of governmental 
entities. Moreover, these authors support the use of institutional theory as an important 
tool in explaining the choice of accounting systems, including MCS, in an organisation 
where self-interest maximising actors cannot exert effective influence over the choice of 
the systems because of their relative power positions in their organisations.
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Institutional theory adds the social and political aspects that are absent in contingency 
theory. Several studies (such as: Alam, 1997; Buchanan and Badham, 1999) have 
discussed the importance of politics in relation to the issue of change. This research 
highlights the key role politics can play in driving and shaping change processes. 
Institutional theory assumes that individuals are motivated to comply with external 
social pressures (Oliver, 1997).
In summary, because of the shortcomings of contingency theory that have been 
discussed above, it was not adopted in this research. This research adopts institutional 
theory as the theoretical framework because it offers a better explanation for 
understanding management control systems change in autonomous Indonesian 
universities. Bums and Scapens (2000) and Collier (2001) argued that the institutional 
theory framework is offered as a starting point for researchers interested in studying 
management accounting change.
4.3. Institutional Theory
Institutional theory argues that change occurs when organisations attempt to obtain 
stability and legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). According to Oliver (1997), 
institutional theory suggests that institutionalised activities are the result of interrelated 
processes that involve the individual, organisational, and inter-organisational levels. She 
argues that at the individual level, managers’ norms, habits, and unconscious conformity 
to traditions account for institutionalised activities11. At the organisation level, she 
argues that corporate culture, shared belief systems and political processes drive 
institutionalised structures and behaviours. Moreover, at the inter-organisational level, 
she identifies pressures emerging from government, industry alliances, and societal
11 Oliver’s (1997) conclusion is based on the work o f Berger and Luckmann (1967)
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expectations (for example: rules, norms, and standards about product quality, 
occupational safety, or environmental management) as defining socially acceptable firm 
conduct. Those social pressures common to all firms in the same sector cause firms to 
exhibit similar structures and activities12.
In recent years, there has been increasing interest in institutional theories within social 
science (Scott, 1995). Different schools of institutional theory have drawn on 
accounting in the literature, such as new institutional economics (Williamson, 1975), 
old institutional economics (Scapens, 1994; Bums and Scapens, 2000), and new 
institutional sociology (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; 
Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Hussain and Hoque, 2002). Brignall and Modell (2000) 
argued that institutional theories assume that a primary determinant of organisational 
structure is the pressure exerted by external and internal constituencies on the 
organisation to conform to a set of expectations to gain legitimacy and so secure access 
to vital resources and long-term survival.
The three schools of institutional theory identified above focus primarily on different 
issues. In old institutional economics (OIE), issues of influence, coalitions, and 
competing values were central, along with power and informal accountability structures 
(Scapens, 1994; Bums and Scapens, 2000). OIE does not accommodate extra- 
organisational (environmental) factors in its analysis. The main focus of new 
institutional economics, on the other hand, is on the issues of the making of optimal 
choices by organisational actors with a view to maximising the economic outcomes of 
their activities (Williamson, 1975). New institutional economics focuses primarily on 
micro-analytic questions (e.g. the comparative efficacy with which alternative generic
12 Oliver’s (1997) summary is based on the work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983)
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forms of govemance-market, hybrids and hierarchies economise on transaction costs) 
but it avoids the broader questions of origins and change in the institutional rules of the 
game: customers, laws, and politics (Williamson, 1991: 269). Old and new institutional 
economics are not adopted in this study because of their shortcomings identified above. 
Instead, new institutional sociology is adopted in this study because it is much broader, 
and is a multi-dimensional approach which focuses on issues of external and inter- 
organisational contexts (DiMaggio and Powell, 1993; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996).
4.3.1. New Institutional Sociology (NIS)
New institutional sociology (NIS) is particularly useful as it provides a very rich 
theoretical framework for analysing and understanding organisational change 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). 
NIS was chosen as the theoretical framework in this study based on evidence in prior 
research (such as Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Hussain and Hoque, 2000), which 
found it to be a useful theoretical framework for achieving a richer understanding of the 
phenomena being studied from its broader context. The theoretical framework adopted 
for the study is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
In NIS, legitimacy plays a central role as a force that constrains change and puts 
pressure on organisations to act alike (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Lawton et al. (2000) 
support the opinion of the importance of legitimacy in an organisation and argue that the 
organisation can fail if  it loses external legitimacy with key stakeholders, particularly 
resource providers. Hence, successful organisations are those that gain support and 
legitimacy by conforming to social pressures (Oliver, 1997).
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Figure 4.1.: Theoretical Framework
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Thus, practices in an organisation are adopted for reasons of legitimacy in the eyes of 
external institutional actors and not only for achieving production efficiency and 
effectiveness (Zucker, 1987; Alam, 1997). NIS focuses on the pressures and constraints 
of the institutional environment. Organisations experience pressure to adapt their 
structure and behaviour to be responsive to institutional environment demands and 
expectations in order to survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991).
Institutions themselves are defined as regulatory structures, governmental agencies, 
capital markets, laws, courts, professions, and public opinions (see DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Oliver 1991). According to Zucker (1977) and DiMaggio & Powell 
(1983), NIS focuses on the reproduction or imitation of organisational structures, 
activities, and routines in response to state pressures, the expectations of professions, or 
collective norms of the institutional environment. The desire of the organisation to look 
like and imitate others is to avoid a lack of credibility. Oliver (1991) argues that besides 
obtaining legitimacy, a change in an organisation is also motivated by the need to 
enhance a means of acceptance and survival.
Johnson (2000) and Ingram et al. (2002) argued that NIS can be used to help us to 
understand the process of organisation status change (for example, privatisation). They 
also argued that NIS is used to gain knowledge of how actors in the process of 
privatisation deal with the forces of institutional change at the level of sense making and 
action. Organisational choice is limited by a variety of external pressures, and 
organisations must be responsive to external demands and expectations in order to 
survive. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Meyer and Rowan (1991) both argued that to 
conform to external demands, organisations will adopt practices or structures that are 
poorly suited for the task that has been mandated by their environment. According to
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Powell (1991) and Newman (2000), the reason for this is because these external agents 
are the suppliers of key resources and it is more likely that organisations that adapt to 
the pressures in order to obtain scarce resources will have higher survival chances than 
those that do not.
Furthermore, Oliver (1997) suggested that under NIS, external social pressure (such as 
government regulation, public interest groups) reduces variation in firms’ structure and 
strategies. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) found that all strategic responses to resist 
institutional pressure for the adoption of an accounting system will ultimately fail 
because of the potency of the institutional pressure that results from the well-organised 
professional accounting and governmental institutional fields. The adaptation of an 
organisation to its institutional environment is called isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1991), which is discussed below.
4.3.1.1. Institutional Isomorphic Change
Organisations need to conform to institutional rules and norms to legitimise their
existence (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and
Powell (1983) identified two types of isomorphism, namely competitive and 
11institutional. Institutional isomorphism is caused by the need for the organisation to 
maintain institutional legitimacy, and political as well as market position (DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) in their study then identified three 
mechanisms through which institutional isomorphic change occurs, namely coercive, 
mimetic, and normative.
13 Most previous studies on NIS have tended to focus only on institutional isomorphism to the neglect o f  
competitive isomorphism. However this study also addresses issues around competitive isomorphism.
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Granlund and Lukka (1998) summarised studies from DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and 
Oliver (1991) and stated that institutional isomorphism is based on two core ideas, 
which are environments are collective and interconnected, and organisations must be 
responsive to external demands and expectations in order to survive. To summarise their 
study, Granlund and Lukka (1998) presented a table to illustrate the factors that drive 
changes in management accounting in an organisation (see Figure 4.2. below). The table 
below is very important in starting to draw the theoretical framework that is used in this 
thesis.
Economic Pressures
F a c t o r s  d r i v i n g  c o n v e r g e n c e :
o  G l o b a l  e c o n o m i c  f l u c t u a t i o n s / r e c e s s i o n s ,  d e r e g u l a t i o n s  o f  m a r k e t s  
o  I n c r e a s e d  c o m p e t i t i o n  ( t h e  g l o b a l i s a t i o n  o f  m a r k e t s )
o  A d v a n c e d  p r o d u c t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  ( e . g .  J I T )
o  A d v a n c e d  i n f o r m a t i o n  t e c h n o l o g y  ( e . g .  i n t e g r a t e d  s y s t e m s  s u c h  a s  S A P  R / 3 ,  A B C  S o f t w a r e  p a c k a g e s ,  
e x p e r t  s y s t e m s ,  I n t e r n e t ,  I n t r a n e t ,  E l e c t r o n i c  D a t a  I n t e r c h a n g e ,  L o c a l / W i d e  A r e a  N e t w o r k s ,  e t c . )
Coercive Pressure
F a c t o r s  d r i v i n g  c o n v e r g e n c e
o  T r a n s - n a t i o n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  ( e . g .  E u r o p e a n  U n i o n )
o  T r a n s - n a t i o n a l  t r a d e  a g r e e m e n t s  ( e . g .  G A T T / W T O ,  N A F T A ,  A P E C ,  E U )
o  H a r m o n i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a n c i a l  a c c o u n t i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n
o  T r a n s - n a t i o n a l s ’  ( e s p e c i a l l y  g l o b a l  f i r m s ’ )  i n f l u e n c e  o n  t h e i r  s u b s i d i a r i e s
o  H e a d q u a r t e r s ’ i n f l u e n c e  i n  g e n e r a l
F a c t o r s  d r i v i n g  d i v e r g e n c e  
o  N a t i o n a l  l e g i s l a t i o n
o  N a t i o n a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s /  r e g u l a t i o n  ( l a b o u r  u n i o n s ,  f i n a n c i a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s ,  e t c . )
Normative Pressures
F a c t o r s  d r i v i n g  c o n v e r g e n c e
o  M a n a g e m e n t  a c c o u n t a n t s ’  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s a t i o n  ( n e t w o r k i n g ,  e t c . )  
o  U n i v e r s i t y  r e s e a r c h  a n d  t e a c h i n g
F a c t o r s  d r i v i n g  d i v e r g e n c e  
o  N a t i o n a l  c u l t u r e s
o  C o r p o r a t e  c u l t u r e s
Mimetic Pressures
F a c t o r s  d r i v i n g  c o n v e r g e n c e
o  I m i t a t i o n  o f  l e a d i n g  c o m p a n i e s ’ p r a c t i c e  ( c f .  B e n c h m a r k i n g )
o  I n t e r n a t i o n a l / g l o b a l  c o n s u l t a n c y  i n d u s t r y
Taken from:
Granlund and Lukka (1998, p.153)
Table 4.2 : Drivers of Management Accounting Change
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Coercive Isomorphism
Coercive isomorphism involves pressures on organisations by external constituents. 
This is driven by two forces: pressures from the other organizations on which a focal 
organization is dependent externally, such as external resource providers including the 
state and the credit markets, and an organization's pressure to conform to the cultural 
expectations of the larger society -  to adopt new systems or practices (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988b; DiMaggio and Powell, 1988; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). According to 
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) and Oliver (1991), coercive isomorphism pressures are 
more common during periods of crisis and uncertainty because of influence from 
external resource providers.
Data from Lawton et al. (2000) showed that the most important source of force for the 
introduction of performance measurement systems in 74 UK public sector organisations 
was legislation or central government directives. There is a threat of punishment or the 
use of force by the headquarters / parent company if its foreign divisions / subsidiaries 
do not comply with standards of systems or practices used in the headquarters / parent 
company. A similar approach will also be used by the central government to make sure 
that state governments and their units adopt its standard of practice. Public sector 
organisations experience pressure to conform to government standards since violating 
them will mean losing their legitimacy and will therefore affect their ability to obtain 
resources and social support (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert, 1985). According to 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), budgeting is an example of coercive isomorphism that is 
often required by the central government for organisations to be eligible for continued 
funding. Political pressures from the central government have influenced the decision 
making and operation of the studied universities.
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Some accounting studies that adopted the new institutional perspective (such as: 
Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988a; Mezias, 1990; Covaleski et ah, 1993, 1996; Carpenter 
and Feroz, 2001) focussed on the impact of coercive isomorphism on shaping 
organisations’ accounting practices. For example, Covaleski et al. (1988a) described 
how the state government played a central role in the formulation of the University of 
Wisconsin System (UWS) accounting systems. While, Covaleski et al. (1993) found 
that pressure for the development of a case-mix accounting system in health-care 
organisations has been exerted by the U.S. Federal government, which is a major payer 
of health-care costs under the Medicare and Medicaid programmes. A further example 
of this kind of legitimation can be obtained from Carpenter and Feroz’s (2001) study, 
which observed that the early state adoption of GAAP in the USA stemmed from 
coercive isomorphism from the credit market. They added that in government entities, 
certain organisational practices have been applied, not because these practices are the 
rational way to manage the institutions, but because they are the socially accepted 
method of the proper way to manage it. In addition, in government entities, Carpenter 
and Feroz (2001) also contend that a government dictates accounting practices in its 
entities because the government imprints such practices as the only acceptable methods 
and hence excludes the use of other, alternative methods of accounting.
The theoretical framework of this study draws on the interplay between an organisation 
and its environment, including the other organizations on which a focal organization is 
dependent (e.g. government bodies). It has been argued by many researchers (such as: 
Brignall and Modell, 2000; Dacin et al., 2002) that organisations or managers have the 
ability to influence the regulatory environment and the process of institutionalisation 
through interaction with the institutional environment.
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Mimetic Isomorphism
The second mechanism that encourages similarity has been labelled mimetic 
isomorphism. Mimetic isomorphism is a response to organisational uncertainty in 
identifying the best course of action (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). The concept of 
mimetic isomorphism is imitating another organisation in the field that is considered to 
be successful. As legitimacy has a central role in NIS, this isomorphic change would 
occur when an organisation models itself on similar organisations in its field that it 
perceives to be more legitimate or successful (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, p. 152). In 
other words, many organisations may change their strategies, structures and procedures 
because other successful firms in their industry are doing so and being successful. This 
imitation is used to enhance the legitimacy of means utilised in an organisation, even 
though there may not be concrete evidence that adoption of such procedures enhances 
efficiency or effectiveness (Meyer, 1986; Covaleski et al., 1993). Concern over 
legitimacy thus forces organisations to look alike (homogenous) and not be different, by 
choosing to select and implement systems used by the most prestigious, visible 
members of an industry to gain legitimacy, reduce uncertainty, minimise risk, and 
ensure survival.
Normative Isomorphism
The third and final mechanism of institutional isomorphism is known as normative 
isomorphism. Normative isomorphism is associated with professionalisation and 
national and corporate cultures (see also Granlund and Lukka, 1998). DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) and Mizruchi and Fein (1999) contend that professionalisation as the 
main idea of normative isomorphism involves two processes, namely that members of 
professions receive education from educational institutions, which leads them to similar 
views, and that members of professions interact through professional associations,
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which further diffuses ideas among them. Organisational changes are much more likely 
to have an influence when they are supported by both national and worldwide 
professional associations (Meyer and Scott, 1982).
According to Meyer and Scott (1982) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), this normative 
isomorphic pressure for change in an organisation occurs when an organisation seeks 
institutional legitimacy. Granlund and Lukka (1998) added that this institutional 
legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organisation and is derived 
from the wider institutional environment. Innovations linked to cultural authority are 
more likely to have an influence and be easier to implement than innovations which lack 
institutionalised legitimacy.
The study by Carpenter and Feroz (2001) of four state governments in the United State 
of America (USA) offers a good example of the influence of professional associations 
as a pressure for change in an organisation. They found that professional associations, 
such as the Government Finance Officers Association (GFOA), influence state 
governments in the USA to promote specific financial management practices. The 
association indicates that the non-use of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP) in financial reporting by government would be considered a negative factor in 
the credit-rating process. Standard and Poors lowered the state’s credit rating on general 
obligation bonds because the state’s financial reporting was not provided with sufficient 
information to rate bonds.
In addition of that, Granlund and Lukka (1998) suggest that in the context of normative 
pressure, national and organisational cultures have been seen as perhaps the most 
important drivers regarding management accounting practices. The discussion of the
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impact of culture in Indonesia in this thesis is in accordance with the reality that, as has 
also happened in other Asian countries, Indonesia has a strongly influential culture that 
has always been a principle underlying the performance of the day-to-day activities of 
the people in the country (Dean, 2001).
In summary, coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphism help explain the influence 
of the external environment on the use of management control systems and enhance the 
similarity of systems across organisations. The study by Carpenter and Feroz (2001) 
provides an example of this comment: at the end of their study, they predicted that all 
state governments in the USA would eventually bow to institutional pressure for change 
and adopt GAAP for external financial reporting. Because of institutional pressure, 
organisations tend to adopt the same practices. This statement has been supported by 
Oliver (1997) that based on her review of many institutional studies, she concluded that 
“organisations in the same environment or industry tend toward similarity over time 
because they conform to many common influences and are interpenetrated by 
relationships that diffuse common knowledge and understandings” (p.706).
Finally, it could be suggested that it is possible to draw on only one or two dimensions 
of the isomorphism. This opinion is supported by a literature survey from Mizruchi and 
Fein (1999), which revealed that over 75% of studies using the new institutional 
sociology that were published in major American journals have focused on only one 
aspect of isomorphism.
4.4. Shortcomings of New Institutional Sociology (NIS)
This section discusses criticisms of NIS. Despite its strengths in organisational analysis, 
there are some limitations to the use of NIS: these limitations have been addressed by
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many researchers, such as Powell (1985), Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988), Oliver
(1991), Greenwood and Hinnings (1996), Collier (2001), and Kostova and Kendall 
(2002). Two major limitations relating to the issues of power and competitive pressure 
are discussed here.
NIS has been criticised for only giving minimal attention to the role of power and 
agency in shaping action, and a lack of discussing the conflicts that appear as a result of 
relations of power (see Powell, 1985; Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; DiMaggio, 1988; 
Fligstein, 1996; Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; Collier, 2001; Kostova and Kendall, 
2002). In other words, NIS fails to provide a theory as to how these competing interests 
can be accommodated or reconciled by management. In relation to this, the theory has 
been argued by Greenwood and Hinnings (1996) to be weak in analysing the internal 
dynamics of organisational change, meaning that it is silent on why some organisations 
adopt radical change whereas others do not, despite experiencing the same institutional 
pressures (p. 1023).
In addition, since NIS was originally based on research concerning organisations in 
non-competitive environments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), the theory fails to pay 
much attention to competitive isomorphism. Competitive isomorphism has been argued 
by Mizruchi and Fein (1999) and Carpenter and Feroz (2001) to relate primarily to 
fields in which free and open competition exist. Even though the two studied 
organisations are not-for-profit organisations, they are located in an environment in 
which some form of free and open competition exists.
Both limitations identified above are addressed in this thesis. Thus, this study examines 
the interplay between institutional forces, market forces, and power relations in shaping
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MCS in the universities studied. The next sub-section explains the issues of power, 
agency and competitive forces in an organisation.
4.4.1. Interplay Between Institutional Forces and Intra-Organisation al Power 
Relations
The use of NIS for this study is based on an argument from Collier (2001) that an NIS 
perspective enables a consideration of relations of power as they affect the organisation. 
Some previous studies have used institutional isomorphism and power in order to 
discuss changes in the organisation’s systems (see Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; 
Abernathy and Chua, 1996; Collier, 2001, Modell, 2002). However, they argued that the 
notion of power in NIS - based accounting research is under-explored.
Power has the potential to be oppressive or to enable an organisation to adapt to its 
environment (or its problem) and also facilitates management reforms in an organisation 
(Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977). As has been discussed above, NIS has been criticised for 
its failure to sufficiently address the relations of power of different institutional actors, 
and the conflict which can result from the relations of power (Collier, 2001). Pfeffer
(1992) defined power as the ability to change behaviour through politics and influence. 
As a consequence, Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) and Pfeffer (1992) argued that those who 
have power have the ability to bring about the outcomes they desire and overcome 
resistance. One of the most important studies in understanding power is the study of 
Hardy (1996), which discusses the use of power in the strategy-making process. She 
defines power as a force that affects outcomes, while politics is power in action. She 
explained that power has the ability to make others do what an individual or 
organisation wants, sometimes against their will. Power continuously evolves through 
social and political exchanges. Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) noted that power in social
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systems could be vertical or horizontal and may be interpersonal or involve relations 
between organisational units.
Hence, by using the definition above, intra-organisational power relationships could 
imply conflicting self-interests among actors in an organisation. The conflictual nature 
of power has been evident in the accounting literature for some time (see previous 
studies, such as Cooper et al., 1981; Hopper et al., 1987; Greenwood and Hinnings, 
1996). As Markus and Pfeffer (1983) found, it is common to find resistance to issues of 
power in the accounting control systems of an organisation. The reluctance to change 
itself has been argued by Oliver (1992, 1997) and Eisendhardt (1988) to occur because 
individuals find it difficult to alter entrenched organisational forces of habits, history 
and routines/traditions that have become the standard of doing things in the 
organisations; because change to less familiar practices precipitates fear or uncertainty; 
or because the replacement of traditional practices with new ones may be perceived as 
socially unjustifiable or disloyal to an organisation’s norms and values.
The ability of internal actors to resist the implementation of new practices can be 
expected when they can mobilise and sustain resources and cultural and political 
support within the organisation to attain sufficient power for this purpose (see Covaleski 
and Dirsmith, 1988a, 1988b; Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996; Oliver, 1997; Modell, 
2002). Collier (2001) also found that resistance also emanates from cultural elements 
within the organisation. In Collier's (2001) study, the culture emanates from the police’s 
occupational culture that was seen as relevant to operational policing and consistent 
with the crime fighting, law enforcement ethos. Pfeffer and Leong (1977) studied a 
confederation of independent social service agencies, the United Fund, to investigate the 
effects of power and dependence on resource allocation decisions. They described the
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relationship between the agencies and the Fund by stating that there was a relative 
dependency of the agencies on the Fund and the Fund on the agencies. The individual 
agency’s power within the United Fund originated from the importance of the agencies 
for the Fund and the agencies ability to articulate a credible threat of withdrawal. They 
further argued that the ability to threaten this came from the agency’s ability to raise 
funds on its own outside of the Fund.
In contrast with the explanation above, Giddens (1976) emphasised that power does not 
necessarily imply conflict in circumstances where the interests of different groups 
coincide. In other words, conflict only occurs when those interests do not coincide. 
Therefore, in adopting Giddens’ view, power has the potential to have a positive 
influence if the actors’ interests coincide. Giddens’ (1976) view has been supported by 
Collier (2001), who adopted NIS to show the effects of power that is not conflictual but 
contingent.
From the discussion above, it can be concluded that institutional change is not only seen 
as arising out of pressures from an organisation’s external environment but also from 
the actions and interpretations of organisational actors. Any discussion of the interaction 
between the institutional environment and organisations needs to be located amidst 
relations of power. A similar argument has been made by Bums (2000), that discussion 
of power helps to explain the “why” and “how” of the process of accounting change in 
an organisation and also highlights unforeseen problems encountered in the change 
process (p.587). Power is one of the most important factors in organisational accounting 
system changes, since the influence of power from an individual or group will have two 
different impacts on organisational changes. Bums (2000) argued that while power can 
provide the energy for implementing accounting change which serves a particular
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interest, it could also work fundamentally against such change. This is consistent with 
Collier’s (2001) conclusion that power has both negative and positive influences. Power 
could be seen as negative since it may create resistance and conflict where interests do 
not coincide; conversely, power could be seen as having a positive influence when it is 
not conflictual and enables interests to coincide. Collier (2001) concluded that NIS 
needs to be more open to the relations of power and their effect on the institution- 
organisation interface.
In this study, power and leadership are important as Indonesian society (that based on 
Javanese culture) is strongly patrician and hierarchical, with what appear to be great 
power distances between each level within a social structure (Dean, 2001). Subordinates 
are expected to respect those in authority and are not allowed to question such an 
authority. Status is strictly defined by obligations and responsibilities, which tend to 
limit movement within the network. As Dean (2001, p.4) points out: “It will be very 
uncommon indeed for a person lower in the network to overtake their patron in terms o f  
rank or income
On the other hand, sub-unit power is also an important issue to be examined in this 
study because intra-organisation relationships play a significant role in the day-to-day 
activities of a university or other organisations (Pfeffer and Salancik 1974; Salancik and 
Pfeffer, 1974; Pfeffer and Leong, 1977; Pfeffer and Moore, 1980). The previous chapter 
provided evidence that decisions in some organisations are made on the basis of subunit 
power.
Hardy (1996) presents a model for understanding the source of power in four 
dimensions, which are the power of the resources, processes, meaning, and system (see
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Table 4.3. below). The dimensions provide a framework to describe the power of each 
individual/unit in the studied organisation. Hence, it is important to explain Hardy’s 
four dimensions of power because the dimensions will be used in this thesis to analyse 
the source of the power of an individual/unit in the studied organisation.
Table 4.3 : Four Dimension of Power
Power o f  resources Power o f  Processes Power o f  Meaning Power o f  the system
Source 
o f  Power
Action o f  
Power
Limits to 
Power
Ability to hire and fire, 
rewards, punishments, 
funding, authority, 
expertise, etc.
Principles o f  behaviour 
modification are used to 
influence specific actions
Continual use o f  ‘carrot’ or 
‘stick’ is required to ensure 
continued change; repeated 
use o f  the ‘stick’ may be 
counter-productive.
Decision-making 
processes, participants and 
agendas, etc.
New awareness is created 
by opening up processes to 
new participants, issues 
and agendas 
New awareness helps 
sustain new behaviour as 
long as it remains within 
existing values and norms.
Symbols, rituals, language, 
etc.
Change is given new 
meaning, making it appear 
legitimate, desirable, 
rational or inevitable 
Change in some 
underlying values and 
norms may be possible but 
specific changes in 
behaviour will be difficult 
to effect.
Values, traditions, 
cultures and structures 
o f  the institutions
Source: Hardy (1996)
The first dimension of power from Hardy’s model is the power of resources, where 
actors deploy the key resources on which others depend (such as information, expertise, 
political access, credibility, stature and prestige, access to higher echelon members, 
control of money, rewards and sanctions) to influence decision outcomes. In other 
words, Mizruchi and Fein (1999) explained that organisations are constrained by those 
on whom they depend for resources. If an organisation is highly dependent on another 
organisation for an important resource, that other organisation will have power over the 
first organisation. Maximum power in an organisation occurs when an organisation has 
unfettered discretion over a resource of high importance to another organisation, for 
which there are no alternative sources.
Second, the power of decision-making processes is where dominant groups influence 
subordinates and prevent them from participating fully in decision-making processes. 
The dominant actors can participate from behind the scenes. The third dimension of
power is the power of meaning, which is related to the influence of an actor’s 
perceptions, cognitions and preferences so that individuals accept and/or reject the 
status quo. This type of power lies in the acceptance of the values, traditions, cultures 
and structures of an organisation that influence all organisation members. This power is 
the backdrop against which all organisational actions and decisions take place. Culture 
itself has been defined by Collier (2001, p.468) as a set o f shared key values and beliefs 
that convey a sense o f identity, generate commitment, enhance social system stability, 
and serve as a sense-making device to guide and shape behaviour.
4.4.2. Interplay Between Institutional and Competitive Forces
A second limitation in the NIS is the interplay between institutional and competitive
forces. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Tolbert and Zucker (1983) suggested that 
there are two forces, which are institutional and competitive isomorphism. Competitive 
isomorphism relates primarily to fields in which free and open competition exists 
(Mizruchi and Fein, 1999; Carpenter and Feroz, 2001).
Previous management studies (such as Oliver, 1991, 1997) recognised the 
contradictions between competitive and institutional pressures. Oliver (1991) noted, for 
example, that market imperfections increase variations in organisations’ resources and 
resource strategies to secure their competitiveness, while external social pressures (e.g. 
government regulations and public interest groups) cause organisations to become 
similar to others in structure and strategy so as to secure their legitimacy.
Oliver (1991), Fligstein (1996), Kraatz and Zajac (1996), Hoque and Hopper (1997), 
D’Aunno et al. (2000), Gary et al. (2000), and Sherer and Lee (2002) have all 
emphasised how important it is for researchers to incorporate both market forces and
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institutional factors into organisational activities, since actors’ choice in an organisation
also depend upon market structure in the environment. This point has also been
supported by Hoque and Hopper (1997), who argued that it is particularly relevant for
analysing organisations that are confronted with uncertainties and, as a result, compete
for market position. Sherrer and Lee (2002, p. 104) explained the relationship between
institutional and competitive forces:
“Without legitimacy, organisations will not be able to achieve initial and 
early change. Institutional theory speaks to how institutional forces enable 
initial innovation and early adoption o f  change. However, without 
competitive forces, organisations will not need to change. Both forces thus 
play o ff each other. ”
Evidence from researchers such as Kraatz and Zajac (1996), Hoque and Hopper (1997), 
and Gary et al. (2000) have identified the influence of market forces on organisations’ 
activities. Kraatz and Zajac (1996) found that local market forces (e.g. consumer 
demand) prompted divergent changes in curricula among U.S. liberal arts colleges (e.g. 
offering business degrees). Hoque and Hopper (1997) demonstrated that there is a 
strong and consistent relationship between high market competition and managers 
attaching more importance to budget-related activities. Gary et al. (2000) used 
institutional theory to examine factors associated with the board's adoption of a formal 
process for evaluating the performance of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and 
found that competitive forces were one of the significant predictors of whether or not 
the board had adopted a form of evaluation for the CEO. Finally, Sherer and Lee (2002) 
gave an example of the relation between institutional and competitive forces by arguing 
that innovation in human resource practice in the principal offices of large law firms 
was motivated by competitive pressures having to do with human resource scarcities 
and enabled by institutional forces having to do with the legitimacy of highly 
prestigious law firm offices.
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As can be seen in Figure 4.1, which shows the theoretical framework informing the 
study, market forces are interconnected with power. Fligstein (1996) explained this 
relationship, saying, “the internal power struggle is about who will control the 
organisation, how it will be organised, and how situations will be analysed and 
responded to. The winners of the internal power struggle will be those with a 
compelling vision of how to make the firm work internally and how to interact with the 
competitors”.
However, market forces were not originally of any great concern in NIS (see DiMaggio 
and Powell, 1983). Hence, market force is supplemented here to explain the choice of 
the studied organisations to adopt a system(s), and also to show how the interplay 
between institutional isomorphism and market forces impinges on management 
accounting systems. Many previous studies have discussed the interplay between 
institutional isomorphism and market forces in NIS more generally (see Oliver, 1991; 
Powell, 1991; D’Aunno et al., 2000; Gary et al., 2000) as well as in the accounting 
literature (such as Hoque and Hopper, 1997; Brignall and Modell, 2000; Hussain and 
Hoques, 2002; Modell, 2002;).
Figure 4.1 presents the theoretical framework showing the integration of institutional 
and market forces. As shown in Figure 4.1, in the theoretical framework of this study 
there are inter-connections between the institutional environment and market forces. For 
example, states as a market regulator and markets are intimately interconnected.
4.5. Institutional Theory in Management and Accounting Studies
Management accounting change has been conceptualised as change in organisational
rules and routines (Bums and Scapens, 2000). Bums and Scapens (2000) concluded that
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since management accounting systems and practices constitute organisational rules and 
routines, a management accounting researcher has to recognise the institutional 
character in order to understand the complex processes (both conceptually and 
practically) of management accounting change.
Accounting systems, including management accounting systems, in an organisation 
could be construed as being shaped by organisational actors and the wider institutional c 
environment. Hence, Bums and Scapens (2000) argued that management accounting 
change requires a thorough understanding of the current context of the organisation and 
also requires an understanding of the habits of organisational members and the 
underpinning assumptions which are taken for granted in day-to-day activity. In other 
words, a researcher should understand management accounting change in terms of the 
behaviour of individuals and groups within the organisation. Based on this, several 
studies have adopted new institutional theory for understanding accounting control 
systems in organisations.
Accounting systems change in general and management accounting control system 
change in particular has become a topic of much debate in recent years. Generally, 
much accounting research has supported the use of an institutional perspective 
(Covaleski et al., 1993; Hussain and Hoque, 2002; Tsamenyi et al., 2004). Institutional 
theory has been adopted to provide a much broader understanding of accounting choices 
and behaviour (Scapens, 1994; Bums and Scapens, 2000): it can also be used to explain 
changes in an organisation because of the pressures and constraints of the institutional 
environment (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991).
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Institutional theory is potentially valuable in helping one to describe why an 
organisation changes and how the process of change operates. The theory can also lead 
us to a better understanding of the process of management accounting change. Because 
of this, in recent years there have been several accounting researchers, such as 
Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988), Mezias (1994), Granlund and Lukka (1998), Brignall 
and Modell (2000), Bums and Scapens (2001), Carpenter and Feroz (2001), Collier 
(2001), Granlund (2001), Modell (2001), Hussain and Hoque (2002), and Tsamenyi et 
al. (2004) who have used institutional theory as a framework for explaining the change 
of accounting systems, which includes management control systems, in both the public 
and private sectors in many countries. In addition, Covaleski et al. (1996) provided a 
review of management accounting studies that applied institutional theory to inform 
their analysis.
Institutional theory provides explanations for changes in organisational practices 
including accounting practices, referred to as institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Covaleski and Dirsmith (1988) used institutional theory to provide a 
convenient point to begin studying the University of Wisconsin’s budgetary relationship 
with the state. Bums and Scapens (2000) used institutional theory to examine 
management accounting change and argued that management accounting is shaped by 
and shapes the organisation's institutions. Carpenter and Feroz (2001) used new 
institutional theory to explore how institutional pressure exerted on four US state 
governments influenced the decision of these governments to adopt or resist the use of 
GAAP for external financial reporting.
Hussain and Hoque (2002) used new institutional theory to understand and explain what 
factors affected the design and use of non-financial performance measurement systems
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in four Japanese banks. Granlund and Lukka (1998) used institutional theory to identify 
and analyse forces that seem to be causing convergence in management accounting 
practices around the world. Tsamenyi et al. (2004) explored the changes in the cash 
management information system of a large Spanish Electricity Company (Sevillana). 
They concluded that the institutionalisation of the new accounting and financial 
information system was shaped externally by the political and regulatory environment, 
and internally by the parent company’s control, and the influence of professional 
associations. Collier (2001) applied institutional theory to understand the context, 
process and consequences of the introduction of new management accounting systems 
to a police force institution in the West Mercia Constabulary in the UK.
In summary, even though this has study found that there are many scholars who have 
used institutional theory as a framework for explaining the change of accounting 
systems, which includes management control systems, in both the public and private 
sectors in many countries, this study did not find institutional theory used as a 
framework to explain accounting systems in a university in LDCs. Further summary 
about some previous studies on management and accounting practices that used 
institutional theory can be found in Appendix 4.1. at the end of this thesis.
4.6. Chapter Summary
This chapter has argued that while technical (or contingent) explanations of cost 
management have not been rejected by researchers, they are clearly viewed as 
incomplete (Scott, 1987). Institutional theory adds social and political elements, and 
thus broadens the scope of our investigation, increases understanding of the topic of this 
study and improves the intelligibility and logic of the attempts to explain the changes of 
management accounting control practice in the organisations. Hence, institutional
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theory has been used here as the framework for explaining the MCS change in the 
organisations.
The arguments presented above are for institutional change to be examined in 
cognisance of competitive forces and power relations. There are three mechanisms 
through which institutional isomorphic change occurs, each with its own antecedents: 
firstly, coercive isomorphism, which stems from political influence and the problem of
legitimacy, including industrial relationships, government bodies, law and regulations;
>secondly, mimetic isomorphism is a response to organisational uncertainty in 
identifying the best course of action; thirdly, normative isomorphism, associated with 
professionalisation, the organisations and national culture. Although this scarcity of 
individual factors motivates an organisation to change, the integration of these 
isomorphisms increases the likelihood of change.
Factors identified as increasing the potency of institutional pressure include: fiscal stress 
and the need to access the credit market; support of key appointed and/or elected 
officials; organisational politics and the potential to alter power relations; participation 
of key accounting bureaucrats in professional accounting organisations; and change in 
elected leadership.
The discussion in this chapter concludes that NIS suggests that an organisation will 
adapt their management practices, which include governance structures and 
management accounting control, to gain legitimacy and to ensure their survival. 
Management control systems could therefore be construed as being shaped by 
organisational actors and the wider institutional environment.
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In summary, the NIS therefore provides a much broader theoretical framework for 
analysing the influence of both exogenous and endogenous factors on an organisation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Hussain and Hoque, 
2000; Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). This chapter looked at previous institutional 
management and accounting research and noted that very little institutional accounting 
research focuses on the education institutions, especially in LDCs (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith, 1988).
Finally, from the discussion above, we can see that most of the studies on organisational 
change that have applied NIS have focused on one organisation only, with few 
exceptions (for example, Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988; Abernathy and Chua, 1996). 
This study applies NIS to two organisations, and would contribute further knowledge to 
this neglected area. Integrating the arguments from institutional and competitive 
isomorphism with power issues contributes to further understanding and predicting the 
sources of institutional change.
This explanation will be continued with a description of the Indonesian environment in 
the next chapter.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
INDONESIAN ENVIRONMENT
5.1. Introduction
This chapter presents a description of the Indonesian environment (including economic, 
political and social issues). This chapter is necessary to lay the foundations for 
investigating how the external environment influences the management accounting 
control practice in the two studied universities.
This chapter is organised into six parts. After introduction part, part two describes the 
Indonesian geography and population. It is followed by description of Indonesian legal 
systems. Part four examines Indonesian culture, while part five describe the labour force 
in Indonesia. Finally, the final part provides a summary of the chapter.
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5.2. Geography and Population
Indonesia has a long history. During the 17th century, Indonesia came under the control 
of the Netherlands, except for East Timor, which remained under the control of Portugal 
until 1975. The Indonesian economy is still underdeveloped, and is smaller and weaker 
compared with that of other countries, because Indonesia was the victim of 350 years of 
marauding by Dutch, Portuguese and other Western colonial rulers, and also the 
Japanese (Jakarta Post, 2002). In the early 20th century, an independence movement 
began in Indonesia and continued with a proclamation by Sukarno and Hatta to establish 
the Republic of Indonesia. In 1950, Indonesia became a member of United Nations.
The name Indonesia was derived from the Greek name "indos nesos", meaning islands 
near India. The country is the world’s largest archipelago, with 6 major and more than 
17,500 minor islands14 spreading more than 3,000 miles from East to West. The 
archipelago is at a crossroads between two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian, and 
bridges two continents, Asia and Australia. Its geographic coordinates stretch from 6° 
08’ north to 11° 15’ south latitude, and 94° 45’ to 141° 05’ east longitude.15 The 
Indonesian sea area is four times greater than its land area, which is about 1.9 million 
sq-km; the sea area is about 7.9 million sq-km (including the exclusive economic zone), 
constituting about 81% of the total area of the country.16 This strategic position has 
always influenced the cultural, social, political, and economic life of the country.
Five main islands and 30 smaller island clusters are the homelands for most 
Indonesians. These main islands include Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Irian Jaya, and 
Java. Java accounts for only 6.9% of the landmass of Indonesia and is the home of over 
70% of Indonesia’s total population (CIA, 2003). Hence, Javanese culture is the most
14 About six thousand are inhabited
15 http:/Avww. indonesianembassv.ors. ukJindonesia profiles.htmlttzeozraphy
16 httv://\v\v\v.indonesianembassv. 0r2.uk/ind0nesia pro files, htmlttgeosraphy
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influential culture in Indonesia. In terms of administrative divisions in Indonesia, there 
are 27 provinces, 2 special regions, and 1 special capital city district17. The capital and 
centre of the country has always been Jakarta in the North-western tip of Java.
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) data remarked that the Human 
Development Index (HDI) in Indonesia in 2002 was 110th out of 120 countries, which 
reflects that the quality of our nation is poor in terms of income, relatively low in terms 
of education, and not hygienic in terms of health. Due to separation by the sea, some of 
the Indonesian inhabitants have lost contact with the others and have individually 
developed their own cultures and languages. The islands, therefore, have diverse ethnic 
groups, even though they have similar ancestors. Some are highly civilised, such as 
thosie who live in Sumatra, Java, and Bali, and some still live primitively, for example, 
isolated tribes in Irian Jaya. Today, about 366 ethnic groups with 35 language families 
and 200 dialects live together in Indonesia. However, one national language, which is 
commonly known as Bahasa Indonesian, has been used to bind together the whole 
country. Since Indonesia has an extremely diverse population and culture, Bhineka 
Tunggal Ika, or Unity in Diversity, has been used as the motto of the Republic of 
Indonesia.
5.3. Indonesian Legal Systems
Indonesia is a republic based on the 1945 Constitution. The Constitution serves as the 
supreme law and sets forth the basic state ideology in five fundamental principles 
(Pancasila). Every Indonesian, organisation and form of business should respect the 
sacred values of Pancasila as a cultural principle because it is the ideology of the state
17 see http://www.cia.gOv/cia/publications/factbook/geos/id.html#Govt
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and the life philosophy of the Indonesian people18. In brief, and in the order given in the 
Constitution, the Pancasila principles are:
1. Belief in the one supreme God;
2. Just and civilised humanity;
3. Nationalism expressed in the unity of Indonesia;
4. Democracy led by the wisdom of deliberations among representatives;
5. Social justice for the whole of the Indonesian people
After the 1945 Constitution, there is a hierarchy of laws, listed here in the order of their 
level of authority:
1. MPR (the People's Consultative Assembly) Resolutions;
2. DPR (the House of Representatives) Enacted Laws;
3. Temporary Regulations in Lieu of Law;
4. Government Regulations;
5. Presidential Decrees;
6. Ministerial Regulations/Instructions and lower departmental decrees;
7. Regulations and instructions.
As stated above, the 1945 Constitution represents the highest regulation in the 
Indonesian legal system, which serves as the basis and reference for all subordinate 
regulations of Indonesia. All must be based on and refer to such a higher level of 
regulation. The MPR is the highest legislative institution as well as the highest authority 
of state in Indonesia and consists of 700 members19. MPR resolutions are implemented
18 Appendix 1 provides more explanation about the state philosophy, the coat of arms, and the national 
anthem.
19 The members include representatives from the DPR, regional delegates^ representatives of political 
parties, and representatives from functional groups such as farmers, businessmen, students and the armed 
forces.
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through laws enacted by the DPR. After enactment, the laws are published in the formal 
statute book. These laws may be made more specific through Government Regulations 
or Ministerial Decrees. The 1945 Constitution Article 20 paragraph (1) states that every 
law requires ratification by the House of Representatives, while Article 5 paragraph (1) 
states that the President of the Republic of Indonesia assumes the highest power of 
administration under the Constitution.
In the government system of Indonesia, the President is both head of state and chief 
executive. He or she holds office for a term of five years and is eligible for re-election. 
Since the President receives a mandate from the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR), he/she must execute his/her duties in compliance with the Guidelines of State 
Policy as decreed by the Assembly. Indonesia is a republic with sovereignty vested in 
the people to be fully exercised by an elected People’s Consultative Assembly, which is 
the highest political institution in the state: the people voice their political and social 
aspirations through this body.
The Indonesian coat of arms consists of a golden eagle, called "GARUDA," that is a 
figure from ancient Indonesian epics. The motto, "Bhineka Tunggal Ika" (Unity in 
Diversity), is enshrined on a banner held in the eagle's talons. This old Javanese motto 
was introduced by Empu Tantular, a saint of the Majapahit Kingdom, in the 15th 
Century. It signifies the unity of the Indonesian people despite their diverse ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds. More detail about the Indonesian legal system can be found in 
Appendix 5.1 at the end of this thesis.
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5.4. Culture in Indonesian Environment
Compared to Western business systems, Asian, including Indonesian, business systems
reflect a much higher commitment to personal relationships and trust, rather than
principals of formal-legal rational authority (Whitely 1992, 1996; Appelbaum, 1998).
Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world with more than 230 million
people (July 2002)20. It is populated by more than 300 ethnic groups speaking literally
thousands of dialects, with one mother tongue called ‘Bahasa’ (a modified form of 
1Malay) . The country contains different ethnic groups such as Javanese (45%), 
Sundanese (14%), Madurese (7.5%), coastal Malays (7.5%) and other ethnic groups 
(26%). The different social and cultural groups are naturally isolated from each other 
due to the geography of the region.
The country is blessed with a rich and diverse mix of traditional cultures and art forms. 
Indonesian culture is an intermixture of influences from many diverse civilisations, 
which include: Hinduism and Buddhism, which arrived from India during the early first 
century AD; the Arabic influence during the 13th century, mainly through the teachings 
of Islam; and also the South-East Asian and Polynesian cultures, as well as influences 
from the influx of Chinese and Dutch people.
Religion and religious freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Constitution. Indonesia 
has been influenced by most of the world's major religions, which were first introduced 
to the coastal areas and subsequently spread inland. Islam, in various forms, is the faith 
of about 88 per cent of the population, and Indonesia is the world's most populous 
Muslim nation. Christianity is the largest of the minority religions with almost 9 per 
cent of the population; about two-thirds are Protestants. Buddhism is practised by about
20 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/id.html#People
21 There are 583 languages and thousands o f dialects
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2 per cent of the population, most of whom are of Chinese background. Hinduism, once 
the predominant religion, is now practised by only about 2 per cent of the population, 
principally in Bali; however, Hindu influences remain strong within the wider 
Indonesian culture and society. A variety of indigenous religions are still practised in 
more remote areas. With the majority of the population Islamic, religion and faith enter 
into decision making on a more subjective basis than in most Western cultures22. The 
influence of Buddhism in Indonesia started from the 7th to 14th centuries on the Island of 
Sumatra. Hinduism prevailed in the 14th century in eastern Java, while the Hindu 
Empire conquered most of what is now known as Indonesia. During the 12th century, 
Islam arrived in Indonesia and dominated in Java and Sumatra by the end of the 16th 
century.
According to Whitfield (2003), employees in Indonesian organisations are reluctant to
talk to a clear superior concerning problems or concerns in the performance of their own
duties. In the organisations, any problem should be solved by the subordinate without
informing the superior, which, as a result, spares him the unpleasant experience of
receiving bad news. Analysis of Indonesian culture by Hofstede indicates that
Indonesian society has low individualism (collectivist). To explain this, Hofstede stated:
“The low individualism is manifest in a close long-term commitment to the 
member ‘group ’, be that a family, extended family, or extended 
relationships. Loyalty in a collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides 
most other societal rules and regulations. The society fosters strong 
relationships where everyone takes responsibility for fellow members o f  their 
group. ” (http://www.geert-hofstede.corn)
Hofstede’s explanation is appropriate for the basic Indonesian principles that have been 
inspired by the concepts of mutual assistance (gotong royong) and communal meetings 
and gatherings (musyawarah) to arrive at a consensus (mufakat). This system derives
22 http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_indonesia.shtml
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from the traditions of agriculturally-based rural life, and is still very much in use in 
community life throughout the country.
Because responsibility to the group remains very strong in modem day Indonesian 
business culture, an employee may not want to approach his superior on his own 
initiative, especially if the employee has knowledge that could cause himself or a co­
worker to lose face or in another way to become embarrassed (Whitfield, 2003). In 
Indonesian organisations, everyone has a status that is different in every situation. In a 
situation where there are several people with equivalent status, group consensus 
decides. In a situation where there is a clear superior, that person decides. A foreign 
executive at the level of general manager or chair of the board of directors has a very 
high status in Indonesian organisations. This will influence the way that Indonesian 
employees treat him and he must understand and respect the obligations that his status 
places upon him (Whitfield, 2003).
5.5. Labour Force
There are two kinds of employment in Indonesia which are employment in private 
sectors and civil servants. In 2002, 148 million people were in employment, with almost 
45 per cent in agriculture, 16 per cent in manufacturing, and 39 per cent in the service 
sector, including transport and public services (CIA, 2003). Since 1997, Indonesia has 
experienced an increase in the unemployment rate, from 4.68% in 1997 to be 8.10% in 
2001. Furthermore, as a result of the economic crisis that hit Indonesia, great 
employment termination (PHK) was to be found everywhere: around 4.2 million people 
lost their jobs (Kompas, 3rd April 1999).
In term of civil servants, according to data from BPS-Statistics Indonesia (2002), 
Indonesia has 3.9 million civil servants. Based on occupation, only 5.32 percent of the
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total civil servants occupied a structural position and around 94.68 percent occupied a 
non-structural position. Civil servants with lower levels of education accounted for 
13.31 percent of the total, while civil servants with higher levels of education accounted 
for 27.43 percent. In Indonesia, the salary received by civil servants is lower compared 
to the salary received by employees in the private sector. Some civil servants even have 
an income less than the Regional Minimum Wage (Upah Minimum Regional / UMR). 
The Government is experiencing difficulty in increasing the standard of Civil Servant 
(PNS) salary due to the increase in the routine budget that occurs as a result of payment 
of instalments of the principal and interest of foreign debt, which is continually 
swelling! The amount of the annual payment for foreign debt is almost twice the amount 
of funds paid for the salaries of civil servants (BPS, 2003).
As a consequence, Rachbini (1996) stated that the younger generation graduating from 
the best universities in Indonesia at the moment is reluctant to enter the civil service. As 
a result, in future the quality of human resources in the government sector will not be 
able to balance the quality of human resources in the private sector. Rachbini (1996) 
added that a further consequence is that the potential employees tend to quit from 
government institutions and those who are not potential employees tend to depend on 
bureaucracy to compensate for their lack of skills. This dependency is the safest way to 
survive, even though their productivity is very low.
The prevailing conditions in government institutions are not the same as those generally 
found in private institutions in Indonesia. In private institutions, the employee and 
employer have respective positions and rights. Neither party is superior to or has more 
rights than the other party. If one of the parties does not agree with the requirements 
requested by the other party, then a contract will not be made. Besides, an employee in a
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private institution may take a dispute with the work provider forward to the courts, or 
he/she may also take it forward through a mediator such as a trade union.
It is to be noted that the conditions in the government institutions are different from 
those in private institutions. In the relationship between the government employee and 
the government agency, there are two parties whose position and rights cannot be 
equalised. The position of a government agency is deemed higher than an ordinary 
person, because a government agency can make a regulation that is binding to or 
enforced upon an ordinary person. In view of this, the provisions regulating a work 
agreement are also determined unilaterally, namely by the government agencies 
themselves, without prior negotiation or agreement with the persons concerned. In 
addition, the changes of the provisions that will be made later on are determined by the 
government agencies themselves without prior negotiation or agreement.
Even if  a civil servant has a dispute concerning his/her work requirements with the 
government department and institution as work provider, then he/she cannot forward 
his/her dispute to a judicial agency in this country. Every civil servant has to carry out 
the actions as instructed to him/her without prior discussion about whether or not the 
action is right, or whether or not the action is included in his/her assignment as 
stipulated in the work agreement. Work in the public interest will not proceed smoothly 
if every action, whether planned or not, must first be discussed with the employees and 
their agreement obtained. Therefore, trade unions in the government agency or 
department have no significant role in the activities of the government agency. 
Furthermore, even the state does not manage the civil servants (PNS), according to the 
Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 13 Year 2003 on manpower. The civil service has 
its own law. According to Government Regulation No.32 year 1979, the age limit for
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civil servants is 56. In general, physically, at 56, one cannot do one’s duties effectively 
and efficiently. On the other hand, for certain positions, this age limit is raised to 65 
after considering the health of the individual.
5.6. Chapter Summary
Indonesia is situated on a crossroads between two oceans, the Pacific and the Indian, 
and bridges two continents, Asia and Australia. This strategic position has always 
influenced the cultural, social, political, and economic life of the country. Like the other 
Asian countries, this chapter concluded that Indonesia is a highly cultural country with a 
rich and diverse mix of traditional cultures and art forms. Compared to Western 
business systems, Asian, including Indonesian, business systems reflect a much higher 
commitment to personal relationships and trust, rather than principals of formal-legal 
rational authority. This chapter also found that the Indonesian people have been inspired 
by the concepts of mutual assistance (gotong royong) and communal meetings and 
gatherings (musyawarah) to arrive at a consensus (mufakat). This system is still very 
much in use in community life throughout the country. Further detail about the 
Indonesian environment can be found in Appendix 5.2 at the end of this thesis.
This thesis continues in the next chapter by providing an explanation of the research 
methodology used in this study. Research methodology is an important factor to guide 
the researcher when undertaking data collection during fieldwork.
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
6.1. Introduction
This chapter discusses research methods and methodology and provides a justification 
for the choice of the research approach adopted by the author. This chapter examines 
the different paradigms within which management research can be located, and then 
explores the different research methodologies and methods. In particular, the chapter 
examines the differences between two paradigms, which are positivism and interpretive 
paradigms. It also identifies and contrasts the two kinds of evidence that may be 
collected for research into business and management studies, which are qualitative and 
quantitative; it also identifies the importance and the major criticisms of the case study 
approach as a research strategy. The chapter further relates all of the above issues to the 
author’s research.
The issue of research methods and methodology has been extensively discussed in the 
literature (Saunders et al., 1997). It is important that at the beginning of any research 
work, researchers should decide on an appropriate starting point for the research 
(Remenyi, 1998), and on the conceptual framework or research strategy within which 
the evidence will be collected (Saunders et al., 1997). These would include decisions to 
use either a qualitative or quantitative approach as a tool to collect the evidence and to 
decide whether to take a positivistic or a non-positivistic approach. The approach 
adopted to investigate a particular phenomenon therefore determines the quality of the 
research (Gummesson, 2000). As a result, a researcher should take decisions about the 
strategy and methods to be used before the research begins. Research methods and 
methodology are therefore paramount for the outcome of any particular research.
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To address the main objectives set out, this chapter is divided into several sections. A 
general discussion of research methodology is provided after the introduction, followed 
by a section on two main paradigmatic assumptions (positivism versus interpretivism). 
The next section provides a discussion on qualitative and quantitative research, 
methodologies. Following this, a discussion of research methods is provided.' This is 
then linked with a discussion of the use of a case study as a research method, followed 
by the justification for the choice of a case study approach as the author's research 
method in this research. The final part of this chapter provides a conclusion.
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6.2. Paradigmatic Assumptions
There are three main paradigmatic assumptions which are prominent in contemporary 
social research (Guba and Lincoln, 1998; Locke et al., 1998; Ratcliff, 2002): these are 
positivism, interpretivism and critical theory. Each paradigm contains research methods 
that are useful in different settings and for different purposes, and that must be 
compatible with the goals of the research and the researcher.
This section will briefly review these paradigmatic assumptions since they significantly 
influence the choice of a research method. The review of the assumptions will focus on 
positivism and interpretivism, as the thesis is located within the interpretivism 
paradigm. Both interpretivism and critical theory have similar philosophical 
assumptions in that they both assume a subjective social world (Guba and Lincoln, 
1998; Locke et al., 1998; Christie et al., 2000) and the active nature of human agents to 
change the world in which they live (Myers, 1996; Guba and Lincoln, 1998; Christie et 
al, 2000).
Positivism has become an important approach in social research. Easterby-Smith et al. 
(1991) argued that there are two key ideas about the positivistic paradigm, which are: 
firstly, reality is external and objective, and secondly, knowledge is only of significance 
if it is based on observations of external reality. Furthermore, Gephart (1999) noted that 
positivism assumes an objective world which scientific methods can more or less 
readily represent and measure, and it seeks to predict and explain causal relations 
among key variables.
Positivist approaches to management research are heavily associated with quantitative 
measures (Bryman, 1989; Johnson and Duberley, 2000) and are deductive in nature by 
putting forward hypotheses, collecting data, testing the hypotheses, and then drawing
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conclusions (Gummenson, 2000). The major strengths of the positivistic paradigm have 
been identified by Easterby-Smith et al. (1997). Positivism can provide wide coverage 
of a range of situations; it is fast and economical; and, particularly when statistics are 
aggregated from large samples, the paradigm may be of considerable relevance to 
policy decisions.
The positivistic paradigm has, however, been criticised by several authors (Gill and 
Johnson, 1997; Vidich and Lyman, 1998). Gill and Johnson (1997), for instance, noted 
that it is impossible to treat people as being separate from their social contexts and they 
cannot be understood without examining the perceptions they have of their own 
activities, an assumption positivism ignores. Secondly, a highly structured research 
design imposes certain constraints on the result and may ignore more relevant and 
interesting findings. Thirdly, researchers are not objective, but part of what they 
observe: they bring their own interests and values to the research, and this is ignored by 
positivism. Finally, capturing complex phenomena in a single measure is, at best, 
misleading. It is impossible to measure a person’s behaviour with a numerical value, as 
is normally undertaken in positivistic research.
Interpretivism and critical theory attempt to address the major limitations of positivism. 
The interpretive paradigm has been referred to as “constructivism”(Guba and Lincoln, 
1989; Gephart, 1999; Robson, 2002). Interpretivism is concerned with exploring the 
meanings that social members apply to a particular situation (Schwandt, 1994; Gephart 
1999). Based on the work of Schutz (1973), Gephart (1999) argued that interpretivism 
involves building a second order theory, or a theory of members’ theories, in contrast to 
positivism, which is concerned with objective reality and meanings thought to be 
independent of people. Interpretivists argue that the social world can only be described,
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interpreted and understood from the perspective of its participants (Bryman, 1989; 
Keedy, 1992; Poulymenakou and Comford, 1996).
According to Shipman (1997), the aim of the interpretive researcher remains 
descriptive, to generate theory and to guide policy and practice. The intention of an 
interpretivist is not to test theory but to develop it from observations in the field 
(Shipman, 1997; Guba and Lincoln, 1998). Interpretive researchers compare several 
data sets from interviews, observations, and artefacts to arrive at a plausible 
interpretation of events and interactions (Keedy, 1992).
The aims of the positivist, to uncover truths and facts using experimental or survey 
methods, have been challenged by interpretivist researchers who assert that these 
methods impose a view of the world on subjects rather than capturing, describing and 
understanding these world views (Cantrell, 1989; Gephart, 1999).
Some researchers (for example Maxwell, 1996) argue that the interpretivist paradigm 
has the potential to produce the most valid conclusions by attaining the deepest 
understanding of the problem in its context. Interpretive research helps to understand 
human thought and action in a social and organisational context: it enables an 
understanding of an organisation’s culture and of particular interest in this thesis, the 
use of accounting policy in the organisation to be understood in its proper context 
(Abdul-Rahman and Goddard, 1998).
The interpretive approach is more suitable to this research because it explores complex 
social phenomena that require working people and real-life experiences and where the
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researcher seeks to understand the research problem by reflecting, probing, 
understanding and revising meanings, structures and issues (Christie et al., 2000).
6.3. Research Methodology
Methodology is defined as “the philosophy of the research process that includes the 
assumption and values that serve as a rationale for research and the standards or criteria 
the researcher uses for interpreting data and research conclusion” 
(http ://wizard.ucr. edu/~kmcneill/methods.htm). Shipman (1997) argued that in 
methodology, the focus is on the logic of using the methods selected.
An understanding of methodological issues is an important part of a research study, as
noted by Gephart (1999, from internet article) in the following context:
“Better understanding o f methodological issues may encourage improved 
research practises by fostering consistency between the underlying 
assumptions, theories and knowledge production activities o f management 
and organisational researchers. ”
Traditionally, there are two types of research methodology, which are qualitative and 
quantitative. Table 6.1 below presents the differences between a quantitative and 
qualitative approach. Remenyi et al. (1998) argued that it is very important to 
understand and to contrast them as evidence that may be collected. Only through 
understanding the strengths and weaknesses of qualitative and quantitative approaches 
can adequate research be designed.
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Quantitative Research Qualitative Research
Activities
i) Counts occurrences across a large population
ii) Uses statistics and replicability to validate 
generalisation from survey samples and 
experiments
iii) Attempts to reduce contaminating social 
variables
Beliefs
iv) Conviction about what it is important to 
look for
v) Confidence in established research 
instruments
vi) Reality is not so problematic if  the research 
instruments are adequate and conclusive results 
are feasible
Steps
vii) First decide the research focus (e.g. testing 
a specific hypothesis)
viii) then devise research instruments (e.g. 
survey questionnaire or experiment)
ix) then approach the subject
Rigour
x) Disciplined application o f established rules 
for statistics, experiment and survey design
a) Looks deep into the quality o f social life
b) Locates the study within particular settings 
which provide opportunities for exploring all 
possible social variables; and sets manageable 
boundaries
c) Initial foray into the social setting leads to 
further, more informed exploration as themes 
and focuses emerge
d) Conviction that what it is important to look 
for will emerge
e) Confidence in an ability to devise research 
procedures to fit the situation and the nature of 
the people in it, as they are revealed
f) Reality contains mysteries to which the 
researcher must submit, and can do no more than 
interpret
g) Decide the subject is interesting (e.g. in its 
own right, or because it represents an area of  
interest) .
h) Explore the subject
i) Let focus and themes emerge
j) Devise research instruments during process 
(e.g. observation or interview)
k) Principled development o f research strategy to 
suit the scenario being studied as it is revealed
Table 6.1. The differences between Quantitative and Qualitative approach. 
Source: Holiday (2002) p. 6
However, even though each approach has strengths and weaknesses, this does not mean 
that one is superior to the other. A methodology should be used where it is appropriate 
with the research aim. Many researchers, including Denzin and Lincoln (1998) and 
Johnson and Duberley (2000), identified the increasing acceptance of qualitative 
methods. This statement is supported by the dramatic increase in qualitative research 
publications and the publication of numerous books on the qualitative research 
approach.
6.3.1. Quantitative Research
Quantitative research analysis refers to numbers and statistics. In quantitative research, 
the researchers classify features, count the research subjects, and even use mathematical
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models, more complex statistical models, and graphs in an attempt to explain what is 
observed (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998; Remenyi et al. 1998). Quantitative research 
analysis applies a deductive approach which is characteristic of the traditional scientific 
method (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; Lee, 1999). It generates hypotheses from 
theoretical assumptions at the beginning of the study, indicating the relevant data to be 
collected (the variables), and analyses and tests them against empirical observation 
(data) to determine whether the hypotheses have been confirmed or disconfirmed 
(Maykut and Morehouse, 1994; Otley and Berry, 1998). Quantitative research is neither 
appropriate nor cost effective for learning why people act or think as they do. The 
picture of the data which emerges from a quantitative approach is less rich descriptively 
than that obtained from a qualitative approach.
Quantitative methods are considered superior to qualitative approaches in achieving 
generalisability due to the naturalistic settings and limited number of cases utilised in 
qualitative research (Johnson and Duberley, 2000). Bryman (1995) argued that 
investigation using a quantitative research methodological approach should be capable 
of replication, which means that it should be possible for a researcher to employ the 
same procedures as those used in another study to check the validity of the initial 
investigation. Even though the collection of large volumes of data can be a strength of 
the quantitative methodology, the quantitative researchers can, however, become 
swamped because the analysis could be driven towards too much complexity, since the 
study could involve too many cases, too many variables, and could consider too many 
factors (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). According to Denzin and Lincoln (1998), 
quantitative researchers are seldom able to capture the subject’s perspective because 
they have to rely on more remote, inferential, empirical materials.
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6.3.2. Qualitative Research
Miles and Huberman (1994), Marshall and Rosmann (1995), Maxwell (1996), and Lee 
(1999) concluded that qualitative research is the methodology to use to answer 
questions of description, interpretation, and explanation, and most often from the 
perspective of the organisational member under study, but it seems poorly suited to the 
investigation of issues of a phenomenon’s prevalence, generalisability, or calibration. 
Van Maanen (1983, p. 9) defines qualitative research as an array o f  interpretive 
techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with 
the meaning, not the frequency, o f certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena 
in the social world (cited from Easterby-Smith et al., 1997, p.70).
Hakim (1987, p.26) 4efines qualitative research as follow:
Qualitative research is concerned with individuals’ own account o f their 
attitudes motivations and behaviour. It offers richly descriptive reports o f  
individuals ’ perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, views and feelings, the meanings 
and interpretations given to events and things, as well as their behaviour; 
displays how these are put together, more or less coherently and 
consciously, into frameworks which make sense o f  their experiences; and 
illuminates the motivations which connect attitudes and behaviour, the 
discontinuities, or even contradictions, between attitudes and behaviour, or 
how conflicting attitudes and motivations are resolved in particular choices ’ 
made.
Atkinson and Shaffir (1998) argued that qualitative research is about observing events 
in their natural setting and reporting them in a systematic way. The qualitative research 
approach refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, 
symbols, and descriptions of the research subjects (Berg, 1998). It allows for fine 
distinctions to be drawn because it is not necessary to turn the data into a finite number 
of classifications.
Studies from Maykut and Morehouse (1994) and Lee (1999) found that qualitative 
research often uses an inductive approach for data analysis. Inductive methods consist
of making generalisations from observations resulting in theoretical statements which
attempt to explain the occurrence of the observed phenomena (Maykut and Morehouse,
1994; Lee, 1999). Consequently, in a qualitative research approach, theoretical
reflection tends to occur during or towards the end of the data collection process rather
than at the outset. Marshall and Rossman (1999, p.61) argued that in qualitative
research, there are three distinct strategies as follow:
“Firstly, a research focusing on individual lived experience typically relies 
on an in-depth interviews strategy or other forms o f  data in order to capture 
the deep meaning o f experience in their words; secondly, a study that 
focused on society and culture including a group, a program, or an 
organisation, typically espouse some form o f case study as an overall 
strategy; and finally, research in language and communication typically 
involves micro analysis through which speech events and subtle interactions 
are recorded and then analysed. ”
Qualitative research itself has four major methods, which are: observation; analysing 
texts and documents; interview; recording and transcribing (discussed later in the 
chapter). To conduct organisational research from a qualitative perspective, the 
researcher can use the two most prominent methods of data collection, such as 
participant observation and unstructured or semi-structured interviewing (Bryman, 
1995). Unstructured or semi-structured interviewing is used in order to understand the 
individual’s experience from his or her perspectives and interpretation. Using 
observation and interview as methods of data collection gives qualitative researchers the 
opportunity to get depth and detail data about a phenomenon (Ratcliff, 2002).
Validity of the data obtained is one of the strengths of qualitative research, since 
individuals are interviewed in sufficient detail for the results to be taken as true, correct, 
complete and believable reports of their views and experiences (Hakim, 1989). 
Moreover, qualitative research is most valuable in exploratory studies, where the
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relationship between the events in question and their environment is not well understood 
(Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998).
With a relatively small number of individuals or situations, qualitative research allows 
the researcher or interviewer to maintain a close association with their respondents. It 
gives the chance for further discussion between the researcher and respondents to obtain 
in-depth research issues and yields great detail in response. Unfortunately, the small 
number of individuals or situations involved in qualitative research make it difficult to 
take the result as representative, even if great care is taken to choose a fair cross section 
of the type of individuals who are the subjects of the study (Hakim, 1989; Maykut and 
Morehouse, 1994). In other words, in qualitative research the result cannot be 
generalised to other people in other situations.
Berg (1998) and Bums (2000) recognised one of the disadvantages of the use of a 
qualitative approach in research, which is the time required for data collection, analysis 
and interpretation. Qualitative researchers should know when to stop the data collection 
in order to prevent the research going too far beyond the boundaries of the research. In 
order to decide when to stop the data collection, the researchers must take into account 
the research goals, the need to achieve depth through triangulation of data sources, and 
the possibility of greater breadth through examination of a variety of sampling sites 
(Hoepfl, 1997).
6.4. Research Strategy (Case Study)
According to Denscombe (1998), case study research is a matter of research strategy, 
not a method for collecting data. Case studies appear in a variety of guises, across many 
disciplines, both basic and applied. Case study research is becoming increasingly
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accepted as a scientific tool for research in the management and business area, including 
general management, organisation, and accounting (Gummesson, 2000).
This study will use a case study approach. As a result, this section will identify and 
discuss the benefits and limitations of such an approach. Later in the chapter, a 
justification for using a case study approach in this study is provided. Yin (1994, pp. 13 
-  14) noted that a case study is an empirical enquiry which:
>  Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; especially 
when
> the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which
>  case study research can include both single and multiple case studies.
A case study approach is used in many separate disciplines. Hakim (1989) and Yin 
(1994) argued that a case study as a research strategy could be used for research on 
organisations and institutions in both the private and public sectors, organisational and 
management studies, processes of change and adaptation, policy implementation and 
valuation, political science, bureaucracies, industrial relations, workplaces, and the 
conduct of dissertations and theses in the social sciences, including professional 
business such as business administration, management science, and social work.
The case study approach is appropriate when investigators desire to gain a rich 
understanding of the topics of the research and rely on multiple sources of evidence 
(Yin, 1993; Saunders et al., 1997). The variety of data collection may include 
interviews, observation, documentary analysis and questionnaires. 
Investigators/researchers use the case study approach in order to generate answers to the
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questions “Why?”, “What?”, and “How?” (Saunders et al., 1997). A case study can be 
used to accomplish various research aims, such as to provide descriptions of 
phenomena, to test theory or to generate/develop theory.
Case study research can involve either single or multiple cases, and numerous levels of 
analysis. Multiple case designs that can be limited to two or dozens of cases are used 
either to achieve replication of the same study in different settings or to compare and 
contrast different cases (Hakim, 1989). In relation to this study's topic, the use of a case 
study has also been applied Baldrige (1971) to study power and conflict in New York 
University (NYU).
Yin (1994) recommends 5 phases of research in a case study approach:
> Problem or research questions definition
> Select case study’s design
> Data collection
>  Analysing case study evidence
> Composition and reporting
6.4.1. Strengths and Weaknesses of Case Studies
The case study approach is a comparatively flexible method of scientific research. 
Because its project designs seem to emphasise exploration rather than prescription or 
prediction, researchers are comparatively freer to discover and address issues as they 
arise in their experiments.
Researchers have identified the strengths of the use a case study approach. Firstly, a 
case study gives an opportunity for in-depth enquiry (Remenyi et al., 1998; Marshall 
and Rossman, 1999). To get a deeper understanding in the research, a researcher needs
not to study a large number of cases. By seeking to understand as much as possible
about a single subject or a small group of subjects, case studies specialise in in-depth
data. The depth of enquiry that is offered by the case study method is significantly
greater than other research methods, such as: survey, focus groups, experiments and
analysis of archival evidence (Remenyi et al., 1998). The superiority of the case study
over other research methods has been stated by Remenyi et al., (1998, p. 167) as follows:
... although attempts are sometimes made to ascertain attitudes by means o f  
questionnaires, the results are often unsatisfactory as one cannot do justice 
to the complexity o f an attitude by ticking Yes or No or rating 1 to 5. Such 
methods o f  evidence collection that reduce responses to a scale o f  binary 
choices lose much o f the richness o f the circumstances or context being 
studied. As a general rule questionnaires alone are increasingly regarded as 
inadequate in providing the type o f  evidence fo r  a doctorate in business and 
management studies.
Secondly, theory developed from case study research is likely to have important 
strengths, such as it generates novel theory, the emergent theory is likely to be testable, 
and the resultant theory is likely to be empirically valid, which arise from the intimate 
linkage with empirical evidence (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 546 -  549).
Thirdly, Otley and Berry (1998) argued that even though case studies have a number of 
potential roles to play, the central role seems to be that of exploration. They argued that 
the idea of an exploratory case study goes beyond that of mere description towards 
explanation. An exploratory study is used when not much is known about the situation, 
or when no information is available on how similar problems or research issues have 
been solved in the past (Sekaran, 2000). In addition, the case study approach allows the 
use of a variety of research methods and multiple sources of data, which facilitates the 
validation of data (Denscombe, 1998).
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In spite of the strengths of the case study identified above, its weaknesses also need to 
be highlighted. Otley and Berry (1998), for instance, argued that case study 
observations and explanations lack generalisability. The lack of generalisability is 
caused by the limited number of observations, especially when the case is based on a 
single subject or small group of subjects. Ijiri (1972) argued that it is more difficult to 
make generalisations in case research in accounting because accounting phenomena are 
much more heterogeneous than phenomena in the natural sciences. Researchers believe 
that one way to enhance generalisability is to increase the number of observations. 
However, Walsham (1995) and Rolland and Herstad (2000) believe that interpretive 
case studies can be generalised through the concepts of development, theory generation, 
giving specific implications, and giving rich insight.
The second problem of case study research identified in the literature (Yin, 1989; 
Atkinson and Shaffir, 1998; Otley and Berry, 1998; Remenyi et al., 1998) is the lack of 
reliability and validity. Otley and Berry (1998) criticise case study research as studies 
that have interesting descriptions but unconvincing results and conclusions. Some 
researchers (such as Remenyi et al., 1998) believe that the use of a case study brings 
problem of subjectivity and bias to the researchers (e.g. problems analysing and reading 
evidence).
Atkinson and Shaffir (1998) and Remenyi et al. (1998) identified some of these 
problems as: firstly, the difficulties encountered by individuals in their being able to 
recall events accurately; secondly, the difficulty individuals have in disclosing 
important feelings for some reason, for example, due to the desire of the subject to be 
helpful to the researcher by telling him what they think he wants to hear; and finally, the 
suspicion individuals have about revealing information that might reflect poorly on
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themselves or their superiors. These issues could prevent the researcher from getting the 
further information from the organisation that is needed for the study.
However, Atkinson and Shaffir (1998, pp. 60 -  61) recommended four common 
strategies that could be used to enhance construct validity, which are: firstly, identify 
clearly the preliminary hypothesis and the background or training that the researcher has 
taken into the study to allow the reader to infer or anticipate what potential observation 
biases may have been introduced; secondly, identify clearly the mode of observation to 
allow the reader to infer or anticipate how the observer may have influenced the process 
either through the act of observation itself or by participating in the process; thirdly, 
develop alternative measures for the same phenomenon and show that both sets of data 
imply the same conclusions, a form of triangulation; and finally, show evidence of the 
result of having the observed review of the material for accuracy and reasonableness.
The third problem with case studies is the difficulty in defining the boundaries of the 
study. With regard to the questions in this thesis a researcher should consider the issue 
of how far the management control system to the larger organisational practices and 
how far the historical analysis of the control system should go back. Apart from that, a 
case study-based researcher should also consider the amount of time available for the 
study. Data collection for case study research can be quite time consuming. Otley and 
Berry (1998) concluded that since lengthy periods of time are needed to conduct case- 
based research, the subjects or data being observed might also have changed during the 
course of the study.
6.4.2. Case Study Approach in MCS Research
The area of research interest in this study is the management accounting system and 
control of organisational activities. The research uses a case study approach to explore
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changes in the management accounting systems in two different universities / 
organisations after deregulation.
A study from Otley and Berry (1998, p.S106) concluded that one reason for adopting a
case-based approach in the study of accounting control is that the role of accounting and
other controls cannot be fully understood in isolation, and that a more contextual
approach is required. They also recommended a case-based approach to develop an
understanding of the relative role of accounting and other controls in the management of
organisational performance for the following reason:
... two distinct aspects to the use o f  accounting information in organisations. 
First, it is used to monitor financial aspects o f performance, an activity that 
might conveniently be labelled financial control. Second, accounting 
information is also used as a surrogate measure by which operational 
activities may be monitored and controlled. This activity can be labelled 
management control. From the latter perspective accounting information 
provides a window through which the real activities o f  the organisation may 
be monitored,-but it should be noted also that other windows are used that 
do not rely upon accounting information. Thus, in order to assess and 
evaluate the operation o f  management accounting and control systems, it is 
necessary to place them in their wider context, (p. 106)
Hence, although the case study has some limitations, as has been discussed in the 
previous section, a case study approach is adopted in this study because it is consistent 
with the aim of this research, to explore and describe (explain) the reason for the change 
of management control systems in the case study organisations.
The use of exploratory research gives an opportunity to investigate phenomena that are 
not well understood, such as the activities of management accounting and control 
systems in Indonesian organisations. These exploratory and explanatory opportunities 
that are offered by a case study approach would not have been found in the other 
approaches.
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Because of the strengths offered by the case study approach, many researchers in the 
management accounting systems and control field have used the case study method to 
conduct their research. Examples of the use of a case study as a research approach 
within management accounting systems and control are Knight and Weigenstein, 
(1993), Modell (1996), Abemethy and Brownell (1999), Jazayeri and Hooper (1999), 
Marginson (1999), Brignall and Modell (2000), Lind (2001), Uddin and Hopper (2001), 
and Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005).
This study adopts a multiple case design with two universities to be researched. This 
will allow for cross-case analysis and comparison, and the investigation of a particular 
phenomenon in diverse settings (Darke et al., 1998). The multiple case used in this 
study strengthens the result by replicating the pattern matching, thus increasing 
confidence in the robustness of the theory (Tellis, 1997). Using two universities in this 
study allows the researcher to investigate the subjects in depth to provide a rich 
description and understanding.
The study will collect empirical data from multiple sources, including field research,
such as interviews and observations, and documentary analysis in order to generate a
rich source of field data with internal checks on its validity. The reason for the use of
qualitative methodology, such as interviews and observation, to collect data is based on
the view of Atkinson and Shaffir (1998), that:
“In contrast to the natural science approach to the study o f  human 
behaviour, qualitative methodology recognises that human behaviour cannot 
be adequately understood by observing it from outside. Instead, and in line 
with the phenomenological perspective, social phenomena are best 
understood from the actor’s own perspective. Human beings are symbol 
manipulators and it is incumbent on the researcher to understand the 
symbols, their meaning and how they are manipulated. Such understanding 
could be achieved through qualitative methods such as field research -  
participant observation, informal reviewing, and others that yield descriptive 
data. ” (p. 43)
119
In addition, the use of interviews allows a more personal interaction between the 
interviewer and respondent, and gives the researcher an opportunity to probe or ask 
follow-up questions, which will help the researcher to explore in depth the activities of 
the management accounting systems and control in the organisations. Using other 
methods, such as a survey, would prevent the researcher from getting an in-depth 
understanding of the management accounting systems and control in the organisations 
since other methods do not permit an in-depth investigation. Another source of data will 
be a document search, including university reports, brochures, and other documents. 
The use of these documents will help the researcher to ensure that the interview data is 
analysed in context and will provide another source of data for comparison.
6.5. Case Research Method
The research method is the research technique or tool used to gather data. There are 
typically six major sources of data, which can all be used in a case study, such as 
documents, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, 
and physical artefacts (Yin, 1994).
Interviews allow the researcher to gather descriptive information with the subject’s own 
interpretations/words (Hoepfl, 1997). Using direct or participant observation by making 
a field visit to the phenomena site, the researcher has an opportunity to get direct 
experience with the phenomena (Yin, 1994; Hoepfl, 1997). Documentation refers to 
“paper” data (Hoepfl, 1997) that come from the following variety of documents: letters, 
administrative documents, textbooks, journals, articles from mass media, agendas, 
policy documents, and other similar items (Yin, 1994; Hoepfl, 1997; Robson, 2002). 
Moreover, according to Yin (1994), “paper” data may also come from archival records, 
often in computerised form, that consist of service records, organisational records, maps
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and charts, survey data, and personal records. Finally, physical or cultural artefacts are . 
used extensively in anthropological research as a source of evidence, from a tool or 
instrument, a technological device, a work of art, or other physical evidence (Yin, 
1994).
However, each method has different strengths and weaknesses (see Table 6.2. below). 
Hence, the use of multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) in case studies is likely to 
increase the reliability and validity of the data (Yin, 1994). The evidence from a case 
study may be qualitative (which uses descriptions and words), quantitative (which uses 
numbers and statistics), or both (Yin, 1994, p. 14).
Source of Evidence Strengths Weaknesses
D o c u m e n t a t i o n y  S t a b l e  -  C a n  b e  r e v i e w e d  
r e p e a t e d l y
>  U n o b t r u s i v e  -  n o t  c r e a t e d  a s  a  
r e s u l t  o f  t h e  c a s e  s t u d y
>  E x a c t  -  c o n t a i n s  e x a c t  n a m e s ,  
r e f e r e n c e s ,  a n d  d e t a i l s  o f  a n  e v e n t
>  B r o a d  c o v e r a g e  -  l o n g  s p a n  o f  
t i m e ,  m a n y  e v e n t s ,  a n d  m a n y  
s e t t i n g s
y  r e t r i e v a b i l i t y  -  c a n  b e  l o w  
y  b i a s e d  s e l e c t i v i t y ,  i f  c o l l e c t i o n  
i s  i n c o m p l e t e  
>  r e p o r t i n g  b i a s  -  r e f l e c t s  
( u n k n o w n )  b i a s  o f  a u t h o r  
y  a c c e s s  -  m a y  b e  d e l i b e r a t e l y  
b l o c k e d
A r c h i v a l  R e c o r d s >  ( s a m e  a s  a b o v e  f o r  
d o c u m e n t a t i o n )
>  p r e c i s e  a n d  q u a n t i t a t i v e
y  ( s a m e  a s  a b o v e  f o r  
d o c u m e n t a t i o n )
>  a c c e s s i b i l i t y  d u e  t o  p r i v a c y  
r e a s o n s
I n t e r v i e w s >  t a r g e t e d  -  f o c u s e s  d i r e c t l y  o n  
c a s e  s t u d y  t o p i c
>  i n s i g h t f u l  -  p r o v i d e s  p e r c e i v e d  
c a u s a l  i n f e r e n c e s
>  b i a s  d u e  t o  p o o r l y  c o n s t r u c t e d  
q u e s t i o n
>  r e s p o n s e  b i a s
>  i n a c c u r a c i e s  d u e  t o  p o o r  r e c a l l
>  r e f l e x i v i t y  -  i n t e r v i e w e e  g i v e s  
w h a t  i n t e r v i e w e r  w a n t s  t o  h e a r
D i r e c t  o b s e r v a t i o n s y  r e a l i t y  -  c o v e r s  e v e n t s  i n  r e a l  
t i m e
>  c o n t e x t u a l  -  c o v e r s  c o n t e x t  o f  
e v e n t
>  t i m e  -  c o n s u m i n g
y  s e l e c t i v i t y  -  u n l e s s  b r o a d  
c o v e r a g e  
y  r e f l e x i v i t y  -  e v e n t  m a n y
p r o c e e d  d i f f e r e n t l y  b e c a u s e  i t  i s  
b e i n g  o b s e r v e d
>  c o s t  -  h o u r s  n e e d e d  b y  h u m a n  
o b s e r v e r s
P a r t i c i p a n t
O b s e r v a t i o n
y  [ S a m e  a s  a b o v e  f o r  d i r e c t  
o b s e r v a t i o n s ]
>  I n s i g h t f u l  i n t o  i n t e r p e r s o n a l  
b e h a v i o u r  a n d  m o t i v e s
y  [ S a m e  a s  a b o v e  f o r  d i r e c t  
o b s e r v a t i o n s ]  
y  b i a s  d u e  t o  i n v e s t i g a t o r ’ s  
m a n i p u l a t i o n  o f  e v e n t s
P h y s i c a l  A r t e f a c t s >  I n s i g h t f u l  i n t o  c u l t u r a l  f e a t u r e s
>  I n s i g h t f u l  i n t o  t e c h n i c a l  
o p e r a t i o n s
>  S e l e c t i v i t y
>  A v a i l a b i l i t y
Table 6.2: Strengths and weaknesses o f  case study data collection 
Source: YIN, K. (1994, pp.80)
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The choice of the use of data collection methods is determined partly by the topic itself, 
partly by the discipline of the researcher and partly by the issue of timeliness, the cost 
involved, concerns with response rates and the other resources available.
A study by Otley and Berry (1998) find that the four case studies23 they reviewed have a 
similarity in the methods of data collection adopted, which are: the extensive use of 
documentary evidence concerning formal control systems design and use; the use of 
semi-structured interviews with managers, generally at levels both above and below the 
level of central interest, and the observation of meetings wherever possible; collection 
of information on the external context in which the university operates; the use of 
questionnaires at a late stage in the research process to try to gain assurance that the 
phenomena reported upon were prevalent throughout the organisation.
6.5.1. Interviews
The study will use the two most prominent methods of data collection, namely 
unstructured or semi-structured interviewing, and documents / archival records, which 
will allow the researcher to undertake an in-depth investigation of the topic. 
Unstructured or semi-structured interviewing is used in order to understand the 
individual’s experience from his or her perspectives and interpretation. Using the 
interview as a method of data collection gives the researcher an opportunity to obtain 
deep and detailed data about a phenomenon (Ratcliff, 2002).
With the relatively small number of individuals and situations used in this study, the 
researcher or interviewer can maintain close associations with his respondents. The high 
personal interaction between the interviewer and the respondent would give the
23 Examples of case studies: Otley (1990), Berry, Laughton, and Otley (1991), Archer and Otley (1991) 
Knight and Weigenstein (1993)
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researcher opportunities to probe or ask follow-up questions, which will help explore in- 
depth the operations of the management accounting control systems in their 
organisational context. However, the small sample makes it difficult to take the results 
as representative, even if great care is taken to choose a fair cross-section of the type of 
individuals who are the subjects of the study (Maykut and Morehouse, 1994). While, 
using a survey method, for instance, would not allow the researcher gain an in-depth 
understanding of the dynamics of the management accounting control systems, since 
surveys do not permit in-depth investigation.
In this study, interviews have been conducted with managers and employees from 
accounting and non-accounting departments as well as at different managerial levels in 
the two studied universities. The decision to interview both accounting and non­
accounting managers and managers at different levels was taken to provide a broader 
understanding of the MCS. Though the accounting department is likely to be involved 
in preparing management accounting reports, these reports would be used by non­
accounting managers as well. It is therefore important to obtain the views of both those 
who prepare and those who use the management accounting information.
Managers have been asked diverse questions, including the types of management 
accounting control systems they have, how these systems support day-to-day decision 
making, any perceived changes in the MCS over the years, and possible factors that 
have influenced the operation of the MCS. To encourage the respondents to participate 
in this study, the researcher used some personal approachies to the correspondents. First, 
the researcher guaranteed the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents. Second, 
the researcher also explained to the correspondents about his identity, the purpose of the
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interview, and the importance of the study for the institutions and Indonesian education 
environment.
A tape recorder was used to record interviews with some of correspondents that agreed 
to this. For the other correspondents who did not feel comfortable with the use of a tape 
recorder during the interview, the researcher only took notes during the interview. The 
interview questions were divided into sections, which were:
1. Three questions examining how formal and informal types of control operated in the 
organisations, both before and after autonomy. The first question asked the 
managers how management control activities operated in the university as a formal 
procedure before and after the autonomous status was granted. The second question 
asked the managers to describe the use of informal controls in the organisation’s 
management process before and after the autonomous status was granted. The third 
question asked managers to give example(s) of how their decisions in managing 
their units had been affected by the status change of the university.
2. Five questions examined the issue of the power and influence of different parties in 
the organisation’s management process. The first question asked the influence of the 
managers in the organisation’s management process before and after the change of 
the organisation’s status. The second question asked the managers to describe the 
influence or power of the board of trustees as shareholders’ representatives in order 
to decide the organisation’s management process before and after the autonomous 
status was granted. The third question asked the managers to describe the influence 
or power of the lower level managers in order to decide the organisation’s 
management process before and after the autonomous status was granted. The fourth 
question asked the managers to describe the influence or power of the government 
in order to decide the organisation’s management process before and after the
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autonomous status was granted. The fifth question asked the managers to describe 
the influence or power of the lower level managers in order to decide the 
organisation’s management process before and after the autonomous status was 
granted.
3. One question asked the managers to describe the influence of some factors (such as: 
change in the organisation’s status, economic situation, competition, professional 
bodies, educational institutions, technology, culture, consultancy industry, 
regulation and legislation, and the other organisations) on the organisation’s 
operation and management control system.
6.5.2. Documentary / Archival Records
In addition to the above method, information was obtained from documentary or 
archival records. Documentation refers to “paper” data that can come from the 
following variety of documents: letters, administrative documents, textbooks, journals, 
items from mass media, agendas, policy documents, and other similar items (Yin, 1994; 
Hoepfl, 1997). The research involved a review of relevant internal and external 
documents such, as Indonesian law and regulations. This study will describe much 
about the Indonesian laws and regulations that influence the organisations’ change.
The use of these documents will help the researcher to ensure that interview data is 
analysed in context, and will provide another source of data for comparison. A number 
of books were used in order to provide the background for the development of the 
theory and the arguments that are presented in the study. Magazines, journals, 
brochures, the Internet (e-mail, web sites, etc) provided information on recent 
developments in higher education deregulation activity and development of the theory.
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6.5.3. Selection of Studied Organisations
The study focuses on two autonomous Indonesian universities. These organisations 
were selected based on the following criteria. Since the study discusses the MCS in 
autonomous universities, the main criterion in selection of the studied universities is that 
they have to be autonomous universities. A brief summary of the two studied 
organisations is provided in Table 6.3 below. The background of the organisations will 
be described in more detail in Chapter Eight.
Organisation Number o f  
Alumni
Number o f  
Lecturers
Number o f  
Students
Year o f  
Autonomy
Number o f  
Admin 
Sta ff
Number o f  
Faculties
Ajar
University
134,219 
(Oct 2003)
2,266 55,000 
(Sept 2003)
Year 2000 2,301 18 Faculties
Didik
University
109,944 
(Feb 2004)
2,434 35,326 
(Sept 2002)
Year 2000 2,000 12 Faculties
Table 6.3 : Profile o f the Studied Organisations
The use of only two universities is not considered a limitation since the researcher has 
considered some important issues. First, there were only two Indonesian autonomous 
universities at the time the researcher prepared the fieldwork questions and undertook 
the fieldwork. The universities were selected by the government to function as “guides” 
in Indonesia’s move toward greater academic and financial autonomy. The second issue 
of concern was with time: in this research, the researcher will deal with two big 
universities with thousands of employees, located in different cities separated by a trip 
by train of at least ten hours, so the researcher needs quite a long time to complete his 
research in the universities. The relatively short time available to conduct the field study 
led to the choice. With a six-month research period, the researcher has spent an average 
of three months in each organisation. The case study adopted here does not attempt to 
locate universal truths or generalisable theories that explain MCS practices. This study's 
aim was not to develop universal or generalisable theories of MCS but to explore the
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process of MCS change. Focusing on the two organisations allows for an in-depth 
investigation of the research issue (Flamholtz, 1983).
Conducting a survey on a large sample of organisations and information users and 
generalising the findings will neither help to understand or explain how MCS operate 
and why certain patterns exists. Therefore, studying a limited number of cases may be 
more suitable to understanding the topics. Furthermore, the importance of the 
educational sectors in the development of the country was another motivation behind 
selecting the two universities from among the various sectors.
6.5.4. Selection of Participants
Overall, 43 people were selected from both organisations based on several criteria: 
firstly, the participants should have some knowledge or involvement in control systems 
before and /or after autonomy; secondly, they should be willing to participate in the 
study; thirdly, they should be senior or non-senior managers in accounting and non­
accounting departments. The reason for this selection of participants was to provide a 
broader understanding of the MCS.
However, to support the study findings from the interview sections with managers, the 
researcher also interviewed some of the lower-level employees. Twenty two formal and 
five informal interviews were conducted in Ajar University, while twenty one formal 
and seven informal interviews has been done in Didik University over six months, each 
lasting between one and two hours. Table 6.4 below summarises the participants in this 
study.
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Items Ajar University Didik University
Number o f Faculties 18 12
Number of participating faculties 6 4
Percentage 30% 30%
Number o f Senior Managers interviewed 2 2
Number o f Middle Managers interviewed 11 11
Number o f Junior Managers interviewed ' 9 8
Total Managers Interviewed 22 21
Informal Interview (with lower-level employees) 5 7
Total Persons Interviewed 27 28
Table 6.4: Research Participants
6.6. Chapter Summary
DocumentsSemi-structured Interviews
Research Topic
Review o f Literature
Data collection in Indonesia
Research Methodology and Methods
Research Objectives and Questions
Data analysis and 
Write-up o f the thesis
Figure 6.5: Research Stages
In summary, Figure 6.5. above illustrates that the study consists of five stages. The 
scheme above draws every stage of this study. The first stage of the study has focused 
on writing the literature review, and developing the theoretical framework for the study. 
At this stage, the researcher has reviewed the literature covering the fields of higher 
education sector deregulation and MCS. The theoretical framework which integrates
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institutional isomorphism, competition isomorphism and power relation is developed at 
this stage. This is followed by developing research objectives and questions for this 
study.
The third phase of the research activity concludes with the research design and 
development of the research plan for the fieldwork in Indonesia. At this stage, the 
research instruments for the primary data collection have been developed and are 
currently being refined based on the advice of the supervision team. Data collection in 
fieldwork used semi-structured interviews and document analysis. After that, the 
research has concentrated on the fieldwork that focused on two autonomous state 
universities in Indonesia. The final phase of the research involves analysis of the field 
results and the subsequent writing up of the results.
The discussion above concluded that the reason for the choice of the research 
approaches used is that they are consistent with the aim of this research to explore and 
describe (explain) the reason for the change of management accounting systems in the 
case study organisations. The use of a case study gives an opportunity to explore and 
explain phenomena that are not well understood.
A qualitative researcher should, however, be aware of the following issues: firstly, the 
research process should be such that it is not too long, since subjects can change before 
the research is completed; secondly, the boundaries of the study should be defined; 
thirdly, ethical issues such as personal integrity, possible prejudices, and bias should be 
taken into consideration; fourthly, the skills of the researcher, such as questioning and 
listening skills, adaptability and flexibility, grasp of the issue, and lack of bias, should 
also be considered.
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This chapter concludes that the study of MCS requires and in-depth case study approach 
capable of locating and capturing the complex relations between the management 
control systems and the wider environment. It is also concluded that although the case 
study method is limited in its ability to generalise findings, it is argued that this was not 
the intention or aim of the study. .
In this study, the two studied universities have been chosen as the research site because 
it is expected that the organisations would provide rich and interesting data suitable for 
an equally interesting case study. As has been described in the chapter, this study uses 
data triangulation methods because this technique improves the validity and reliability 
of the research findings.
The next chapter provides an explanation of the higher education reforms in Indonesia 
and the research propositions.
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CHANGES IN THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND 
RESEARCH PROPOSITIONS
7.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the institutional environment as a pressure for 
change in Indonesian higher education institutions. This analysis is necessary in order to 
provide an understanding of the context within which the management control systems 
are located. Data for the analysis presented in this chapter were obtained from 
interviews and documents. Further evidence was also gathered from semi-structured 
interviews conducted with the study participants in each organisation and informal 
discussions with employees of these organisations.
This chapter explains the background of Indonesian higher education and is organised 
into five major sections. After this introductory section, this chapter continues with an 
explanation of the higher education reforms in Indonesia, including the definition of 
autonomy in the context of Indonesian universities and the factors that influenced the 
Indonesian government’s decision to reform the Indonesian universities. This section is 
followed by a description of the advantages of university autonomy. The next section 
consists of the propositions of this study, and the final part presents a general conclusion 
to the chapter.
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7.2. University Reforms in Indonesia
When a university is given the right to autonomy, it is given the authority to manage 
itself. The status of State-Owned Legal Board (BHMN/Badan Hukum Milik Negara) is 
given in order that the university can manage itself without government intervention. 
Thus, services, responsibility, and competitiveness are able to increase with no 
bureaucratic hindrance. The acceptance of autonomy by universities presented the 
opportunity for a public university (PTN), which was a government institution, to 
become an independent administrative entity. In a deeper sense, Lee (2001) noted that 
reforming universities should be better understood as a move to restructuring the 
relationships between universities, the state / government, and society.
The formation of a State-Owned Legal Board (BHMN) involves three aspects of
autonomy that require change: (a) financial or funding resources; (b) human resources
or personnel system; and (c) organisation. Through autonomy, a university gained the
independence to manage all of the aforementioned aspects. All of the freedoms were
bestowed in order not to bind a university to the rigidity of various government
bureaucracy, especially in terms of finance and employment. Furthermore, a participant
commented on the status changes as follows:
“We can look at the status changes as “the basics needed to jum p” to a 
better direction. As the changes occurred, we expected to be better 
organised in everything: well-organised in administration, in education 
execution, and so on. ”
The driving forces behind the changes is: increasingly severe global competition, 
community demand for the improvement of democracy in the nation state, the 
community’s strong will to step towards a civil society, and the needs of institutes that 
play a role as a moral force in materialising the plan. Universities represent one of the 
institutions that have the capability to make a contribution, in addition to addressing the
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need to balance the universities’ functions in their participation in developing science 
through global communications and in keeping their identity, as history and national 
history are an intrinsic part of them (Directorate General of Higher Education, 1999).
By looking at the changes explained above, Tilaar (2000) and Chacha (2000)
commented that a university needs to operate with the highest degree of freedom and
autonomy to allow it to be an institution that has creative character, and it will then
become a pioneer of change, both within the surrounding community and in scientific
progress. Dlamini (1996, from internet article) explained this point further:
“Academic and institutional freedom is very important because it enables 
universities and other tertiary institutions to do their job o f generating and 
disseminating knowledge and information effectively. That knowledge is 
fo r  the benefit o f society in general and not for a few  individuals. This
knowledge is aimed at improving the quality o f  life o f all people,
physically, economically, politically and even spiritually. ”
The process of changing the status of the studied universities from a public university 
(PTN) to a State-Owned Legal Board (BHMN) has such a long way to go because there
are state institutions that are related to each other, namely; the Department of National
Education with the Secretary of Cabinet, the Department of Finance, the Minister of 
State for State Apparatus Empowerment, and the National Development Planning Board 
(BAPPENAS). Each of the state institutions is bound by laws and legislation, which are 
different for each of them.
The issuance of the Government Regulations for the universities to become universities 
that are a State-Owned Legal Board (PT-BHMN) do not automatically mean that the 
universities will change as a whole in organisation and management. The changes will 
be undertaken systematically and carefully because they relate to academic staff and 
non-academic staff, who amount to around 5000 people, and they are connected to more
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or less 40,000 students from any of the various education levels. Besides, the changes in 
the universities also relate to government institutions and laws and state legislations. 
Therefore, though autonomy was bestowed on the universities by the government in 
2000, some parts of the university still cannot change.
7.3. Factors Influencing University Reforms in Indonesia
Several factors influence university reforms in Indonesia, such as: political issues in the 
country, globalisation that leads to competition, pressure from foreign donors, such as 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), pressure from the 
public, and the economic crisis that led to the country's financial problems. Figure 7.1 
below identifies some of the factors that influence the higher education reforms in 
Indonesia. Some of the institutional forces identified in Figure 7.1 below are explained 
in the remainder of this section.
G l o b a l i s a t i o n  /  
C o m p e t i t i o n
E c o n o m i c  c r i s i s  a n d  t h e  
s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y
Pressure from 
public
Political
Changes
Pressure from foreign 
donor institutions
Limited financial and 
human resources
Better condition for civil society
H i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  a s  m o r a l  f o r c e  f o r  c h a n g i n g
R e f o r m a t i o n  i n  g o v e r n m e n t  a g e n c i e s
Fig 7.1 : Background of university autonomy in Indonesia
7.3.1. Globalisation / Competition
Globalisation means ferocious competition in almost all aspects. There are a number of 
reasons, one of which is a globalised world in which universities are under market
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pressures in that they have to compete for the best students, resources, and become 
world renowned (Brodjonegoro, 1999). According to UNDP / United Nation 
Development Programme (2001), Indonesia is responding to the global economic 
situation by maintaining open regimes.
According to Brodjonegoro (2002), competition is an acknowledged central force in 
Indonesian higher education and is nurtured by many scholars. Indonesian universities 
experience a low quality of educational background. Table 7.2. below was shown that in 
2000, out of 78 universities in Asia, all of the universities in Indonesia were below the 
rank of 60: Didik University was in 61st place, Ajar University in 68th, and University of 
Diponegoro (UNDIP) in 74th (according to ASIAWEEK, 2000). Considering this 
situation, the government attempted to discern the reason for it and it surmised that it 
was due to the large amount of government intervention, both in the curriculum and 
finance management, as well as in the appointment of lecturers. For instance, almost 
80% of the curriculum was managed centrally.
University Position Note
1998 1999 2000
Didik University 55 70 61 1998: out of 61 universities 
1999: out o f 79 universities
2000: out o f 77 universities 
Science and Technology Univ 
1999: Out o f 35 universities 
2000: out o f 39 universities
Ajar University 49 67 68
Univ of Diponegoro 64 77 73
Univ o f Erlangga 61 79 75
ITB 14 15 21
Source: ASIAWEEK, 1998, 1999, 2000
Table 7.2: Position o f Indonesian Universities in Asia and Australia
To illustrate the limited control the universities have in managing education, one of the
Deputy Rectors of Ajar University stated in a newspaper (Jawapos, 25/10/2002):
“ All this time, though a number o f universities have brilliant people, they 
are weak systematically because they are limited by government rules”
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However, he also added:
“Autonomy is one o f  the ways to attain quality learning, quality research 
and a high commitment to the community. Autonomy is one o f the 
components for conducting improvements in management or improving 
quality. Due to autonomy, the university will develop in the management 
sector or in university management and other activities. ”
As for regulation, the Indonesian government is moving towards allowing overseas 
universities to set up offshore campuses in Indonesia. Many prestigious universities 
from several countries, including the US, the UK, Germany, Japan, and the Netherlands, 
are collaborating with Indonesian universities to offer degree and non-degree 
programmes using an international education system and curriculum to compete with 
local universities. In addition, the competitive environment is allowing Indonesian 
industry to continue to develop and expand, and the domestic job market is becoming 
more and more competitive, leading to concerns over the low quality of national 
university graduates, who are perceived to be less marketable and have weaker 
bargaining power in the job market compared to those who have graduated from 
overseas universities in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and 
France. Unemployment among the educated labour force continues to increase. To be 
able to compete, the Indonesian population has to be better educated than the 
populations of the competitors. In this case, public universities could be vital tools to 
help the country to benefit from globalisation (Bloom, 2002).
7.3.2. Political Pressure
Independence came in the rush of decolonisation after World War II, and was 
proclaimed on 17th August 1945.24 Indonesia has faced unprecedented turmoil over the 
years, facing first the Asian financial crisis in 1997, then the fall of President Suharto 
after 32 years in office in 1998, the first free elections since the 1960s, the loss of East
24 The country became ‘legally’ independent from the Netherlands on 27th December 1949
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Timor, independence demands from restive provinces, bloody inter-ethnic and religious 
conflict, and unending corruption scandals.
Political turmoil and civil unrest led to the resignation of President Soeharto in May 
1998. The first democratic General Election was held on 7th June 1999 and 
Abdurrahman Wahid was elected President in November of that year. President Wahid
jhimself was removed from office on 23 July 2001 by a special session of the MPR (the 
People's Consultative Assembly) and replaced by the then Vice President, Megawati 
Soekamoputri.
Indonesia had no history of stable democratic government, bore the scars of more than 
30 years of authoritarian rule and possessed armed forces deeply entrenched in the 
political and economic life of the country (Bourchier and Hadiz, 2003). The vacuum 
created by the collapse in 1998 of the centralised Soeharto system led to pressure in 
outlying areas for greater autonomy and louder calls for independence in some regions.
This power vacuum had further results, such as several bomb attacks in Jakarta and 
violence in the troubled Aceh, Maluku (Moluccas), and Irian Jaya (Papua) provinces, 
along with several others. Since East Timor was finally allowed to go its own way and 
break away from the rule of Jakarta, residents of the North Sumatran province of Aceh -  
a predominantly Muslim province -  have been demanding that they should be given the 
choice to hold a referendum, in the same way as East Timor. The Acehnese people have 
been unsatisfied with the way the government in Jakarta has kept them under tight 
control while exploiting them of their rich natural resources. The separatists have been 
fighting a guerrilla war against Indonesian rule, and thousands of people have been 
killed since the separatist rebellion began in 1976.
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Meanwhile, the Indonesian government has also been facing an independence 
movement from a Papuan separatist group. The separatist group of the Papua Movement 
has been fighting for independence from Indonesian rule, claiming that the 1969 Free 
Choice vote was a sham and discredited. Thousands of people have died in years of 
struggle between Indonesian armed forces and separatist rebels in Papua.
In addition, shortly after the collapse of the Suharto regime, violence erupted in the 
capital of the province of Ambon. Thousands of people have been killed in the region as 
a result of fighting between Muslims and Christians, and also as a result of clashes with 
the security forces. Many Indonesians believe that the roots of the conflict seem to be a 
more basic struggle for territory and identity. Many Muslims believe that Christians 
have preferential access to government jobs, but, on the other hand, Christians think that 
they do not receive adequate protection from the government and fear that the influx of 
Muslim migrants will leave them a powerless minority.
Since 1967, the state leadership has changed from the Old Order under Soekamo to the
9 ^New Order under Soeharto. With the New Order government under Soeharto,
everything had to comply with the ‘one and only principle’ (asas tunggal). To describe
what the New Order government has done, the people of Indonesia know this phrase:
“To dream o f something different would be so frightening, more so to act 
differently."
The development system that occurred in the New Order was centralistic. In general, the 
New Order leaders believed that it is the duty of the people to carry out the development 
programme that the government has planned. They still assume that people are inferior,
25 The New Order era began when President Soeharto assumed leadership in 1967
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that they must be guided all the time and that they lack the ability to understand the 
technical issues that are required by the development plan.
In a book about the history of Ajar University, it is explained that the treatment of the 
university by the New Order was different from its treatment by the Old Order. 
Soekamo’s (the leader of the Old Order) regime did not intervene in university policy, 
at least not in the case of Ajar University, while in the New Order there was a tendency 
towards co-optation: for example, the postponement of the promotion of a Doctor, or 
deciding when a lecturer should gain promotion in rank or go abroad to undertake 
graduate study.
According to Sukarto (1999), the inclination to date in the education system in 
Indonesia is for the uniformity of education, uniformity of results and perception. This 
matter is shown in the determination of the national curriculum and, in the case of 
Senior High Schools and lower education, in the uniformity of textbooks used. The 
rapid advancement of the world requires the adjustment of a dynamic curriculum. The 
national curriculum, which must be determined nationwide, often results in an impact 
on the educative staff that makes them static, with less concern for demands for change.
However, university education autonomy has become a trend of globalisation. After 
being granted autonomy, the education system in Indonesia .must play a more 
distinguished governmental role than before. Tilaar (2002) said that the role of central 
government bureaucracy in the area of education before autonomy was granted was 
greater than today, which discourages initiative on the part of the institutes.
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In the reform era, following the fall from power of Soeharto, a new spirit of the 
democratic process arose in Indonesia. In the reform era, a greater part of power in the 
management of the country, which in the past was centralised, has, except for matters 
which are vital in nature, been transferred to regional administrations. This is shown 
with the issuance of Law No. 22 and No. 25 of 1999 on Regional Autonomy, and PP 
61/1999 on University with Legal Entity Status (PT-BH), which was issued in the same 
year. In his study about economic reform and higher education in China, Ma (2003) 
concluded that economic diversity not only leads to changes in the structure of the 
country’s leadership, but also leads to some kind of autonomy in university governance.
Up to the year 2000, as set forth in the Law on National Education No. 2 of 1989, 
autonomy given to a university was only in the form of academic freedom, the freedom 
of speech and autonomy in science. Now Government Regulation No. 60 and the 
following Government Regulation No. 61 of 1999 provides higher education institutes 
with autonomy in the area of management matters, planning and budgeting. There are 
two Indonesian universities that have been granted the autonomy status.
7.3.3. Economic Crisis
The bestowal of status as a legal board and of autonomy for universities is also an effect 
of events that occurred in the Indonesian economy. A crisis hit Indonesia a few years 
ago, specifically in the midst of 1997, and has continued up to the present: there has not 
yet been a recovery. The public universities are, by definition, funded by the public 
exchequer. The crisis implies financial stringency for the government and hence it can 
be expected that allocations to all sectors, including higher education, may decline 
during the crisis period. In acquiring public funds, the higher education sub-sector has 
to compete with more pressing sectors, i.e. basic education, poverty alleviation, and 
health.
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As a result, the bestowal of autonomy was also an inseparable consequence of
government finance since the economic crisis that hit Indonesia recently: because of the
unorganised economy in Indonesia, the government was incapable of providing a
sufficient budget. The Rector of Ajar University revealed his opinion about government
responsibility in education after the crisis:
“The low education quality in Ajar University is inseparable from state 
responsibility. However, Ajar University can’t expect too much that the 
government will give huge funds. For instance, in 2004, the government 
only gave a subsidy o f around Rp 46 billion for Ajar University. In fact, in 
2003, the Ajar University budget reached around Rp 553 billion. ”
Meanwhile, the government simply allocated 3.49 per cent of its Income Budget
(Anggaran Pendapatan) and State Budget (APBN) for the education area (UNDP,
2001). The allocations were far removed from the government’s obligation to allocate
20 per cent of the State Budget (APBN) for the education area in accordance with the
mandate of the 1945 Constitution and Law Number 20 year 2003 on the National
Education System. The government’s incapability to allocate 20 per cent of the State
Budget (APBN) for the education area was revealed, by the Minister of Finance
(Kompas, 27/01/04), to be because:
“The state burden is so heavy. Besides, it must provide a budget for all the 
other 19 sectors, and the state is also obliged to pay the debt and the 
interest every year, which is a great amount. In 2004, the debt and interest 
paid was Rp 131.2 trillion or 149 per cent o f  the education budget. ”
7.3.4. Pressures From Foreign Donors in Indonesia
International Financial Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank (WB) have a long history of intervention in Indonesia. This started 
during the early 1960s when the Indonesian economy experienced a crisis caused by a 
collapse in the price of Indonesia’s major export, rubber. As a result, the WB offered 
substantial loans to Indonesia, conditional upon the implementation of severe austerity
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measures and the de-nationalisation of the previously foreign-owned sector of the 
economy (Down to Earth, 2000). In response, the Indonesian President Sukarno rejected 
the WB aid package. However, following Suharto’s coup in 1965-66, the IMF and the 
WB were back through the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI, later re­
named CGI) and control over the Suharto regime’s economic policies.
In 1997, an economic crisis began in Indonesia, which has brought Indonesian 
companies to the point where they are not in sufficiently good financial health to run 
their businesses. There was also a “lack of confidence” among foreign investors, who 
continued to shy away from investing in the country’s unstable political economy. 
Support from official foreign investors and international financial institutions is still 
critical to Indonesia's economy since Indonesian investment activity is primarily from 
foreign companies. In addition, Indonesia's government is unable to borrow more 
money from international investors unless it pays impossibly high interest rates.
Foreign donor organisations, like the IMF and World Bank, have issued almost- 
irresistible demands for economic law reforms, backed by the loans needed for 
economic and political survival (Henisz et al., 2004). A dependency of the Indonesian 
government on the IMF has been caused by the credit given by the IMF, which has 
become bigger and bigger every year (see Table 7.3 below). With about 75% of 
Indonesian businesses in technical bankruptcy following the country's economic 
collapse in 1998, the government was forced to turn to the IMF for an emergency debt- 
relief package totalling $43 billion l www.imf.orgl.
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Name o f Projects Project’s Fiscal Year Total Loan (US$ Millions)
Human Resources Educational 1971 - 1992 1301.1
Human Resources Educational 1994- 1998 528.3
Source: Basri et al. (1999), "A Study Case of Corruption in World Bank Projects", the paper has not been
published, as written by Nugroho (2000).
Table 7.3: World Bank Package for Indonesian Education Development 1971 - 1998
In return for this, the strategy adopted by the Indonesian government has to reflect the 
agreement between the government and the IMF, such as slashing the social budget 
(subsidy cuts in education, fuel, etc.), privatisation programmes, re-capitalising 
insolvent banks, liberalising foreign trade and investment, increasing the transparency 
of public sector activities to enhance the quality of governance, and dismantling 
domestic monopolies (Fanning, 2000; www.imf.orgl. The important point is that when 
the state decided to revoke subsidies for the parts of the public sector that were thought 
to be uneconomical, as was asked by the institutions, the education sector was included. 
The revocation of subsidies was meant to lead to the government relinquishing control.
The IMF demanded that Indonesia implement an economic reform programme in order 
to help save its economy. IMF demands included creating greater transparency in the 
issuing of government loans and subsidies, and stricter enforcement of laws and 
regulations in the area of government procurement. The government has announced 
several reform initiatives since receiving the IMF bailout package, including the 
planned privatisation of several sectors of the economy and reform the state higher 
education institutions. In its effort to satisfy the donor institutions in order to secure on­
going funding, the government has pursued these policies.
In addition to this, the influences of foreign donor institutions (i.e. the IMF) on 
Indonesia can be seen in the following examples: the IMF forced the Indonesian 
government to liquidate one of the Indonesian banks and rejected the government plan
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to present a rights issue of Rp. 3.9 billion26 as an alternative solution to save the bank; 
the IMF also forced the Indonesian government to sell one of the biggest companies in 
Indonesia, Asia Pulp and Paper (APP), to a foreign creditor.
In addition, the IMF and the other donor agencies have also worked with the 
government by providing the government with some technical assistance on a number 
of public sector related issues. The IMF and the Asian Development Bank placed some 
of their advisors in the Ministry of Finance to assist the government in these issues.
7.3.5. Societal Pressure
The bestowal of status as a legal board and of autonomy for universities is also an effect 
of events that occurred in the Indonesian economy. The economic crisis spread to 
become a political, social, and cultural crisis in Indonesia. This situation has led to less 
and less public trust in formal institutions, the government, or even in public groups. 
Therefore, the process of transition to a more democratic civil society needs a trusted 
partner that is able to act as a moral force: public universities are expected to be capable 
of playing this role, provided that some requirements can be met.
An attempt has been made to put public universities in a position as a moral force. In 
order for the public universities to play their role in the process of development of a 
more democratic civil society, as well as being capable of competing globally, their 
legal status needs to change from the present condition. As a unit in the Department of 
National Education, it would be difficult, legally, for a public university to play an 
important role in creating a moral consciousness. A self-reliant moral force can develop 
if a university does not depend on something (Kompas, 23 July 1999).
26 Exchange rate for £ 1 = Rp. 15,000
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Additionally, society, through tax, donation, and tuition fees, has become the funding 
party, so that a university has to be accountable to society for the use of funds and the 
quality of its product, i.e. graduates. Following President Soeharto’s resignation, there 
was a growth in public demand to discover the way the public institutions spend public 
resources. Accountability to society may not be an easy thing to ask of a public 
university as a unit of the Department of National Education. Moreover, its credibility is 
simply gained when the two things, autonomy and accountability, are gained in reality, 
as well as being applied in public university management. Thus, a PTN has to change its 
legal status to an independent State-Owned Legal Board and autonomy must be 
bestowed.
Based on Government Regulations (PP) No.61 Year 1999, the Ajar and Didik 
university’s decision to become a State-Owned Legal Board (BHMN) was taken due to 
the following considerations:
(i) To improve the national competitive ability required of the universities to be the 
moral and intellectual force in the process of development of a democratic society, 
and also to be able to compete and cooperate globally.
(ii) In order to be able to play the role as the moral and intellectual force that has the 
credibility to support national development, as well as having competitive ability at 
the international level, the universities must have independence.
(iii) Ajar University and Didik University already have the ability to implement 
adequate management in order to obtain autonomy, independence, and more 
responsibility.
Indonesia is a highly pluralistic country and a diverse nation, reflected by its national 
credo: ‘Bhineka Tunggal Ika’ which means ‘Unity in Diversity’. With dosens of
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existing ethnic groups and several hundred different local dialects, Indonesia is 
comparable with Europe in terms of diversity (see appendix 5.2. for further 
explanation). In such a highly pluralistic country, a universal policy that applies to every 
institution is not suitable. Uniformity of practices does not fit such a heterogeneous 
system. Providing more autonomy to higher education institutions is considered to be 
the best-suited approach to managing the higher education system in a highly pluralistic 
country such as Indonesia.
7.4. The Case for University Reforms in Indonesia
The positive side of the status change is that the universities are independent, which 
means that they have the power to make decisions and manage their own governance. 
The universities have the authority to adopt any behaviour. Therefore, Their 
accountability is improved. As a result, the universities should change their paradigm 
from accountable to government to becoming accountable to stakeholders, where the 
government is one of the stakeholders. The implications of facing autonomy are that, in 
practice, it sucks up extra energy in preparing supportive resources and infrastructure. 
The Rector of Ajar University explained the reason for the bestowal of autonomy on the 
university:
The government formed BHMN universities in order that they might 
have greater authority to manage and set the curriculum, to make 
universities independent education financial policy and in determining 
requirements for lecturer appointment that are in accordance with 
university needs. With all the authority and independence, it is expected 
that student quality will improve. ”
The administrative reason for the need for decentralisation is that the centralised system 
is classified as bureaucratic and wasteful. Fiske (1996) said that empowerment of 
officials at a local level would give better results, as it eradicates the multi-level 
bureaucratic procedures and motivates education officials and lecturers to be more 
productive. Fiske (1996) also said that decentralisation would improve the quality of
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teaching and learning, as it places decisions near the place of teaching and learning, 
encourages the officials and lecturers to work better, and serves as a place for people 
and educational officials of all levels to have a sense of belonging in the education 
system.
Consequently, in the case of universities, measures taken to overcome government 
funding deficiencies are as follows: first, to rely on comprehensive plans from the state; 
second, to raise tuition fees; third, to find out ways to attract foreign investors or private 
institutions, including loans; fourth, to develop business units such as petrol stations, 
supermarkets, telecommunications points and so on. According to some interviewees, 
the fastest and the most appropriate way for now is to try to raise tuition fees, in spite of 
opposition from certain parties.
7.5. Proposition
7.5.1. Reform of an Organisation’s Status and MCS
There are some studies that discuss the impact of the change of an organisation’s status 
on the management control activities. One of the major subjects for study is the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Evidence has suggested that 
privatisation has some effect on MCS (Uddin and Hopper, 2001). For instance, the 
above study by Uddin and Hopper (2001) on a privatised soap factory in Bangladesh 
found that privatisation changed the budgetary control system. Due to the 
computerisation of information systems, the company now has a more detailed 
budgetary control system which is reviewed more frequently.
In the case of the higher education sector, review of the previous studies in Chapter Two 
revealed that there is evidence that university reforms have led to some changes in MCS 
context within universities. For example, Watts (1996), Meek and Wood (1998) and
Crebert (2000) found that management accounting control systems (such as: strategic 
planning, governance, and budgeting) in Australian universities changed after the 
Dawkins reforms in 1988. Moreover, Lee (2001) and Ma (2003), who conducted studies 
in universities in Singapore, Hong Kong and China, found that university reform 
brought a new remuneration system in the universities, which consists of a basic salary 
and other components that relate to performance, responsibilities and market value. Lee 
(2001) added that reforming universities has been seen as a move to restructure the 
relationships between universities, the state / government, and society.
Based on the above argument it is proposed that
PI: The changes in the status of the universities from state units to 
legal entities will lead to changes in their management control systems
7.5.2. External Organisations and MCS (Coercive)
The economic crisis in Indonesia produced ideas to improve rationality over state 
financing activities in order to obtain efficiency, effectiveness, and economy of state 
expenditure. As the condition of state finance is poor because of the crisis, the 
importance of a budgeting function to decide on priorities and to combine an action plan 
with available potential resources was realised. The benefits and cost of any activities 
are analysed and any institutions that use the budget have a duty to report their 
performance. The economic crisis also provided an opportunity for Indonesian policy­
makers to examine and identify the structural weaknesses within its public sector and to 
undertake the necessary budgetary reforms in an appropriate, sequenced manner.
The economic climate since late 1990s has led to pressure on government and 
companies’ management to find a way to improve financial performance. From the 
beginning to the middle of the 1990s, management faced uncertain economics because 
of government and business actors’ debts. The crisis, coupled with the political decline,
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led Indonesian society to the call for the resignation of President Soeharto and demands 
for political reform. The vacuum created by the collapse in 1998 of the centralised 
Soeharto system led to pressure in outlying areas for greater autonomy and louder calls 
for independence in some regions.
Hence, following Soeharto’s resignation, Indonesia introduced major law reforms and 
new legislation in the management of economic and social processes, including 
bankruptcy, unfair competition, decentralisation and related laws to improve democratic 
life, and has also undertaken the process of decentralisation. With the new law reforms, 
the government grants greater autonomy and new responsibilities to the districts. This 
re-allocation of power has turned Indonesia from a centralised to a de-centralised 
country. This de-centralisation has continued in some government agencies, such as 
educational institutions.
Soeharto’s government manipulated people to keep silent towards the “over-extended 
family” and “corruption, collusion and nepotism” cultures. These cultured had been 
abused for economic and political domination. The change of political situation gave the 
Indonesian people back the political voice that was silenced by Soeharto’s leadership. 
Indonesian people increasingly demand the rights of freedom of speech, to participate 
and to organise themselves to control the government’s activities. As a further result, 
the workers have organised themselves so that they are strong enough to fight for their 
own interests, so that they can participate in the process of production and share in the 
profit (Banawiratma, 2000). These rights also led to a growing public interest in the way 
in which public resources are used. In the case of universities, this situation was added 
to by the growing interest of students, as the main users of university equipment and
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services, to be told the way that the university spends the money it receives from them 
(such as: tuition fees).
The Reform Era gave Indonesian people the opportunity to practise democratic 
principles. The Indonesian people want the Reform Era to decrease or abolish 
corruption, collusion and nepotism in every area, including in government units. To 
achieve this goal, some changes have been made to the Indonesian laws and regulations 
(which are: Government Regulation No.61/1999 on reforms in Public Universities, Law 
No. 17/2003 on State Finance, Presidential Instruction No.7/1999 on the System of 
Finance Report of the Government Institutions). The most important change is that to 
the Indonesian 1945 Constitution, which represents the highest-level regulation in the 
Indonesian legal system, and serves as a basis and reference for all of the subordinate 
regulations of Indonesia. The change in the constitution was followed by other laws.
Regulations create and reinforce routine and structures, since organisations need support 
from the environment for their survival and continued operation while, if they fail to 
conform to such regulations, they risk losing their legitimacy and external support from 
the government as the fund provider, society, and the other stakeholders (D’Aunno et 
al., 1991). Moreover, the Law on Finance of 1925 (Indische Comtabiliteit Wet/ICW), a 
legal product since the Dutch colonial rule, and Law No. 43/1999 on civil servants 
(Civil Service Law), have been considered as barriers to the universities changing 
certain existing management control practices. D’Aunno et al. (2000) found that state 
legislatures produced several policies that aimed to promote or inhibit change in their 
studied organisations. This contradictory effect has been argued by D’Aunno et al. 
(2000) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) to be because institutional actors have multiple 
and often inconsistent interests.
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As one of the government units, the universities are also dependent on the acquisition of 
resources from government to support their activities. The universities also have to obey 
the requests of the governmental institutions where their operations are regulated in 
order to secure funds from the agencies (see also Collier, 2001).
Based on the above argument it is proposed that
P2a: The external environment, such as governments, including 
government bodies, and laws and regulations, would influence the 
operations of management accounting control systems in the studied 
organisations
P2b: Political situation would influence the operations of management 
control systems in the organisations
P2c: Laws and regulations would promote or inhibit the change in 
management control systems in the organisations.
7.5.3. Willingness to Imitate Other Organisations and MCS (Mimetic)
Many countries, especially Asian countries, have already changed their state university
systems to be autonomous, examples being China, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore. The explanation in section 7.3.1 above concluded that the 
low ranking of the Indonesian universities in Asia created a willingness in the 
Indonesian government and academicians of the Indonesian universities and public to 
develop the quality of the Indonesian universities to catch up. For example, they learned 
from the experiences of the neighbouring countries (such as higher education reforms 
giving an autonomous status to the state universities) in order to catch up with their 
counterparts.
Based on the above argument it is proposed that
P3: The willingness to imitate other successful organisations would 
influence the organisations to adopt certain management accounting 
control practices
151
7.5.4. Professionals, Cultural Value and MCS (Normative)
Economic development in Indonesia over the past years, especially in the New Order 
era, has had a strong relationship with the United States and other Western countries 
(Heuer et al., 1999). In the New Order era, Indonesian technocrats that trained in the 
United States or other Western countries have been the main players as policy makers. 
An example is given by Hollinger (1996) and McCormack (1999), who stated that in the 
beginning of the New Order era, a group of economists trained at the University of 
Berkeley set up a policy about foreign direct investment in order to support economic
0*7growth through export. Moreover, Heuer et al. (1999) argued that Indonesian 
managers’ completion of the U.S. or overseas Master of Business Administration, and 
the proliferation of such programmes in Indonesia, have played a part in the widespread 
application of Western Management techniques in Indonesia.
In addition, McCormack (1999) added that most of the bureaucrats who held influential 
positions as policy makers were also lecturers at leading universities in Indonesia. This 
situation supported the development of Western knowledge, including accounting 
theories, in Indonesia. With their positions, these bureaucrats and scholars diffused 
knowledge through education to young scholars who represent the next generation of 
policy makers and bureaucrats.
Based on the above argument it is proposed that
P4a: Management control systems in the studied organisations are 
shaped by professionals both within and outside the organisations
Many previous researches (such as Bimberg and Snodgrass, 1988; Granlund and Lukka, 
1998; Collier, 2001) discuss about culture in their study. Bimberg and Snodgrass (1988)
27 Further explanation about the influence o f Indonesian Western-trained bureaucrats in the development 
of the Indonesian economy can be obtained from McCormack (1999) in his article “Fifty years o f  
Indonesian development: “one nation,” under capitalism.”
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in their study that comparing Japanese and American culture found that culture affects 
control in an organisation. In term of Indonesian environment, Tsamenyi, et al. (2004b) 
found that the adoption and evolution of control systems in the family-owned university 
they studied are significantly shaped by the Indonesian culture. Culture that is 
developed in any of the various organisations in Indonesia is inseparable from a number 
of factors, which are the system of values accepted in general by society: for instance, 
the principle of consent (musyawarah), unanimous decisions (mufakat), co­
operativeness (gotong royong), loyalty, kekeluargaan (family atmosphere); forgiving 
culture, look up to the top officers (in Javanese, this is called ing ngarso sing tulodo) 
(see Rademakers, 1998; Dean, 2001; Tsamenyi et al, 2004b). An example of the 
influence of culture in Indonesian people day-to-day activities has been shown in 
Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution that stated that the national economy shall be 
organised as cooperative endeavour based on the family principle.
Hence, as has been also argued by Dean (2001), Tsamenyi et al. (2004b) that all the 
culture issue above may well explain some managerial practices in Indonesian 
organisations. It has been supported by some researchers (such as Granlund and Lukka, 
1998; Collier, 2001) that argue that the success or failure of an adoption of new 
management and accounting systems in an organisation depends on the relative strength 
of a culture. Collier (2001) provides an example of this by saying that managerial 
reform in an organisation could be impeded by a resistance that has been supported by a 
strong culture.
Based on the above argument it is proposed that:
P4b: Culture would promote or inhibit the organisations to adopt 
certain management control practices.
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7.5.5. Inter Organisational Power Relations and MCS
Organisational power relations among individuals or institutions within an organisation 
produce opposing effects, either promoting or inhibiting change in the organisations' 
systems (see Bums, 2000; Collier, 2001). The review by Collier (2001) highlights that 
organisational power may cause conflict where interests do not coincide. Organisations 
experience difficulties in changing their existing systems when faced with the ability of 
an individual(s) or an institution(s) to influence behaviour and overcome resistance 
(Bums, 2000; Pfeffer, 1992). On the other hand, Giddens (1976), Bums (2000) and 
Collier (2001) have also argued that power has the potential to be enabling if the 
interests of different groups are shared.
As can be seen in the study by Collier (2001), the power of institutions arises from the 
need of the organisations for legitimation. As an example, in universities, as 
government units, political uncertainties were linked with laws and regulations, and this 
led to a lack of managerial autonomy that prevented managers from responding to 
problems relating to their sub-ordinates (such as rewards and sanctions): the managers 
must obey these laws and regulations to support their survival and continued operation 
(Collier, 2001). This finding is similar to that of Hoque and Hopper (1994), who found 
that reward and punishment systems in the studied state owned companies have been 
influence by the regulation from government. As a result, the companies only took little 
action against any employees who failed to achieve set targets because compensation 
and punishment was decided by the government.
Based on the above argument it is proposed that
P5a: Power relations would either promote or inhibit change in the 
organisation’s management control systems.
P5b: Government laws and regulations influence certain management 
accounting control practices by affecting organisational power 
relations of the universities managers over their sub-ordinates
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7.5.6. Market Forces and MCS
Most countries in the world, including Indonesia, have been influenced by the 
phenomenon of globalisation and the knowledge-based economy that have caused 
dramatic changes to the character and functions of public sector institutions, including 
higher education institutions (Mok & Lee, 2001).
As has been discussed in Chapter Three, most universities in LDCs are today facing 
more competition from universities in developed countries, for example from the 
establishment of local branches or satellite campuses, or through international distance 
education and e-leaming for course delivery (see Mohamedbhai, 2002). This 
phenomenon has also been happening in the Indonesian higher education market since 
early 2003 (see explanation in section 7.3. above). Indonesian law No.20/2003 on the 
System of National Education promotes change in the universities accounting control by 
allowing overseas universities to set up local branched or work together with local 
private universities to establish a new university. This fact has increased competition 
between national and international higher education institutions in Indonesia. This 
strong competition motivates organisations to consider their existing system to increase 
the organisation’s ability to face the competitive pressure (see also D’Aunno et al., 
2000).
Some experts (such as: Mia and Clarke, 1999) have argued that an organisation needs to 
adapt quickly to face threats and opportunities in the competitive environment and that 
they design appropriate control systems for this purpose. Consequently, Mia and Clarke
(1999) also argued that if  an organisation faces increasing competition in its market yet 
fails to adopt and implement appropriate strategies to deal with such competition, its 
performance will decrease.
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Hannan and Freeman (1977) and Baum and Haveman (1997) argued that organisations 
that have comparative disadvantages in key areas need to make substantial changes in 
templates as they seek domains in which they can hold a competitive advantage. This is 
consistent with the argument of Parker (2002), Mensah (1981) and Gordon and 
Narayanan (1984) that control system design is sensitive to the way that a firm 
competes; hence, universities in many countries have dramatically adjusted their 
activities as a response to global external environment pressures.
As government units, the two studied universities had limited freedom to manage their 
day-to-day activities in order to face market competition, especially from their 
international competitors. Hence, the universities sought more freedom from the 
government in order to manage their activities. For that reason, after a long discussion, 
the government granted autonomy to the universities. Conway et al. (1994) provided an 
example of the influence of competitive forces, which is that, in the UK, market forces 
influence the new universities' and colleges' management accounting practice (e.g. 
strategic planning). They argued that the universities and colleges need to incorporate a 
greater market orientation into their strategic planning process to acquire a competitive 
advantage over their rivals.
Based on the above argument it is proposed that
P6a: Competition influences certain management control practices in 
the organisation.
P6b: Government regulations and policies influence certain
management accounting control practices by increasing the level of 
competition that organisations face
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7.6. Chapter Summary
From the literature review above, there are some external factors that influence the 
decision to grant the autonomous status to some universities in Indonesia. The reforms 
in Indonesian higher education institutions have been an integral part of some of these 
factors, which are: firstly, economic constraints, like the Indonesian financial crisis, 
quicken the tempo of the reform steps; secondly, the Indonesian government’s plan to 
reduce the burden of its budget; thirdly, the autonomy is in line with the foreign donors’ 
reform packages to increase accountability and transparency within the Indonesian 
government; fourthly, pressure from the public, who expect the country’s major 
universities to play a greater role in the strengthening of the economy and in the 
empowerment of the regions by producing better-qualified graduates in a more efficient 
and transparent way; fifthly, influences from world globalisation, which puts Indonesian 
universities under pressure to compete for resources, students, and a good name; sixthly, 
pressure from the public on the university to act as a free and independent moral agent 
for changing to better conditions for civil society.
Finally, the complexity of problems that the university faces will immediately become
an obstacle to reform in the two universities. Therefore, the reform needs to proceed
gradually to avoid collisions between viewpoints and interests. As one of the deputy
deans in the Didik University stated:
“We don’t have any magic wand to change conditions in the blink o f an 
eye. We should make continuous and gradual changes. We should dare to 
innovate in this kind o f situation to solve any problem. ”
This discussion will be continued to the next chapter, which discusses the background 
of Indonesian higher education and the studied organisations.
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CHAPTER EIGHT:
BACKGROUND OF INDONESIAN HIGHER EDUCATION AND 
THE STUDIED ORGANISATIONS
8.1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the background of the Indonesian higher 
education environment and the research sites, Ajar University and Didik University. 
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part provides an overview of the 
background of the Indonesian higher education environment in order to provide more 
information in chapter discussion, followed by an introduction to Ajar University and 
then Didik University in next section. This chapter then closes with a summary.
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8.2. Education in Indonesia
8.2.1. The Structure of Education in Indonesia
Educational development is a priority for government policy because Indonesia is a 
developing country. Education levels included in the school education system are based 
on the Law No.20/2003 and consist of primary education, secondary education, and 
higher education. According to UUSPN, higher education is education after secondary 
education, and covers the diploma programme, undergraduate, postgraduate, and 
specialist degrees, and doctorates. The education and training sector also includes non- 
formal, professional, and out-of-school education. The system of formal education in 
Indonesia consists of the following levels of education:
1. Pre-school programme. The pre-school programme is largely organised by 
private groups. This programme is more popular in urban and developed 
regions, and is still quite rare in rural and less developed parts of the country. 
Included in this programme are: (1) Nursery school (< 5 years of age), and (2) 
Kindergarten (< 6 years of age).
2. Primary education. Compulsory basic education in Indonesia lasts for nine 
years and consists of two parts: six years of primary school (Sekolah Dasar / 
SD), and three years of junior secondary school (Sekolah Lanjutan Tingkat 
Pertama / SLTP).
3. Secondary Education. This programme of education is intended for children 
between the ages of 16 and 18 years. Senior secondary education consists of 
three years and is divided into vocational (Sekolah Menengah Kejuruan / SMK) 
and general streams (Sekolah Menengah Umum / SMU).
4. Higher Education. There are three types of higher educational institutions, 
which are: universities; advanced schools and institutes; polytechnics and 
academies.
Figure 8.1 below summarises the Indonesian education system.
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Figure 8.1: School System  in Indonesia
8.2.2. History of Indonesian Education
Education in Indonesia has experienced three different eras subsequent to political 
changes in Indonesia: these are the Old Order educational system, the New Order 
educational system, and the post-reform educational system.
8.2.2.I. Education in the Old Order Era (1945 -  1965)
The Old Order period started from the time Indonesia gained freedom from the
colonialists. The Post-Independence Indonesian National Education System formally
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commenced following the declaration of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945. 
At the time, all activities were directed to encourage nationalism, union and unity as 
well as towards the consolidation of national power. Consequently, education was 
directed towards an indoctrination process, rejecting all ideas from outsiders (Tilaar, 
2000). Tilaar (2000) further argued that education in Indonesia was not oriented towards 
quality improvement but used as a power tool in order to achieve the government’s 
goals.
8.2.2.2. Education in the New Order Era (1965 -  1998)
In this New Order era, President Soeharto’s administration ordered uniformity in 
thought and action. The government tried to create a homogenous society. It killed 
democratic life and developed a rigid bureaucracy, in which officers were to ask for 
their superiors’ guidance, which eventually bridled the initiative of individuals to form 
their own opinions and extinguished freedom of expression. During this period, the 
ruling voice (government) was absolute. Furthermore, education had no social 
accountability since society was not involved in its management. Accountability was 
determined by the rulers, not the consumers. Society had been distanced from their right 
to education.
The consequence of a dead democratic system during the New Order period, Tilaar
(2000) concluded, was an unclean government with bad practices such as corruption, 
collusion and nepotism (KKN). Corruption triggered a high-cost economy. However, at 
the time, as Tilaar (2002) explained, the education system in Indonesia was aimed at 
achieving quantitative goals. As a result, Indonesian educational output did not have 
global competitiveness.
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8.2.2.3. Education in the Reform Era (1998 -  Now)
Entering the reform era, subsequent to the Soeharto government, the Indonesian people 
intended to create a democratic society, which meant that each person would have 
communal rights and obligations, freedom of expression and rights to reject certain 
opinions. According to the Central Statistics Agency of Indonesia (2003), the 
percentage of the population completing an educational grade tends to get smaller in 
line with the increasing educational grade. The percentage of the population completing 
elementary school and junior high school amounts to 29.6% and 14.7%, respectively. 
Furthermore, the percentage of the population who graduate with a minimal Bachelor’s 
Degree only amounts to 1.7%.
In addition, the Central Statistics Agency of Indonesia also records that the opportunity 
to obtain an education is not enjoyed by all of the population. Of the population aged 5 
years and over, the proportion that have never attended school amounts to 11.1%, the 
proportion that are still attending school amounts to 24.8%, and the proportion that have 
dropped out amounts to 64.1 %.
In the year 2002, it was recorded that the number of schools existing under the 
Department of National Education at the elementary school level amounted to 148,516 
units, junior high school amounted to 20,842 units, senior high school amounted to 
12,307 units, and university amounted to 1,891 units, as shown in the graph below. The 
graph below also shows that there was an increase in the number of universities from 
1,633 units in the academic year 2000 to 1,747 units in the year 2001 and 1,891 in the 
year 2002.
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Figure 8.2: Total number of Schools in Indonesia 2000 - 2002 
Source: BPS -  Statistics Indonesia
In Indonesia, private institutions play a dominant role in higher education. However, 
most private institutions only enrol a small number of students: 1.6 million students are 
enrolled in 1558 private institutions, compared to the remaining 950,000 students in 
merely 75 public institutions. The table 8.3. below summarises this information.
Number of institutions Number of student enrolled
Public institutions 78 942,973
Private institutions 1558 1,681,175
Source: Moeliodihardjo (2000), Dikti PTN (1998), Dikti PTS (1998)
Table 8.3: Distribution o f Institutions and Student Enrolment
The 1945 Constitution stipulated that one of the constitutional obligations is to develop 
the mentality of the nation. Higher education institutions in Indonesia have to 
implement national objectives. Subsidy is a policy instrument that the government of 
Indonesia utilises to bring justice and equality into reality in various public services, 
including higher education institutions. When the government’s finances are sufficient, 
this normally enables the government to expand the higher education institutions. 
Before the economic crisis, the government subsidises 95 percent of the cost of the 
higher education institutions. Since the economic crisis, government finance is not as 
good as it used to be and, as a result, this has had the effect of reducing the level of 
subsidy.
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8.2.3. Indonesian Higher Education Systems
The Indonesian higher education system is comprised of both state and private 
institutions, which are both recognised by the Ministry of Education and Culture. 
Indonesian higher education institutions are typically academies, polytechnics, institutes 
and universities. An academy conducts applied science education in one, or part of one, 
discipline, technology or one of the arts. Polytechnics are attached to universities and 
provide sub-degree junior technician training. A polytechnic conducts applied science 
education in several particular fields. Both of these forms of higher education are 
categorised as professional education. A college/school, both public and private, 
conducts academic and professional education in one particular discipline. An institute 
consists of faculties conducting academic and/or professional education in disciplines 
that belong to the same group of professions. This category includes Islamic institutes, 
which have the same rank as universities but come under the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs, and institutes and teacher training institutes, which rank as universities with full 
degree-granting status. A university consists of several faculties conducting academic 
and/or professional education in several disciplines, technologies and/or several of the 
arts.
Higher education in Indonesia recognises bachelor (SI), master’s (S2) and doctorate 
(S3) programmes, each of which covers the number of system credit units (sks) 
amounting to 144-160, 180-194 cumulative for a master’s programme, and 220-233 
cumulative for a doctorate programme. In the system as conducted in the United 
Kingdom, at undergraduate level, a university usually offers both arts and science 
degrees. Furthermore, a master’s degree lasts an average of two semesters, which is then 
continued to doctoral degree level. The master’s programme and doctoral programme
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are also called graduate school. Graph 8.4 below summarises the differences between 
higher education in Indonesia and the United Kingdom.
Indonesia United Kingdom
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_____ (000 000 ______
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(180 -1 9 4  SKS)
-------- Graduate School --------
----------MA; MSc, MBA -----------
---------- Sarjana(Sl) ---------
(144 SKS)
—  College / Undergraduate —
Arts Science
Table 8.4: Higher education system in Indonesia and United Kingdom
The Ministry of Education and Culture reports that, in the year 2000, there were 77 
public and 1,365 private tertiary institutions. Coordination is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Education and Culture through the Directorate General of Higher Education, 
which exercises authority over both state and private institutions. State institutions are 
financed by the central government, although provincial governments may also provide 
funds. Each of these has different standards and facilities, particularly among private 
institutions. Roughly 10% of tertiary education students attend government-run state 
institutions, while the remaining 90% attend private institutions. Tertiary education 
includes both academic and vocational streams and students may choose between four- 
year academic degree programmes and vocational non-degree programmes of study, 
which last for one to four years.
A lecturer in a government higher education institution is a civil servant, as decided by
the government in the Decree of the Minister of State for Empowerment of State
Apparatus on “Lecturer Functional Position and Credit”, which states:
“Being a lecturer in a Government Higher Institution is the right o f an 
individual only i f  he is a Civil Servant and possesses the ability to teach in 
it. ”
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Lecturers in Indonesia, be they civil servants or private company employees, have the 
same level of classification. The positions and classifications of lecturer, from the 
highest ranking to the lowest, include the following:
a. Assistant Expert: 1. Penata Muda golongan ruang Ill/a;
2. Penata Muda Tingkat I golongan ruang Ill/b;
b. Associate Professorship consists of:
1. Penata Golongan ruang III/c;
2. Penata Tingkat I golongan ruang Ill/d;
c. Senior Associate Professorship:
1. Pembina golongan ruang IV/a;
2. Pembina Tingkat I golongan ruang IV/b;
3. Pembina Utama Muda golongan ruang IV/c
d. Professorship: 1. Pembina Utama Madya golongan ruang IV/d;
2. Pembina Utama golongan ruang IV/e
8.2.4. Performance and Problems in Higher Education in Indonesia
Higher education in Indonesia is facing a number of problems, one of which is funding.
The Indonesian government has, for many years, invested less than 3% of its GNP in
education. Since the Indonesian economy is unorganised, the government is incapable
of providing a sufficient budget. Another problem is the low level of salaries. Generally,
the salary of lecturers throughout Indonesia is too small to live a decent life. Therefore,
many lecturers also have additional jobs in order to make ends meet. As a result, they
lack the time and concentration to improve their academic qualities. It is common for
some lecturers to resort to lecture notes, teaching strategies, and test materials that have
been used for several years without any improvement. Moreover, lecturers are unable to
update themselves in their respective fields and to do research as a prerequisite to
climbing the career ladder. A university lecturer who participated as a research subject
gave the following comment on his salary:
“I f  I  calculated my monthly salary as a lecturer, it would perhaps just 
cover 25% o f the cost o f  living for me and my family each month. In 
anticipation o f this, I  have to do another job outside o f the university. In 
addition, my wife also works full-time in a company. ”
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Therefore, the government and public universities, as well as all components of society,
must work harder to give a more prosperous life to all levels of lecturers and public
university employees: if these people attain a decent life, this will result in their
increasing commitment; if  not, they would seek other opportunities for work outside of
the university, which would decrease the effectiveness of education on campus. They
are hardly bound to their university, as they have to find extra income outside of the
office. A respondent emphasised the above during the interview:
“The welfare o f lecturers should be raised; then they would have more o f a 
commitment to stay at the campus. I f  they had a better income, they would 
concentrate more on subject preparation. As a result, they would be more 
eager to guide their students. The students would then graduate on time 
and funding resources, as well other resources, would not be overspent 
during the course o f  study. ”
Another problem is when achievement in a managerial position is more appreciated than
scientific achievement. People are more proud of getting a position such as a major
head, dean or rector, and especially director general or minister, than being a scientist
instead. As one interviewee commented:
“I t ’s understandable since the structural positions in the university, for  
example, get much better payment than a lecturer. It emerged that some o f  
the lecturers prefer to support non-regular programmes which provide a 
huge income. ”
A further problem is the high dependency on sponsors, since most research in a 
university is directed by outside parties, both government institutions and companies. 
Research reports therefore aim just at meeting the needs of the sponsor: very little effort 
is put into an in-depth analysis of the data or writing it for submission to a qualified 
publication whilst referring to the very latest literature. The majority of university 
lecturers assume that research is simply an extra activity to get additional income and
167
not to make a new breakthrough or to contribute their knowledge to others: they do it 
because their salary is low.
Finally, the critical issue in the Indonesian higher education system is the availability of 
qualified staff among the institutions, which has a serious impact on the quality of the
education process. Many programmes in the regional universities do not have enough
staff with the proper qualifications, which endangers the level of competitiveness of its 
graduates in the job market. More than half of the staff in public universities hold only a 
first degree, as illustrated in table 8.5. below.
Highest degree earned Total
Diploma 471
First Degree 27,597
Specialist 1,747
Master's 13,990
Doctorate 4,123
Total 47,928
Source: Dikti PTN (1998)
Table 8.5: Distribution o f staff in public universities
8.3. Background of Ajar University
Ajar University was established in year 1940s and is located in Yogyakarta. Ajar
University, which is located in Yogyakarta, was established in the 1940s when a private 
foundation, consisting of a faculty of law, was established by a group of Indonesian 
intellectuals and nationalists. At the same time, the Department of Education of the new 
Republic of Indonesia founded many schools in many areas of Indonesia. Years after 
that, the government decided to establish a new university and united the six faculties /
9Rschools into one single university.
Today, Ajar University is one of the biggest universities in the country with around
50,000 students and approximately 4,000 lecturers and non-educative employees. At the
28 The six faculties were: the faculty of medicine, the faculty o f law, the faculty o f engineering, the 
faculty o f language, the faculty o f veterinary science, the faculty o f agriculture.
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moment, Ajar University comprises 18 faculties and a graduate programme, 2 institutes 
with 12 university-wide centres, 5 inter-university centres, central laboratories and an 
agricultural experiment station, a computer centre, and a network of university libraries. 
The 18 faculties are the Faculty of Biology, the Faculty of Economics, the Faculty of 
Pharmacy, the Faculty of Philosophy, the Faculty of Geography, the Faculty of Law, the 
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, the Faculty of Medicine, the Faculty of 
Dentistry, the Faculty of Veterinary Science, the Faculty of Forestry, the Faculty of 
Mathematics and Natural Sciences, the Faculty of Agriculture, the Faculty of Animal 
Husbandry, the Faculty of Psychology, the Faculty of Cultural Science, the Faculty of 
Technology, and the Faculty of Agricultural Technology.
The composition of the lecturing staff at Ajar University is that 6% of the academic 
staff are Professors, and around 30% of the staff hold doctorate degrees. Moreover, a lot 
of the academic staff are continuing their studies to obtain doctorates, either within the 
universities in Indonesia or abroad. Ajar University has produced a great number of 
scholars, around 70,000, with various degrees. It has taken merely half a century for 
Ajar University to develop into one of the greatest national universities in Indonesia. 
Ajar University runs all degree programmes, namely undergraduate programmes (SI), 
master’s degrees (S2), doctorates (S3), and diplomas (SO).
8.4. Background of Didik University
As the oldest university in Indonesia, the university is the highest institution, and is 
highly experienced in education as well as in research. Similar to Ajar University, the 
origin of Didik University was also as a collaboration of nine faculties united into one 
single university. As also happened with Ajar University, the government established 
Didik University to unite schools that had already been founded. In the 1950s, when the 
university was first established, Didik University was a multi-campus university with
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faculties in Jakarta, Bogor, Bandung, Surabaya, and Makassar.29 In the 1960s, all of the 
faculties moved to three campuses, all in the same city. The university consists of 
twelve faculties: more than 200 study programmes are offered, along with research- 
based professional programmes, such as the diploma programme and the doctorate 
programme, and there are a total of around 36,000 students. Ajar University has 3 
campuses, the areas of which are 320 hectares, 93,850 square metres, and 7,703 square 
metres.
To date, the university has 12 faculties - namely the Faculty of Medicine, the Faculty of 
Dentistry, the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, the Faculty of Technology, 
the Faculty of Law, the Faculty of Economics, the Faculty of Cultural Science, the 
Faculty of. Psychology, the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences, the Faculty of 
Public Health, the Faculty of Computing, and the Faculty of Nursing - as well as a post­
graduate programme, and an international class programme. Faculties coordinate both 
degree and non-degree programmes, the former consisting of undergraduate degrees, 
master’s degrees (post-graduate programme) and the doctorate programme, whereas in 
the latter, the diploma programme is available. The objective of the post-graduate 
programme is to organise a cross-studies master’s programme while still guaranteeing 
teaching quality. The Academic Year is from September to August and comprises two 
semesters, each lasting for 16 weeks. There is a short vacation between semesters, and a 
longer one at the end of the second semester.
Based on data from 2003, the university’s teaching staff comprised the following: 183 
Professors, around 480 Doctors / PhD, plus 1,278 master’s degree teaching staff. In 
addition, the data revealed that several of the academic staff were taking advanced study
29 Didik University was a multi campus university with faculties in Jakarta (Medicine, Law, and Letters), 
Bogor (Agronomy and Veterinary Medicine), Bandung (Engineering, Mathematics and Natural Sciences), 
Surabaya (Medicine and Dentistry), and Makassar (Economics).
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courses to obtain a doctorate, either in Indonesia or abroad. Up to 2003, the university 
had already produced a huge number of scholars, which numbered, in all degree 
programmes, more than 109,944 students.
Table 8.6. below provides the comparison between the two studied universities.
Table 8.6: Brief Description of Ajar University and Didik University
No ; Items ! Ajar University Didik University
1. Year o f established 1940s 1950s
2. Origin o f the university j Union o f six schools:
\ the faculty o f medicine; 
] law; engineering;
| language; veterinary 
j science; agriculture
; Union o f four schools: 
Medicine, Law, and 
, Letters; Agronomy and 
• Veterinary Medicine;
■ Engineering, 
Mathematics and 
Natural Sciences;
; Medicine and Dentistry; 
I Economics
3. Grant o f an autonomy status by government Year 2000 Year 2000
4. ; Location : Yogyakarta ; Jakarta (Capital city)
5. Number o f faculties 18 12
6 /' ’ Number o f students .; 55,000
7. Number o f alumni 134,219 109,944
8. ' Number o f employees
' - Lecturing staff i 2,266 2,434
: - Non-lecturing staff \ 2,301 2,000
Total ! 4,567 4,434
9. The composition o f the lecturing staff
Undergraduate Degree N/A 676
Master Degree N/A 480
- PhD 680 1278
10. ; Employees Status \ Majority are Civil 
| Servants
■ Majority are Civil 
J Servants
11. Highest authority before autonomy Government Government
12. ; Highest authority after autonomy MWA MWA
13. Members o f MWA (in persons)
Government Representatives 1. 1
Academic Senate o f the University 12 11
Society/Members o f public 7 6
Employee Representatives 2 1
Student Representatives ■ 2 V 1
- Rector (has no vote) I . . .  ' .... 1
Total 25 ■. 21
14.' ; Programmes that are provided undergraduate 
j programmes, master’s 
i degrees, doctorates, and 
i diplomas
. undergraduate 
programmes, master’s 
: degrees, doctorates, and 
diplomas
15. Position in Asia and Australia (Year 2000) 68 61
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8.5. Summary of Chapter
The discussion above concluded that educational development is a priority for the 
Indonesian government. Education in Indonesia has experienced three different eras 
subsequent to political changes in Indonesia, which are the Old Order educational 
system (1945 -  1965), the New Order educational system (1965 -  1998), and the post­
reform educational system (1998 -  Now). There are, at present, a number of problems 
facing the educational environment in Indonesia, especially the higher education 
institutions, such as: limited funds, low salaries, sponsor dependency, and human 
resources. As was also concluded in Chapters Two and Four, these problems influence 
the management control systems in the studied organisations.
The studied organisations in this thesis are the two oldest and largest universities in 
Indonesia, and they have a long history. As has been described above, the universities 
have a similar history. The discussion also explained that the universities have 
thousands of students and employees, including teaching and administrative staff.
This thesis will continue in the next chapter with a description of the case results in the 
two studied universities.
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CHAPTER NINE 
CASE RESULTS:
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS (MCS)
PRE HIGHER EDUCATION DEREGULATION
9.1. Introduction
This chapter is the first of two chapters reporting the case study results and provides a 
description of the different components of the management control systems (MCS) in 
higher education before deregulation. This chapter focuses on MCS components such as 
strategic planning, budgeting, employee performance, appointment of managers and 
price decisions at Ajar University and Didik University.
)
This chapter is divided into six sections. After the discussion part, the second section 
describes the industrial relations and relations of power among the actors in the 
universities, followed by the third section, which describes strategic planning, including 
the missions, visions, goals and organisational strategies, that were applied in the 
universities before deregulation. The fourth section explains the budgeting practices in 
the universities before the government granted their current autonomous status. The 
next section describes the mechanisms for setting the tuition fees in the universities 
before deregulation. The final section provides a conclusion to the chapter.
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9.2. Industrial Relations
This section briefly outlines the roles of diverse groups in the universities, such as: 
government, academic senates, university leaders, the faculty leaders, and academic and 
administrative unit leaders. This discussion is important for understanding the sources 
of control of the changes that have taken place in the universities.
9.2.1. Relations Among Managers
The participants from the two universities refer to the universities as a “multiversity” 
than as an “university”. Multiversity itself means that the faculties and departments 
“run” their own policies and that there is no synergy between them to achieve the 
university’s goals. In the universities, the department is the spearhead of education 
implementation, research, and public services. Participants from the two universities 
gave comment on relations between the Rector, Dean, and the Heads of Departments by 
saying that relations between them occurred only in the hierarchy but not in daily 
management activities. This situation has arisen due to the mechanism for the 
appointment of a manager, which is not undertaken by the higher officers. The 
managers therefore assume that they do not have to comply with the higher officers’ 
decisions. In addition, the different management activity systems in every faculty are 
also caused by the absence of regulations from the universities, which previously set the 
standard for implementation of daily management activities. As a consequence, faculties 
run on their own according to their previous habits.
Since the historical background of the universities is that they were formed as a 
combination of pre-existing faculties, the result of this is that there is no coordination 
among faculties. Some respondents from the two universities stated that, since the 
establishment of the two universities, they have been in federal form: for instance, there
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is no coordination in financial matters between the faculties, as revealed by an officer in
the Directorate of Finance in Didik University:
“Though each faculty is under one institution, called the university, they 
operate on their own. For example, each faculty finds their own funds in 
their own way since the university will not give extra funds to faculties with 
fewer students. At the same time, the rich faculties won’t help the poor 
ones. Although the university has a role as the administration centre, it 
only gets 10% o f the income from the students. The rest is delivered to the 
academic departments to manage their money independently. ”
The same thing also happens at Ajar University. Interviews in the universities revealed
that such circumstances have encouraged “little kings” in the universities, perhaps
resulting from departments’ ability to raise their own income without depending on the
university as the administration centre. A respondent from Ajar University stated:
“Besides tuition fees from the students, each o f  departments has some 
income resources outside o f the fees. The lecturers - who have side jobs, 
like teaching in other private universities, holding positions in other 
institutions, and so on - contribute part o f their received fees to the faculty 
or department. Then, the fees are collected for their own needs without 
university recognition. Usually, i t’s not reported to the university as the 
administration centre. ”
9.2.2. Employment Status and Review of Employees’ Performance
Before the bestowal of autonomy, the employment status in public universities,
including the two studied universities, was that the majority of the employees were civil
servants (PNS) who were governed by the prevailing government rules. With regard to
the status of university employees, a participant expressed his opinion by saying:
“With the status o f PNS, the government is an institution that holds a key 
role in regulating us. Starting from our appointment as PNS assigned to 
this university, the salary, allowances, and sanction imposition up to our 
termination as employees are all carried out by the government through 
the officials as appointed by the Minister o f  State Apparatus 
Empowerment. Even for higher-ranking officials, the President o f  the 
Republic o f  Indonesia him/herself carries this out. ”
30 This regulation is set for a certain period, reviewed within approximately five years or at certain times 
according to need.
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The Minister of State Apparatus Empowerment (abbreviated to MennegPAN) assists the 
President in preparing and formulating policy in the area of personnel in this country.31 
According to the Presidential Instruction, the assignment of assistance includes: (1) 
organising personnel affairs in their entirety; (2) matters relating to personnel 
regulations; and (3) human resources development. Apart from the government, the 
institution that also takes part in determining policy on civil servants is the House of 
Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat / DPR). However, the role of the DPR is 
limited to significant or key matters, namely when the policy needs to be promulgated 
in law. In making the law, the DPR is entitled to forward suggestions and proposals to 
add or change the draft rules, which are usually accepted by the political party in 
government. The DPR also has a very important role to play in preparing the state 
budget (APBN). This APBN is closely related to personnel affairs such as determining 
the level of salaries, allowances and so forth.
Before deregulation, the procedure for employing new educative staff was similar to 
that for administrative staff. These procedures were based on a quota system that was 
determined by central government. This system encouraged problems between the 
educative and administrative staff that were employed in accordance with knowledge 
priority and those that had to be accepted because of a central decision. A participant
31 This is pursuant to the Presidential Instruction that stipulates:
"The number and ranking grade o f  employees fo r  an institution under the jurisdiction o f  
the government is set by the minister responsible in the area o f  state apparatus 
empowerment by observing the opinion o f  the management o f  the institution concerned. ”
32 As civil servants, they were recruited based on the SI certificate qualification. After two years as a 
candidate employee (capeg) they will be appointed as a permanent lecturer: their starting position will be 
class IIIA, a middle expert assistant (asisten ahli madya) (if SI), class IIIB, an expert assistant (if S2), or 
class IIIC, a junior lecturer (if S3), within certain age limits. The class (and position) slowly progresses to 
HID (middle lecturer), IVA (lecturer), IVB (the head of middle lecturers), IVC (the head o f lecturers) and 
so on, with a two year minimum to rise from one class to the next class. If they meet the required 
standard, then a lecturer can rise to the highest position, class IVD, a professor. Promotion in academic 
positions is possible when the related individual meets the required credit qualifications as well as having 
a good performance review. The amount o f credits required for any position is referred to in the 
governmental rules. These credit points are obtained from teaching, researching, and public service 
(Three Obligations o f University/Tridharma Perguruan Tinggi). It takes 50 points to rise from class IIIA 
to IIIB, for instance.
added the following comment on the regulation of personnel in the university at which
he worked before the granting of autonomy by the government:
“In the personnel area, this university also had to adhere to government 
regulations. In fact, in the government regulations, the minimum 
qualification for civil servant (PNS) appointment is an undergraduate 
degree. In my opinion, those appointed as lecturers should hold a master’s 
or doctoral degree. It is not appropriate that those holding bachelor 
degrees have to teach students holding the same degree. This has caused 
the ranking o f the university to be low because the lecturers do not have 
the doctoral degree qualification and, in the government regulations, it is 
also stipulated that a civil servant must hold the minimum o f a bachelor’s 
degree to be appointed”.
Considering the policy of the government, a number of faculties in the two universities 
have the financial ability to appoint several lecturers or employees that they need with 
funds from the faculty alone; the employees are appointed to become faculty staff by the 
relevant Faculty Dean using a decree. An interviewee responded to this matter by 
stating as follows:
“In this faculty, we need such employees and the university does not have 
sufficient funds to pay them. Therefore, the Faculty Dean recruited them 
using funds from the faculty budget alone. The appointment uses a decree 
from the Faculty Dean. ”
In addition, in recruiting employees and lecturers, the faculty and the relevant
department also face a number of problems, as stated by an interviewee as follows:
“We find difficulty in recruiting employees who have the expertise 
required fo r the job to be assigned. For example, the active tradition o f  
giving priority to family members in employment, no matter the quality 
thereof, has meant that we have several times been influenced by some 
lecturer or senior staff member to hire his/her family member to work here. 
The result is that, although the quantity exceeds the requirement, the 
quality is, however, far below the standard requirement. This tradition is 
still active in this university. ”
Another respondent added on the background of employees working for the university:
“Several employees in the faculty were recommended by lecturers who 
were working on a project at that time. When the project was finished, the 
lecturers left their assistant to us to keep them working fo r  the faculty. 
Now, with autonomy operating, the faculty has issued an announcement
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that the assistants recommended by the lecturers shall be the responsibility 
o f the relevant lecturers and the faculty will not appoint the assistants to 
workfor the faculty. ”
A respondent commented on the human resources policy applied by Didik University, 
which hinders the university in developing the quality of its students:
Before autonomy, as a government institution, we had to accept the 
lecturers and employees supplied by the government. Pursuant to the 
government regulations, the candidates fo r  lecturer/employee should be SI 
graduates. The university had to abide by this policy. However, based on 
such undergraduate qualifications, we do not actually have any 
competency to teach the undergraduate students. ”
A participant in Ajar University commented on the recruitment of employees as 
follows:
“No method is used in recruiting employees. They simply hire a candidate 
i f  the relevant candidate originates from the same village or from the 
family o f  one o f  the university’s employees. The reason for this matter is 
that the recruitment o f employees at this time is not based on competence 
nor do they consider whether or not the candidate is qualified for the work 
to be carried out. The result is that so many employees do not know how to 
do their job well. ”
As a result of this, when the researcher asked one of the employees in one of the studied
universities about his duties and responsibilities, he said that:
‘7  have no idea what duties or what responsibility I  carry, so I  just spend 
my time sitting or walking around. ”
As a result, managers in the two universities argued that the bad industrial relations in 
the organisations meant that they could not exert discipline over their subordinates. 
Hence, this study found that the top officers in the universities principally use informal 
procedures with their subordinates in daily work activities. This issue will be discussed 
more in the Chapter Eleven. Several faculties implement various rules on sanctioning 
lecturers concerning their attendance. However, they are simply moral punishments, as 
conveyed by one of the Deputy Deans:
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“Since most o f the lecturers have civil servant status, we have no power to 
punish them with respect to their salary. We just announce the individual 
whose performance is poor in a faculty meeting that the lecturers attend. ”
Formally, the performance of Ajar and Didik Universities' administrative staff is
measured by their attendance: they have to indicate their attendance twice a day, in the
morning and in the afternoon before they go home. However, the attendance record is
simply a piece of paper that should be signed when they come and go, which provides
an opportunity to cheat. Besides, the human resource unit only collects the attendance
sheet once every 3 months to calculate the incentives for employees. Thus, the
administrative staff in some units that have low levels of control would sign the
attendance sheet for three months in one go. A member of the administrative staff
responded to this matter by saying:
”Control o f attendance manually by the top officer is hardly possible 
because the related officer comes in later than their subordinates; 
sometimes they are not even in the office as they are busy with their own 
business. ”
According to the writer’s observations during the field research at the university, it 
seems that, even though the rules state that administrative staff have to come in at 7 am, 
in fact a lot of offices are still empty at 8 am. This is strengthened by the comment from 
a Deputy Rector:
"Early in the morning I  made an unannounced inspection o f  some units at 
the Central Office o f Administration. The result indicated that, at 07.25, in 
some units less than 25% o f the employees had arrived at the office. At 
07.35, the work units were just occupied by around 25% o f  employees. 
This frequently occurs in this university, in which the majority o f the 
employees are civil servants (PNS). ”
On the other hand, there is different approach to measure the performance of the 
teaching staff. The role of faculty management in the sector of education and learning is 
to manage the education system, commencing from the establishment of the system and 
continuing until the period of evaluation. After the determination of the curriculum by
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the faculty, the next principle is how a lecturer shall principally implement the 
curriculum in the learning process, and responsibility for this is fully given to the 
lecturer. The role of the faculty is to equip the lecturers with the knowledge and 
proficiency skills they require in order to comprehend the lecturing programme: this is 
achieved by the involvement of lecturers in upgrading the course on the particular 
learning subject.
Some managers explained how to direct and supervise the implementation of the
lecturers’ daily duties: they stated that, with respect to psychological aspects, they are
reluctant to issue rigid orders and to supervise strictly the lecturers concerned due to the
acknowledgement given to the autonomy of lecturers. As stated in the Rules of
Association of the University:
“Academic freedom shall by right belong to members o f the University 
Academy to be responsible and self-reliant in carrying out the Academic 
Programme. "
The aspect of reluctance occurs in case they have to face a senior lecturer; therefore, an 
evaluation of the implementation of the learning process is conducted. A representative 
Dean explains:
“Concerning the issue o f lecturer evaluation, so far the implementation is 
mainly through monitoring the attendance o f  the lecturers and their 
discipline. Such monitoring comprises: total attendance hours, total 
lecturing hours, including the lecturer attendance list, the students 
attendance list, and materials presented by the lecturer that conform to the 
syllabus obtained from the faculty. The first Deputy Dean also monitors 
the aspect o f student evaluation given by the lecturers concerned, with the 
grades ranging from E to A, through the provision o f  quizzes, mid-semester 
tests, and final semester tests. ”
The following are explanations of the evaluation of curriculum implementation. A
respondent explains:
“The control o f curriculum implementation by a lecturer is applied 
through: (a) lecturing unit (SAP) o f  the respective subject; (b) report from
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the students concerning the implementation o f  the lectures by the 
respective lecturers, related both to the material o f  the lectures and the 
lecture schedules; (c) regular meetings between faculty management and 
the lecturers concerned”.
A Dean explained his role in evaluating lecturers with regard to the implementation of
the curriculum as follows:
“The Dean’s role with regard to the evaluation o f  lecturer performance is 
monitoring and assessing the lecturer’s performance. Sometimes the Dean 
warns the lecturer (mostly the senior lecturers) in a persuasive way. This 
approach is more effective compared to a formal method because the 
lecturers feel they are more appreciated and, as a result, this kind o f 
approach really works. ”
A Dean also explained:
“Commencing when I  was a lecturer and continuing until now, when I  
have been the leader I  have used many approaches to supervising the 
lecturers in carrying out the curriculum, starting from the non-formal or 
persuasive approach, such as through dialogue with them concerning their 
problems in giving lectures, up to the level o f  formal action, such as 
compelling them to fill in an attendance list and to write down the main 
issues o f the lecture subject, to the dissemination o f questionnaires to the 
respective students concerning the attitude, method and materials o f  the 
respective lecturer. However, it all depends on the person himself. Based 
on this data, the Deputy Dean o f General Administration identifies the 
performance o f the lecturer in order to take action. With regard to a cross­
checking approach, the Dean usually directly inspects in the field to 
investigate directly by questioning or to see directly what’s going on. ”
Another respondent illustrated the sanctions in his faculty:
“We practise moral sanctions in our faculty. We won’t get involved in any 
projects with a lecturer whose performance is poor. In other words, we 
would isolate the person. ”
The universities have no mechanism to award bonuses for lecturers or employees. 
Besides there being no reward, the universities do not have a recognised system of 
punishment. Thus, a diligent employee, in fact, is not treated differently to a lazy 
employee. Actually, as civil servants (PNS), the employees of the universities are bound 
to the central government’s rules. There are sanctions that manage them: however, as
181
civil servants in Indonesia, it would not be easy to take action against them, since the 
bureaucracy is too long to bother with when a civil servant must be punished. Usually, 
the government only takes action if an employee commits an act that is against the law, 
such as criminal actions, is a member of a prohibited organisation, attacks the 
government, and so on. If they just do silly things, the government ignores it. Even if an 
employee were indeed to commit a terrible act that is against the law, the universities 
would just call and ask the individual to resign, which is the utmost that the universities 
are able to do.
Therefore, there is no difference between the treatment of a hard-working employee and 
one who is not. Thus, the employees are not worried about their status. There is a strong 
culture among PNS all over Indonesia, in general. An employee responded to his status 
as civil servant:
“What do I  work hard for? What is the advantage i f  I  work hard? Whether 
I  work hard or not, there is just no difference. I  will not get less payment. 
Even i f  there are some who work hard, i t ’s simply because they have that 
quality. ”
The problem was conveyed by an employee who had worked in his institution for a long 
time:
'7  do my best in my job because I  want to dedicate myself as a civil servant 
who works here. As a civil servant, we receive our salary in advance at the 
beginning o f  the month and, in return, we have to work to the optimum.
Unfortunately, there are few  employees who think like me. ”
However, to review their level of employee discipline, the universities, as a part of a 
government unit, used the DP3 (Work Performance Appraisal List), which was 
completed directly by the top officer to monitor staff work quality. The DP3 was used
as the basis to determine periodic rank promotion. The review was, however, not
effective enough to improve employee performance, due to difficulties getting the top
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officers to give as objective a review as possible: as a result, when they had to review
their subordinates, they simply assigned a “good” mark to their staff. Another reason is
that the review depended on the top officer’s point of view, which could become a
polemic with the staff. Thus, a “not quite good” mark would cause the emergence of
conflict between them. An employee said that:
“I f  I  got a “not quite good” mark for my achievement, I  would go straight 
to protest and ask for an explanation from my boss and, i f  I  could, I  would 
try to change the mark, because this review affected my rank promotion, 
which is also related to my salary. ”
Likewise, both the top officers and the subordinates thought that the performance
review was very subjective since it relied simply on the top officer’s perception. Hence,
the head of a sub-section explained the monitoring of his subordinates’ performance:
“When my subordinates’ performance was poor, I  would warn them in a 
family atmosphere’. I f  they ignored the warning, I  just submitted the 
problem to the university. ”
9.2.3. Management Structure
Faculty Faculty
Academic Senate
Service Units
Faculty
Board of Curator Rector And Vice Rectors
Administrative Bureaus
Government (Minister of National Education)
DIKTI (Directorate General of Higher Education)
Figure 9.1 : State Universities’ Management Before Deregulation
Figure 9.1 above illustrates the organisational structure of the two case universities 
before the higher education reforms. Before autonomy was granted by the government,
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all Indonesian state universities, including the two studied universities, had the same 
organisational structure that had been designed by the government (e.g. the Minister of 
Education and Culture of the Republic of Indonesia (now Minister of National 
Education)) through decree No.0133/0/93 issued in 1993. Apart from regulating the 
organisational structure, this decree also regulated the job descriptions of the managers 
in the two universities.
According to the decree, the organisational order of the universities was to consist of: 
the Rector and four Assistant Rectors as the leaders at university level, directly 
responsible to the Minister; a Dean and Assistant Deans as the leaders at faculty level; 
the Faculty Senate as the highest normative body in faculties; the University Senate as 
the highest normative body in the universities; the Administration Bureaus; a technical 
executor’s unit; and a guidance board.
The Rector managed activities with regard to education, research, community service, 
student academy development, administrative staff and environmental concerns. 
Pursuant to the Decree of the Minister of Education and Culture, the university was an 
organisational unit, part of the Department of Education and Culture. The Rector was 
the university leader and was responsible to the Minister of Education and Culture. The 
four Assistant Rectors were responsible for the academic, general administration, 
studentship, cooperation, and planning and development fields, respectively.
The University Senate comprised: regular professors, extraordinary professors, 
university management, Deans and Deputy Deans, whose appointment was stipulated 
by a decree from the Rector with the approval of the University Senate. The Senate had 
the following main duties: (a) formulate academy policy and university development;
184
(b) formulate policy with regard to assessment of the prestige and proficiency of the 
academy as well as the behaviour of education staff; (c) formulate the norms and 
standards of the education system, research and community service; (d) discuss and 
approve the university budget plans; (e) evaluate and approve the proposal of the tariff 
structure and fund management procedures derived from the community, which are 
formulated by the university management before they are proposed to the Minister of 
Finance through the Minister of Education and Culture; (f) assess the university 
management responsibility regarding the stipulated policy; (g) formulate the regulations 
of university academic freedom; (h) provide inputs to the Minister of Education and 
Culture regarding the candidates proposed to be appointed as Rector and lecturer to fill 
the positions of academic levels above lector; (i) enhance the applicable norms for 
academy members; (j) propose and confirm the awarding of Honoris Causa Doctor to 
the persons concerned that have met the requirements; and (k) conduct Doctoral 
Promotion tests. The administration bureaus consisted of: a bureau of academic 
administration; a bureau of finance administration; a bureau of general administration; a 
bureau of studentship administration; a bureau of planning administration and 
information systems.
Each faculty was managed by a Dean who was assisted by three deputies: a deputy in 
the academic sector, a deputy in the general administration sector, and a deputy in the 
student affairs sector. The Dean managed the education programme, research and 
community service, and developed the academy staff, students, and administration staff. 
The Faculty Senate was the highest normative body in the faculty and had the authority 
to interpret university policies and regulations for the faculty concerned. The Faculty 
Senate comprised: regular professors, extraordinary professors, faculty management, the 
Heads of Departments, and regular lecturers in the faculty that had at least the position
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of Junior Head Lector. The Faculty Senate was chaired by a Dean. The main duties of 
the Faculty Senate were as follows: (a) formulate the policy of the faculty academy; (b) 
assess the prestige and proficiency of the academy as well as the behaviour of the 
lecturers; (c) formulate the norms and standards of the implementation of faculty policy; 
(d) assess the responsibility of faculty management regarding the implementation of 
faculty policy as mentioned in point (c); (e) provide inputs to the Rector regarding the 
candidates for Head and Secretary of the Department as well as the heads of 
laboratories; (f) meet the requests of the Dean in the form of inputs and 
recommendations to assist the faculty.
9.2.4. Appointment to Management Positions
This sub-section further discusses the appointment of management positions (such as: 
Rector, administrative managers, and managers in faculties) in the two studied 
universities before, the grant of autonomy status from the government.
In term of Rector appointment, the two studied universities had a similar approach to 
appointing their Rector, which is because, before the bestowal of autonomy, both of 
these universities had to abide by government regulation No.30/1990 concerning higher 
education, which was then renewed by government regulation No.70/1999.33
Before deregulation, the Rectors of the universities were appointed as well as dismissed 
by the President on the suggestion of the Minister of National Education, another 
Minister, or another head of government, after receiving consideration from the Senate 
of the related university. As also occurred in every public university in Indonesia, the
33 The regulations stipulated that “the Rector o f a university/institute as organised by the government is 
appointed and terminated by the President based on recommendations from the minister (of education), 
other ministers or other government agencies upon obtaining consideration from senate of the 
university/institute concerned”.
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University Senate would hold a meeting to determine three candidate Rectors, who were 
then submitted to the Minister of National Education. The Minister would then choose 
and appoint one of them. The Minister had the prerogative to make the decision.
A participant from Didik University shared his experience of the role of officials in the
university and faculties with regard to the election of a Rector:
"Before the change o f university status, the Rector was elected only by 
members o f  the University Senate, whose members are the professors and 
structural officials at the office o f  the university head (Deputy Rector) and 
faculty (Dean). Such a mechanism gives the impression o f an elite and 
closed system, and so many campus members, apart from the University 
Senate, do not know about the vision, mission, and orientation o f the 
candidates for the position o f Rector, who are competing to manage the 
University in the years to come. In other words, the applied approach is 
the so-called elite approach. In fact, each member o f the campus is a 
stakeholder; they have the same right to invest in campus education, so 
they also have the right to participate in determining the future o f their 
campus. ”
Another respondent from Ajar University supported the comment from his counterpart
with an explanation of his opinion as follows:
’’Before autonomy, Rector selection was not open, which was against 
democratic principles o f openness. It was like "buying a cat in a sack” 
when we chose our leader. We had no idea about the quality o f the Rector 
or his programmes. In the reform era o f  today, the Indonesian people 
demand democratic principles in every sector. The university is expected to 
be a moral force in Indonesia, and must follow the principles. ”
Another respondent said that:
"The previous approach was not transparent; the final decision was made 
by the Minister o f Education and Culture. We did not have any idea about 
the capability o f the newly-elected Rector. How could we cooperate with a 
person whose capability was still unclear? ”
An examination of some the universities' documents reveals that the government 
frequently appointed a Rector based on political affiliation: this occurred where the 
government disapproved of the candidate Rector who won the vote of the University
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Senate. This situation caused conflict between the government-appointed Rector and the 
University Senate. The differences in opinion sometimes extended to the students or 
university employees, and disturbed the teaching and learning process; for example, 
during the Rector elections of 1967 and 1974, students in Ajar University who were 
opposed to the government appointments carried out a demonstration.
Other management positions in the universities relate to administrative units. According 
to the regulations concerning civil servants, the Rector, as the head of the institution, is 
the official in the university most authorised to choose a civil servant for filling a certain 
administrative position, such as Head of Bureau, Head of Unit, and so on. The 
appointment of someone to fill a post is closely related to the ranking grade as set for 
that position, so that a civil servant (PNS) having a higher rank cannot be directly 
subordinate to another PNS who has a lower rank. In appointing an official in this 
university, the university management sets the ranking grade that includes seniority in 
rank, job title, education and job training, years of service and age.
While, in term of appointment of the faculty leader, the two studied universities have a 
similar approach to appointing a Dean. Before the granting of autonomy, a Dean was 
selected based on a democratic system through voting by all lecturers in the related 
faculty. In this matter, the Rector, as the highest leader in university management, 
simply approved the result of the election that the faculty executed by issuing a letter of 
decree. This system affected routine activities in the universities where the Rector was 
unable to manage the Deans, who were under the Rectors administratively.
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A manager responded that:
“Though a Dean is under the Rector administratively, the Dean is not 
selected by the Rector but by the members o f  the faculty. The Deans 
therefore assume that they are not obliged to abide by the Rector's 
decisions and are not beholden to the Rector as the highest executive 
leader. The Dean is responsible to the members o f  the faculty who gave 
him the mandate to lead them. ”
Before autonomy, the appointment of a Deputy Dean was the prerogative right of the 
Dean. The Dean selected a person as the Deputy Dean, and then the Rector approved it 
and issued the letter of appointment. The Rector had no power to reject the Dean’s 
decision.
Finally, the Head of Department, who is hierarchically below the Dean and Rector, is
selected by the lecturer board. Although the Head is, in fact, under the Dean and Rector
administratively, the Dean and Rector have no authority to set aside the result of the
appointment by the board. Lecturers have the authority in the appointment of a Head of
Department. As a result, the Head did not have an obligation to obey the higher
authority, the Dean. The Dean was also unable to replace the Head of Department. A
Deputy Dean responded to the phenomenon as stated below:
“7 have found that it's very difficult to manage the Heads o f  Department to 
implement policies that the faculty has determined. ”
9.3. Mission, Vision and Organisational Strategy
As part of a government unit, before autonomy, the determination of the vision and
mission of the studied universities were inseparable from government intervention. The
universities had to follow the vision and mission that the government decreed, Hence,
the universities had similar visions and missions that had been provided by the
government. A participant commented on this as follows:
“In the past, the vision and mission o f  the university were not clear as all 
activities were unilaterally decided by the government. We can safely say
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that the vision and mission were imposed. The university had to follow 
whatever the government decided. Students, lecturers and other people at 
the university might not have agreed with the decision, but the university 
had no power to challenge it, we just had to follow whatever the 
government decided. ”
A government document provided evidence that the missions and visions of the studied 
universities and other state-owned universities had not been re-modelled since 1989. 
The universities’ strategic plans were also the results of government decisions.
9.4. Budget
Since the universities had the status of government institutions, they were obliged to
hand over all of their income, which came mainly from the tuition fees from the
students of all of the departments which the university owned, donations and charities,
and collaborations with other parties. As government service units, the universities
received a significant amount of subsidy from the government. Therefore, the
government was the party that played the most important role in the activities of the
university and universities had to comply with government regulations in financial
management, personnel management, the appointment of rectors, and some other areas.
As was stated by a former Assistant Rector in Ajar University:
“Even though the amount o f money provided by the government is still far  
from enough, the biggest percentage remains from government assistance. 
Moreover, the state universities alone cannot look for additional money by 
themselves at their own will. They have to report, even hand over the 
money to the government, before it is returned to the universities 
concerned to help with educational costs. However, this way is fe lt to be 
burdensome at critical times, when all kinds o f costs are swelling. That is 
why, since the economic crisis that started several years ago, the 
government aid for operation that was originally considered sufficient is 
felt to be inadequate. "
Even though the universities had to hand over their income to government, the
interviews with lower level managers in the two universities found that most donations,
and income from charities and collaborative activities were not reported to the central
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government. It found that the departments, as the working units, kept the income for 
their own needs.
The central government, which acted as the policy decision maker, had the greatest role
in determining the budget for the university. Therefore, the Rector of the university, and
also the Rectors of any other public universities (PTN), along with the Minister of
National Education, had to struggle with the government’s internal environment and
work hard to lobby within the government. The greatest role in setting the education
budget was in the government’s hands, as stated by a manager from Didik University:
“As a PTN, we are part o f the government where they decide everything 
via a budget proposal process. ”
The universities’ budgets were affected by the ‘development programme’ that the
government wished to be implemented. A manager explained this as follows:
“Our budget very much depends on the ‘development programme ’ that the 
government wishes to be implemented. For example, when the government 
wishes to develop oceanography, the budget related to it would thus be 
given a higher priority by the government than others, even though the 
others are highly urgent”.
At this time, the state universities used the traditional system of budgeting, which
consisted of Incremental Budgeting. To understand the reasons for the use of this
system, a respondent explained:
“The previous traditional system that university and other government 
institutions professed used in accordance with the demands o f the era, 
which put simplicity as a priority and achievement was measured from  
how far the university could spend the budget as it wanted. I f  we couldn’t 
spend it, they thought we had failed to improve our performance. ”
Meanwhile, the universities used a traditional system to prepare their budget. A Deputy
Dean commented on budget issuance before autonomy as follows:
“A long time ago, before autonomy, the budget was issued on an historical 
basis with respect to previous years’ budgets. The budget amount was
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always at the same level. There was not much change year by year. We 
were incapable o f raising the level for a necessary item even though 
indeed we needed it. ”
Based on regulations from the government, the universities divided the budget into two
parts, firstly, the government routine budget (DIK), which was intended to include the
operational fund of the university; and secondly the government development budget
(DIP), which was used for development, investment and progress, including the added
operational fund. The universities were not given the freedom to manage both the
money from the government and from society. A Dean explained both budgets from the
government as follows:
“The development budget shows long-term plans and budgets for 
permanent assets such as buildings, equipment, vehicles, tools, and so on. 
The development budget is for expenses that could be o f  benefit for more 
than one year and could increase the assets or the wealth o f the 
government and also would increase the routine budget for operational 
funds and maintenance. The routine budget is for expenses that are o f  
benefit fo r one year only and cannot add to the assets or wealth o f the 
government. It is called “routine ” since the character o f the expenses is 
that they exist repeatedly every year, like general administration 
expenditure and operation and maintenance expenditure. The routine 
budget includes income from tuition fees. ”
Almost the entire DIK (85% - 90%) is allocated for personnel expenditures, and the 
remaining 10% to 15% for operation and maintenance. The DIK is not negotiable since 
it is directly allocated by the Ministry of Finance (MOF) based on the number of 
teaching and administrative staff. Salaries are directly allocated by the MOF to 
individual staff.
Management of the government investment budget (DIP) should comply with rigid 
regulations, uniformly applied to all government institutions. A proportion of the DIP, 
perhaps 20% to 30%, is actually allocated for recurrent expenditures. Flexibility 
between line items does not exist, and the main objective is the administrative
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conformity between the budget and realisation rather than effectiveness. Allocation is 
mainly determined based on the various performance absorbing and disbursing the 
allocated budget, and direct negotiation between each public institution in Indonesia, 
including the studied universities, and the Directorate General of Higher Education 
Institution (DIKTI), MOF and the National Developmmt Plan Board (Bappenas). 
Performance is measured based on input indicators such as the number of staff, books, 
equipment, or space.
Furthermore, the universities had prepared a specific form for the preparation of the
budget. It was therefore hardly possible to eliminate the items that had been received or
the existing expenses in the budget structure, though, in reality, it might be that a certain
item was no longer relevant to be utilised at that point. The universities budget was
managed based on the character of income and expenses, such as income from
government, or expenses for salaries, for purchasing goods, and so on, and was not
based on the desired objectives of the expenditure. Therefore, it was impossible to
review performance accurately, because the only measurement was on trustworthiness
when using the proposed funds. However, problems still remained in the budget system.
One of the officers of the Audit Board said that:
"The traditional budget, which was used before the bestowal o f  autonomy, 
was unable to reveal how much o f the funds were spent on each activity, 
and the budget even failed to give the information about the cost o f the 
activity plan. ”
The budget preparation of the universities is conducted using a bottom-up method, 
namely the respective unit prepares the budget for the unit. Before autonomy, the 
universities had no plan/annual work programme that coordinated among the units in 
the university. Each of the departments created their own work plans without any 
coordination with other units. However, in fact, from year to year the budget of each
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unit was of a similar amount. The Head of the Bureau as well as the staff just followed 
the previously provided numbers. In addition, a manager commented on the previous 
budget system:
“Before, we practised line item budgeting (previous-year budget). We had 
to face such a lot o f  red tape to make decisions: It reduced bottom-line 
creative ideas and obstructed top-line directed information. ”
The budget only increased or decreased the Rupiah amount of previously available
items by using the previous year’s data as the basis for matching the amount of increase
or decrease without any deep review being made. Not only could this kind of approach
not guarantee to fulfil the real needs, but it may also have caused continuous mistakes,
because the universities never knew whether the previous year’s expenses, used as the
basis for the budget arrangement of the current year, were already based on needs.
Interviews demonstrated that the universities frequently did not consider the economic
concepts of efficiency and cost-effectiveness when they managed their budgets. This
opinion is supported by a manager who stated that:
"To date, the figures for the budget in this unit are only a recitation to 
commit to memory: these figures do not undergo many changes every year. 
The changes were only around 10% compared with the previous year.
Therefore, if at the end of the budget year, there was a budget surplus, the allocation of
which was forced towards activities that were not too important. The activities that
followed were simply meant to spend the remaining budget. In response to these
matters, a respondent said that:
“We must spend all o f the arranged budget because, i f  that’s not done, it 
will affect the allocation in the next year’s budget. The government would 
decrease the next budget allocation. ”
This situation occurred because the budget performance was reviewed based on the 
amount of the budget that was used and not on output considerations resulting from the
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activities undertaken and the desired performance targets. A further result was a lack of 
motivation for the universities to use the budget funds efficiently.
When calculating the state budget amount, especially for the education sector, the 
Bappenas played the most important role, as the DPR would approve the education 
budget proposed by the government. In recent years, merely half of the budget proposed 
by the DIKTI, along with public universities, to Bappenas was approved.
9.5. Setting the Tuition Fees
The two universities have two types of student, namely, students taking the SI regular 
programme, for which recruitment is made through a national examination, and those 
taking the irregular programme, for which recruitment is made by the respective 
universities. The government does not give any subsidy at all to the irregular 
programme.
The government plays an important role in setting the tuition fees for the students. The
government, through the Ministry of Education, decides how much of the tuition fees
have to be paid by the students. The universities, as the field executors, have absolutely
no power to change this decision. Though the tuition fees provides just 1/9 of the
amount that the universities need, the universities have to accept this situation. A
manager gave comment on this:
“For the last few  years (since 1995), the Government has not increased 
tuition fees. In fact, operational costs are getting higher for several 
reasons. Actually, the university takes on so much to raise the required 
funds. However, to fulfil the obligation for citizens to get a decent 
education, the Government has no desire to raise tuition fees. ”
Moreover, a participant commented on the tuition fees, which are, by necessity, 
standard, by saying:
“This University, as a state-owned educational institution, has to support 
the Government programmes to develop the mentality o f  the nation. "
There have not been many changes made to the mechanism by which the universities
determine tuition fees. Concerning how this is implemented, a top officer in a
department explained as follows:
“Before autonomy, the determination o f tuition fees fo r  the SI Regular 
Programme was still decided by the Government through decrees o f the 
Ministry o f  National Education. I f  I ’m not mistaken, tuition fees for the SI 
Regular Programme have not changed fo r  the last ten years, more or less. 
Even though the tuition fees are below the level that we require to 
undertake the teaching, we, as the working units, simply accept the 
government’s decision. ”
9.6. Summary of the Chapter
In Indonesia, especially before the era of President Soeharto, the top-down style of 
management not only drove government bureaucracy in Java but also permeated the 
scattered university system. Centralisation caused universities to be extraordinarily 
dependent on the government. The universites' employees were civil servants that were 
appointed by the government. The Universities' Rector and Deputy Rectors were 
appointed by the government. In addition, this study found that before the granting of 
autonomy, the number, pay level and occupations of staff in the universities and all 
national universities were also controlled by the government. On the financial side, 
financial regulations for the universities were basically identical to other government 
units in which the budget used previously available items by using as its basis the 
previous year’s data. Prior to the changes in 1999, the universities had a centralised 
system of resource allocation in the hands of the government with the managers having 
little financial autonomy.
Moreover, the government, as the major fund provider for the universities, dominated 
the form of controls over and within the universities. At this time, as a government unit,
the universities had a long organisational hierarchy above the university management 
that comprised ministries (e.g. Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Finance), 
government auditors (e.g. BPKP), government planning body (e.g. Bappenas), and 
parliament that influenced the universities’ day-today activities.
The findings above indicate that the central influence from government caused the 
universities not to have the freedom to manage their day-to-day activities: they just 
altered and edited the previous year’s budget to prepare the budget for the current year. 
Hence, there is evidence in this study that there were some characteristics of the budget 
in the universities before the granting of autonomy, such as a lack of participation and 
irrelevance to day-to-day activities, due to the universities managers' lack of power to 
arrange their own policies over the government's plans. As a further result, this study 
found that it was not surprising that in practice, the managers had manipulated the use 
of the budget.
Following the discussion of the management control systems in the two universities 
before deregulation, the next chapter describes the MCS after the granting of autonomy 
to the universities in order to ascertain which parts of the universities’ systems have 
changed.
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CHAPTER TEN 
CASE RESULTS:
MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS (MCS) 
POST HIGHER EDUCATION DEREGULATION 
10.1. Introduction
This chapter is the final of the two chapters on the case results and provides a 
description of the different components of the management control systems (MCS) after 
the higher education, deregulation. This chapter focuses on MCS components such as 
strategic planning, budgeting, employee performance, appointment of managers and 
price decisions at the Ajar University and Didik University.
This chapter is divided into six sections. After this introduction section, the second 
section describes the industrial relations and relation of power among the actors in the 
two studied universities after the deregulation, including new employment status, new 
management structure, and the appointment of managers. The next section describes 
strategic planning, including the new missions, visions, goals and organizational 
strategies that have been applied in the universities since deregulation. The fourth 
section explains the new budgeting practices in the universities since the higher 
education reforms. The fifth section describes the mechanism for setting the tuition fees 
in the universities since the reforms. This chapter closes with a final section that 
provides a conclusion to the chapter.
10.2. Industrial Relations
This section will discuss the relationships between the managers in the studied
universities after the granting of autonomy by the government. After the granting of
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university autonomy, the two universities began to unify the academic units under their 
control. There are several ways that have been and will be used by the universities to do 
this; for example, the Rector appoints the managers under him, such as Deputy Rectors, 
Deans, Deputy Deans and so on.
10.2.1. Employment Status and Review of Employees’ Performance
Human resources are the most valuable assets of a higher education institute and are
assumed to be more important than in the industry, business, and government sectors. 
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, the two universities have experienced 
bad industrial relations within the organisations when the managers could not exert 
discipline over their subordinates.
To overcome this issue, there are several things that the universities are doing, namely: 
(1) since the bestowal of autonomy to the universities, the Directorate General of Higher 
Institutions (DIKTI) has implemented a “zero growth” policy, which means that an 
autonomous university is not allowed to employ more civil servants (PNS). The 
universities therefore appoint new non-civil servant employees whose status is as 
university employees. (2) Under this policy, the universities are waiting for all civil 
servants in the universities to retire.34 If all of the civil servants were to retire, the 
remaining employees would be lecturers and non-civil servant employees that the 
universities appointed. The civil servants who are still employed today still work in 
accordance with the government-determined civil servant rules. As a Deputy Rector in 
Ajar University stated:
“We are waiting for all o f the civil servants in the university to retire. I f  
they all retired, those left are simply university employees. I  have no idea
34 According to civil servant’s Law, every civil servant has to work for a minimum o f 20 years before 
they retire or resign, which is why the policy to wait until these civil servants retire would take such a 
very long time.
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when this will be. Perhaps when my grandchildren become college 
students. ”
However, the employment problem is how to change the status from civil servant (PNS) 
to university employee. There are several reasons why civil servants in the universities 
have not changed status to become university employees, which are: firstly, personal 
reasons, such as they want to work until they retire to get a pension; secondly, the salary 
is not attractive, the benefits are unclear, and there are uncertainties concerning salary 
increases; and thirdly, the contract is not attractive, and there are uncertainties 
concerning tenure. One of the participants compared his salary with his former students 
as follows:
“I  have been a lecturer for more than 30 years and have attained the 
highest position in academia, which is professor. However, I  receive a 
salary lower than that o f my former students on entry point salaries where 
they have just graduated and have got a job in one o f the consultancy 
offices. ”
Another respondent added that:
“A professor’s salary per month is Rp. 2 million. I t ’s only just enough to 
pay the electricity bill and the phone bill. So, how do these 
professors/lecturers meet their cost o f living? ”
Therefore, if  we talked about employment status, some civil servants in the universities 
that were interviewed stated that, if the payment conditions were to remain the same, 
they would decide not to accept a new status as university employee. Through change in 
employment status, the universities would then have more control over their employees, 
and while they would be happy to be under university control as long as they were to
35 The Director General o f Higher Education Institutions o f the Republic o f Indonesia (Kompas, 
20/6/2003) stated that, to make a decent living, a doctor who devotes himself to being a lecturer should 
get at least Rp. 7 million/month. Exchange rate: 1 GBP (£) = 15,000 IDR (Rp).
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receive a high enough salary, if their salary were to remain as low as when they were 
civil servants (PNS), they would refuse to be under the control of the universities.
Because of the difficulties found in changing the status of civil servants into university 
employees, there are now three kinds of employee in the universities since the bestowal 
of autonomy, namely civil servants, university employees, and casual employees. A 
public university as a State-Owned Legal Board (BHMN) would be better to gradually
change its employee status from civil servant (PNS) to contract-based university
employee. A Deputy Rector said:
“For non-civil servant employees, every two years the contract would have 
to be renewed. Though it’s going to cause trouble fo r  the university, yet it 
will make it easy to control all employees in the university. ”
The universities would then have more power to practise an employee reward system 
for good achievement and reprimand those whose achievements are not good. The 
universities applies a contract system for the non-government employees, which 
facilitates the faculty management in the supervision of their performance. A Deputy 
Dean said:
“We give more supervision to the university employees and casual 
employees. We don't appoint them as permanent employees, but we do 
apply a contract system that is extended on an annual basis. This system 
has advantages and disadvantages. Fortunately, as the Deputy Dean in 
General Administration I  can fully assess them. I  can report to the 
university about their performance. As a result, the casual employees
cannot be promoted to university employee, whereas the university
employees can be changed into casual employees and his/her salary will 
be decreased. In other words, for promotion, the non-government 
employee has to achieve good performance. I f  not, I  will not promote them. 
For example, out o f 24 casual employees I  have only proposed 18 to be 
promoted because the achievement o f the rest has not been good and their 
performance does not meet the required standard. ”
Finally, this issue encourages the impression that, if the intention is to change 
employment status at the universities, they would have to have great financial resources
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to contract the lecturers, which would mean that the lecturers would work full time in 
the universities. This matter, which has become an obstacle to changing the employment 
status of civil servants (PNS) in the universities, shows that a change of status is not as 
simple as all that.
10.2.2. Management Structure
After deregulation, the organisational structure in the universities was different to that 
before. The issuance of Government Regulation No. 152/2000 shows the change of 
status of Didik University into its new status as a State-Owned Legal Entity (BHMN). 
The change of Didik University’s organisational structure has also been influenced by 
the use of Organisational Rules that have been approved by the university’s board of 
trustees (MWA).
At this time, the autonomous universities have the right to decide their own structure. 
As result, the two studied universities now have different organisational structures to 
each other. However, since MWA in Ajar University has not agreed the university’s 
organisational rules, and hence differs from Didik University, Ajar University has not 
implemented a new management structure.36 Figure 10.1 below shows the new 
organisational structure of Didik University.
36 At the time o f the research, Ajar University continued to use the old organisational structure that was 
discussed in section 9.2. However, Ajar University management and the board of trustees (MWA) are still 
in discussions to design a new organisational structure.
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Figure 10.1: The Organisation Structure of Didik University
Since the status change, however, the MWA, the Academic Senate of the University, 
the MGB (the Assembly of Professors), the Audit Board, and the new University 
Leaders have been set up. After becoming autonomous, the names of many positions 
were replaced and directorates were formed under the Deputy Rector. Examples of 
name changes are ‘Assistant Rector’ to ‘Deputy Rector’, ‘Assistant Dean’ to ‘Deputy 
Dean’, and so on.
Another change is the formation of a brand new institution, the Audit Board. Its duties 
are to cover matters as follows: to carry out a frame of. reference internal audit that is 
executed by an auditorial institution; to evaluate the annual audit plan made by the 
auditorial institution; to learn from and to review the results of the internal and external 
audits; and to report the work to the MWA. All expenses incurred in the implementation
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of these duties will be bome by the university from its budget. By MWA approval, the 
Audit Board has the right to appoint and hire professional audit staff for auditing the 
university in terms of education, students, finances, as well as manpower (employees), 
if necessary. The Audit Board is responsible to the MWA.
The University Senate and the Faculty Senate changed their names to the Academic 
Senate of the University (ASU) and the Academic Senate of the Faculty (ASF). In daily 
activities, ASU duties are now more extensive than before and cover the following: to 
provide input for the Minister over MWA performance reviews; to set the academic 
policy of the university; to confirm degrees; to develop the university; to set the policy 
over achievement reviews and academic ethics; to develop the personality of academics; 
to formulate standards and measurements of university coordination; to provide input 
for the MWA based on the review of university leadership performance in academic 
matters; to formulate the rules for the effecting of academic freedom and scientific 
autonomy; to provide input for the university chairman in arranging the strategic plan as 
well as the work plan and annual budget; to control academic quality in university 
coordination; to give input, advice, and warnings to the university chairman in 
managing the university in the academic field; and to formulate regulations concerning 
campus life. ASU membership consists of the Rector and Deputy Rector, the faculty 
Deans, the Head of the Post-Graduate Programme, representatives of the faculties, and 
the Head of the University Library.
The duties of the faculty management comprises the following matters: (a) secure the 
activities of the academic programme managed by the faculty; (b) general 
administration programme in managing all the resources within the faculty; (c) 
management activities delegated by the university management; and (d) facilitate the
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welfare of students, as delegated by the university management. At the faculty level 
there are departments, that is the academic executor elements in a faculty that 
implement academic and/or professional education in one or part of one of the science 
branches, in technology and or in certain of the arts. Each department consists of: (1) 
the head element - the head and secretary of the department; and (2) the academic 
executor element - lecturers. Thus the departments are the faculty units that act as the 
coordinators of education, research, and public services directly. As we saw in the 
section on organisation background, the lecturers are the direct executors of education; 
they implement the curriculum in the study learning process with the students.
One of the largest changes in the universities’ management structures is the.involvement 
of stakeholders (the government; members of academic staff, consisting of lecturers, 
employees, and students; and the public), who are united in the MWA. The MWA is the 
highest authority in the universities. The Rector of the universities, as the top executive 
leader in the universities, is appointed by and responsible to the MWA. The MWA has 
the right to make Rules of Association (Anggaran Rumah Tangga / ART) that cover the 
whole implementation of the activities in the universities, for example, how the Rector 
is elected and appointed, the Dean of a faculty’s authority, and even academically 
related matters.
As can be seen in the Figure 10.2 below, the role of the MWA involves the following 
aspects: to approve the university’s strategic plan, and also the university budget and its 
amendment, to maintain the financial health of the university; to implement general 
control and supervision of the university management; together with the management of 
the university, to compose and present the annual report to the Minister; to assess the 
performance of the management of the university; and to handle the resolution of
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university issues at the highest level. A participant used the example of a company to
describe autonomous universities:
“ I f  we imagine autonomous universities as a real company, which means 
as a State-Owned Legal Board (BHMN), then the universities' Rector is 
Managing Director, the MWA is the Board o f Shareholders, and the 
government is the greatest shareholder and fund provider. ”
Owners
(State, Society, Private)
By Law
The Board of Trustees
F u n c t i o n s :
P o l i c y
R e g u l a t i o n
D e c i s i o n s
S u p p o r t
O v e r s i g h t  a n d  
A u d i t i n g
I n f o r m a t i o n  R e p o r t s  
I s s u e s
Rectors 
and Team
University Internal Organs
Figure 10.2 : The Role of The Board of Trustees in the Universities
The membership of the MWA is important in order to enable the universities to provide 
accountability, so it must represent the stakeholders in a broad sense. The MWAs in the 
universities occupy a constituency of members that represent the government, lecturers, 
employees, alumni, society and students: the number of MWA members is different in 
every autonomous university. The MWA in Ajar University has 25 members, while the 
MWA in Didik University has 21 members (see Table 10.3 below). MWA membership 
is dependent on a number of factors, such as the different numbers of faculties in the 
universities, the number of employees, the number of lecturers, and so on. MWA 
members have equal voting rights, except in the election of the Rector: in this case, the 
members from the ministerial element cast 35 percent of the overall votes.
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Stakeholders Ajar University Didik University
Government Representative (Minister o f National Education) 1 person 1 person
Academic Senate o f the University 12 persons 11 persons
Society / Members o f public 7 persons 6 persons
Employee Representatives 2 persons 1 persons
Student Representatives 2 persons 1 persons
Rector (has no vote) 1 person 1 person
Total 25 persons 21 persons
Table 10.3 : Members o f the MWA in Ajar and Didik University 
10.2.3. Appointment to Management Positions
This sub-section discusses the appointment to management positions (such as: Rector, 
managers in faculties, and administrative managers) in the two studied universities after 
the grant of autonomy status from the government.
Since autonomy, government regulations require Rector selection in the two studied 
universities to be more democratic, transparent and accountable (Didik University,
nn2003). Previously, choosing a new Rector was the government’s prerogative right. 
Today, the selection of the Rectors in the two studied universities involves the 
participation of stakeholders (the government, and “academy members”, comprising 
lecturers, employees, students, and the community) that are united in the MWA. The 
University Rector is appointed and discharged by the MWA through voting: the 
ministerial element is 35 per cent of all votes; the remaining 65% are divided evenly 
between the other members, who consist of representatives of university employees, 
non-Professor lecturers, Professors, alumni, the public, and students.
In the beginning, the MWA forms the Rector Selection Committee that has the duty of 
selecting and evaluating Rector candidates, either from inside or outside of the 
university, through an open competition mechanism. The committee helps the ASU and
37 According to government regulation No. 152/2000: “The procedure for electing a university Rector 
shall be applied through the formation o f a committee by the Supervision Board (MWA) to select the 
Rector candidate through an open competition mechanism, both on an external as well as an internal 
basis. Rector selection shall be conducted in an open meeting by the Supervision Board led by the 
Chairman o f the Supervision Board. The candidate for Rector who has the largest vote shall be appointed 
as the Rector based on the decision of the Supervision Board.”
207
the MWA to obtain “requirement and administration data resume”38 from each 
candidate for the position of Rector, which will help both institutions execute fit and 
proper tests more effectively.39 The ASU arranges fit and proper tests (through 
interview) for all candidates selected by the Rector Selection Committee to select half 
of the Rector candidates to be forwarded to the MWA. The MWA selects a Rector to 
manage the university for the next five years. The Board of Professors has a share in the 
Rector selection process, by making report for the MWA as a consideration in 
evaluating the performance of the Rector candidates. In addition, the Rector Selection 
Committee is also involved in the process of gaining public responses to the seven 
Rector candidates by placing advertisements in print media.
In the selection process, the candidate Rectors are obliged to deliver their vision and
mission as well as their strategic plan for the future of the university, in one open
meeting of the MWA that is chaired by the Head of the MWA. At the final stage of the
election of a Rector, the Rector candidates undergo a public debate to help develop both
a transparent climate and also mass participation from the university. Some respondents
commented that this public debate shows which of the candidates would be the more
capable Rector. The programme is also continued by discussions with the participants.
An informant in Ajar University commented:
“This public debate is completely new. We really feel that the candidates 
concerned are being seriously tested, even by the public, students, 
lecturers, and staff We will learn the quality o f the Rector candidates. This 
debate will show who has the better leadership skills. Employees also
38 Government rules and regulations o f association o f the university regulate some points to be followed 
by a candidate for the position of Rector. The first requirement is that the candidate shall be an S3 
graduate from a credible and recognized university. Secondly, the candidate must have experience in 
education institution management, and at least three years experience in a research institution. Thirdly, 
the candidate must be o f Indonesian nationality. Fourthly, the candidate must have integrity and be highly 
committed to being a good leader. Fifthly, the candidate must have a spirit o f entrepreneurship. Sixthly, 
the candidate must have a wide insight into the scope of higher education.
39 Government Regulation No 152/2000 and No. 153/2000 stipulates that the Academic Senate o f the 
University is the supreme normative board at university, having rights to propose university Rector 
candidates to the MWA. Based on this, the Academic Senate o f the University is assumed to have an 
interest in fit and proper tests for Rector candidates.
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participate in the election o f their Rector, even though this is only through 
their questions raised during the debate. ”
The Rector selection process is supported by the availability of technology owned by
the university, such as through the development of closed-circuit television (CCTV) and
the Internet so that students, society and journalists can monitor the whole process of
the selection of the Rector live. The employees in the universities support this new
approach to Rector selection because of the advantages of the approach. As a
respondent from Didik University commented:
“Rector election on a direct and more open basis is more accountable, 
because the related candidates have the task o f sharing their visions, 
missions, and work programme orientation with the public, and so the 
public will know who the candidates in such competitions are, and also 
know the commitment, competency and capability o f the respective Rector 
candidates. ”
Another participant from Ajar University added:
uThe new systems will be applied for Rector election as the basis ofpublic 
control o f the Rector and the level o f bureaucracy, in case there are any 
problems o f inconsistency or issues which do not conform to the related 
commitment. This public control plays the role o f a check function and a 
balance for Rector policy, mainly in the strategic policy that influences 
and has a direct relation to the campus. Based on this, the direct election 
o f the Rector will form the basis o f  university public management 
organized on a transparent, democratic and accountable basis. However, 
the university will face hard and varied challenges in the years to come. ”
In summary, Appendix 10.1 and Appendix 10.2 at the end of this thesis provide a 
diagram of the Rector election process in Didik University.
In term of the appointment to faculty officials, in Ajar University, this study did not find 
many changes to the mechanism for selecting a Dean. The faculties in this university 
still use the existing mechanism: all of the lecturers in the related faculty gather to vote 
(one man one vote), which continues when the appointment of a Dean is approved by 
the Rector. A respondent in Ajar University explained the reason why this mechanism is
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used in this university while Didik University has applied a new approach to the
selection of a Dean:40
"Unlike our counterparts in Didik University, we still don't have an 
Organisation Rule, which is the basis for the university to select a Faculty 
Dean. Without a legal basis such as an Organisation Rule, the Rector is 
incapable o f making any changes."
On the other hand, Didik University has selected Deans on the basis of a new paradigm. 
Previously, a Dean was elected by the academy staff in the faculty, but now it is 
regulated by the MWA, and an election system assesses the competency of the 
candidates.41 At this time, there have been some changes to the Dean appointment 
process. Firstly, the term “selection” is used in preference to the term “election”, as 
previously used, and also the term "assessment" is used.42 Secondly, a Committee of 
Candidate Dean Selection/Panitia Seleksi Calon Dekan (PSCD) is formed, which 
implements the duties detailed in the Rector Decision Letter and is a university 
committee that is responsible to the Rector. All of the committee’s activities are paid for 
out of the budget of the university. In the selection process, based on the government 
regulation, the university has decided to empower the Senate both in the university 
(Academic Senate of the University/ ASU) and in the faculty (Academic Senate of the 
Faculty/ ASF). The ASF is authorized to determine almost all PSCD members, with 
only one of its members appointed by the Rector and one person from outside of the 
university. Flexibility is also given to deciding the number of committee members, from 
six to twelve persons, in accordance with faculty considerations. Subsequently, the
40 To manage the mechanism of Dean appointment, the MWA in Didik University has issued an 
organisation rule and decree on the Procedure of Candidate Dean Selection in the university environment. 
The decree contains five chapters and seven articles, governing various things related to candidate Dean 
selection, such as the requirements, the committee, and the selection process.
41 However, the university is still bound by the government provision stipulating that the term o f office 
for Dean and Assistant Dean is four years, and that the Dean and Assistant Dean may be re-appointed 
under the condition that the term of office occurs no more than twice consecutively.
42 From the university document and interviews, this study concludes that “Election” is based more on the 
individual popularity o f the candidate Dean. On the other hand, “selection” means that assessment o f the 
candidate is demanded. The term “assessment” is preferred to “review” on account o f “assessment” being 
more extensive than a simple “review”. “Assessment” implies an investigation o f documents, personal 
history, etc., and also leads to a complex and comprehensive review.
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PSCD must recruit three persons as candidate Deans, either from within or from outside 
of the university, who meet the administrative requirements43 and 44 to advance in the 
selection process. Candidate Deans from outside of the university are attracted through 
placing an advertisement in a national newspaper, on television, or in any other media. 
When selecting the Dean, the PSCD makes an “assessment” of the candidates based on 
the required criteria45. After a score is given, it proposes three of the best candidate 
Deans to the Rector. In the final step, the Rector invites each candidate to give an 
explanation of their vision, mission, and work programme if  they are selected. Next, the 
Rector assesses the candidates and decides, in a prerogative manner, the selected Dean 
from the three candidates that the PSCD proposed.
The interviews and the examination of university documents lead to the conclusion that 
the alteration is based on the logic that, as a unit that is under the Rector 
administratively, then the Faculty Dean, who is the executive head at faculty level, is 
selected by and responsible to the Rector. The new paradigm is expected to enable 
Didik University to become a real university, not simply multiple faculties, as it has 
previously seemed. To summarise the explanation above, Figure 10.4 below describes 
the selection process discussed in this sub-section.
43 Administrative requirements for candidate Dean are: statement o f willingness to be nominated; 
Curriculum Vitae; copy o f doctoral certificate or accreditation as legitimate doctorate from the related 
university; paper which describes the candidate’s motivation to be a Dean, as well as their perspective 
about the vision, mission, and the work programme if  they get selected; statement o f willingness to work 
as a full time Dean.
44 General requirements for candidate Dean: Indonesian Citizenship and never lost Indonesian 
Citizenship; sound o f body and mind; hold doctoral degree or accredited specialist as Doctor within the 
related science; integrity and a strong commitment to Ajar University and the prospective faculty; 
credible in management, high leadership qualities, spirit o f entrepreneurship; broad knowledge o f higher 
education.
45 Criteria and weightings for candidate Dean assessment by PSCD are: academic performance that 
matches the faculty science (10%); leadership (10%); entrepreneurship (10%); commitment to faculty and 
Ajar University (10%); understanding of strategic issues in faculty (10%); acceptability in faculty area 
(10%).
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Selected Dean
The Selection Process o f Candidate Dean by Rector
Socialization and Internal and External Embracement
Rector Decision Letter on PSCD formation
Requirement Explanation for Candidate Dean by PSCD
Submit the Requirement Document for Candidate Dean
The assessment process o f Candidate Dean by PSCD
The requirement of Candidate Dean as a result o f Rector selection
Figure 10.4: Steps in the Dean Selection Process in Didik University
Meanwhile, a few significant changes have also occurred in the appointment of the 
administrative managers in Didik University since autonomy. Meanwhile, this study did 
not find many changes to the mechanism for the appointment of administrative 
managers in Ajar University since the university hasn't have an Organisation Rule as a 
legal basis to adopt a new appointment approach.
At this time, Didik University has issued a policy that a vacancy at directorship level 
(middle management) must be filled by teaching staff that hold at least master degree or 
a professional from outside of the university, with a view to improving the quality of the 
relevant directorate. The appointment is no longer based on either a seniority policy or 
the working period and the persons’ ages, which were the policies that the government 
had established, but on the quality of their knowledge and their expertise. In a
212
democratic manner, no matter who the lecturer is, even if they are still junior, the most 
important factor is that they have an excellent quality of knowledge, so the individual 
ought to be the foremost consideration.
Moreover, another change is that advertising media are now used to attract candidates 
from inside and outside of the university. Now, there is a new procedure that must be 
followed when selecting an officer for a certain position: the candidate officers who 
meet the qualifications set by the university have to present their vision, mission, work 
plan and management system for the institution in front of the evaluator team, which is 
formed by the Rector and which consists of university elements.
An example of these changes is the appointment of a Director of Human Resources in
Didik University, who is a professional, non-civil servant who has many years of
experience in managing Human Resource problems in many national companies. This is
in line with his story, as follows:
“I  am a professional who has worked in various big national companies 
and not a civil servant. This is the first time that I  will have worked in a 
government institution. The Rector o f  the university himself asked me in 
person to take the position as Director o f  Human Resources. My duty is to 
handle any problems around here since the change in status. He appointed 
me both for my competency and my experience in this field. ”
However, the appointment of an official who is not a civil servant at the university will
meet with an obstacle. On this issue, a director put it as follows:
" Unlike a civil servant, I  do not have a civil servant number, so I  cannot 
correspond with the government. Because o f  this, my letters must be signed 
by my subordinate. ”
213
10.3. Mission, Vision and Organisational Strategy
As has been discussed in a previous chapter, before the granting of autonomy, the 
universities did not have their own strategic plans. The change of university status to a 
State-Owned Legal Board (BHMN) has obliged the universities to develop strategic 
plans for the next five years.46 The compilation of the strategic plan is also the result of 
Law No.20/2003 that requires the universities to produce an activity-based budget.
Moreover, the strategic plan, as one of the requirements when compiling an activity- 
based budget, has become an indicator of every single objective. Hence, after the 
granting of autonomy, the universities are required to produce a vision and mission 
statement since these are the first steps in the strategic planning process (see McLemore, 
1997). Interviews revealed that because of the benefits of this system, senior managers 
from both universities supported the use of strategic plans to improve their ability to 
compete in the new market environment.
The two universities designed their first mission statements in the year 2000 based on 
Presidential Instruction No.7/1999, which requires that all government units, including 
the universities, produce a vision and mission statement in accordance with each of their 
major duties, as well as to report on the achievement of their visions and missions. 
Since then, the universities have been given the freedom to decide their mission, vision, 
and goal with the approval of the Board of Trustees (MWA). In 2002, the Ministry of 
National Education, through DIKTI, forced the universities to produce mission 
statements by requiring all units in the universities to submit their mission statements in
46 Government Regulation o f the Republic of Indonesia No.61/1999 on the decision for according public 
universities BHMN status states that the university is responsible for developing a strategic plan, as stated 
in Article 17, “A Strategic Plan is a strategy that is selected to accomplish the objectives, as well as a 
five-year programme to execute the strategy. ”
214
order to receive funding from the government. Figure 10.5 below presents the new 
organisational visions, missions, and goals of Ajar University and Didik University.
Vision and Missions of Ajar University 
Vision
To become a reputable international research university that is oriented to the interests of the state 
Missions
1. To organize high-quality research and services to the community.
2. To uncover and develop the treasure o f national culture in a sustainable way.
3. To develop and boost responsible university organizations.
4. To provide services, facilities and infrastructure on campus in line with advances in technology.
5. To develop a network at the regional, national and international level.
6. To provide graduate and postgraduate education o f an international standard.
Vision. Missions and Goals of Didik University 
Vision
To become an autonomous, modem research university, and to gain an intemationally-reputable 
academic standard.
Missions
1. To be the front-line institution in the development o f science, technology, and art (centre of  
excellence).
2. To produce highly-qualified graduates, who are able to compete in the global market and meet 
its demands.
3. To support development o f Indonesian morality through the creation o f inventions in the field of 
science, technology, and art for the benefit o f the advancement o f Indonesia.
4. To participate in the advancement o f world civilisation by producing graduates having global 
insight, tolerance, a sense of love for peace and high academic achievement.
Goal
To preserve the university’s reputation as the best university in Indonesia by producing qualified 
graduates, who are able to compete in the global market and meet its demands, and by producing 
qualified, international-standard researchers as well as producing research and design products that 
can support the competitive power of the nation.
Table 10.5 : The universities’ visions, missions and goals 
Source: From the documents of Ajar and Didik University
As a result of this requirement for strategic plans, visions and mission statements, 
during the Rector selection process, the candidate Rectors are obliged to deliver their 
vision and mission and also their strategic plans for the future of the universities.47 After 
being elected as Rector, the vision and mission so presented is then reformulated by the 
universities’ senior management. The organisational mission and vision that are
47 A more in-depth explanation o f the Rector selection process has been given in a previous section.
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produced are then translated into a strategy. After that, the vision and mission statement 
and the strategic plan are submitted to the MWA, as the highest body in the universities, 
to be approved. The members of the university are obliged to carry out the vision, 
mission and strategic plan that have been approved by MWA. Next, the vision, mission 
and strategic plan of the universities would be interpreted into the faculties and lower 
level units, which would then prepare their own plans.
However, as was described in Chapter Nine, relations exist between managers in the 
universities only in the hierarchy but do not extend to the daily activities of the 
management. Hence, this study found that the departments in the universities prepare" 
and run their own policies and there is no synergy between them in order to prepare the 
universities’ strategic plans. The role of the universities, as the central administration, is 
only to undertake the required administration before sending the strategic plan to the 
MWA to be approved.
10.4. Budgeting
At the moment, autonomy cannot yet be given fully to the two studied universities,
A Oespecially in financial matters. As a consequence, the universities now have two 
systems for financial budgeting. The first system is used for the budget from the 
government (routine and development budget) and uses the system that the government 
applies. The second system is used for the budget received from private sources (such as 
tuition fees), for which the budgeting system used is a government-regulated system.
48 Further explanations o f the reasons for this can be found in the Discussion chapter (Chapter Eleven).
216
10.4.1. Budget from Government49
There have not been many changes to the application of budget systems to manage
funds from the government since the government still uses the very old Law on Finance
of 1925 (Indische Comtabiliteit Wet/ICW), a legal product dating from Dutch colonial
rule, to manage government funds.50 Like other public universities in Indonesia, the role
of the universities and faculties in the preparation or implementation of the budget that
originates from the'government is still only to act as the proposal provider and to
implement administrative tasks, whereas the decision is in the hands of the
government.51 Moreover, as fund provider, the government has a duty to look for the
funds for such expenditures. An officer of finance commented as follows on the
authority of Didik University to determine the budget allocation from the government:
“In the university, we don’t have any authority to increase or to reduce a 
budget allocation from the government. We merely carry out an 
administrative job when using the budget as well as reporting it to the 
government. ”
10.4.2. Budget from Private Sources
After autonomy, the routine and development budgets from the government are still 
awarded but with funds from private sources, such as from the students as well as 
income from co-operating with other institutions, added to the budget. Now, according 
to Government Regulation No.61/1999 on reforms in Public Universities, the 
universities themselves have the authority to find income from private sources without 
being bound by government rules. The universities no longer have to surrender their 
income to the government; they are simply obliged to present a report to the Department 
of National Education and the Department of Finance.
49 An in-depth explanation o f this issue can be obtained from the previous chapter (Chapter Nine).
50 Indische Comptabiliteit Wet, a 1925 law enacted by the Dutch Government when Indonesia was its 
colony.
51 The expenditures in the university that originate from this routine budget are more related to the 
teaching and learning activities as organized by the university. One o f these routine expenditures is for the 
salary o f university employees having the status o f civil servants.
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At this time, according to Law No.61/1999 and Law No.20/2003, the universities are 
required to produce a strategic plan and an annual budget work plan (Rencana Keija 
Anggaran Tahunan/RKAT). Hence, coordination in the universities is now based on the 
strategic plan and the RKAT. As regulated by law, the strategic plan in the universities 
is composed by the leaders of the university after receiving input from the ASU and is 
proposed to the MWA to be discussed and authorised.52
The strategic plan and RKAT, once it is approved and authorised by the MWA,
becomes the guidelines for the universities to manage their funds. A Deputy Rector in
Ajar University explained the importance of the work plan and annual budget:
"The Work Plan and the Annual Budget that the MWA have approved 
would provide guidance for Ajar University to manage its funds. To cover 
the required amount o f funds for the budget, the university would use two 
basic principles, namely to maximize the income from tuition fee (SPP) 
and to minimize the burden on poor students. ”
As also explained by a Deputy Rector:
“In my opinion, the autonomy system in the sector o f finance is expected to 
stipulate management methods that more specifically conform to the local 
conditions in order to reach good quality. Management is more efficient 
and effective. Due to its financial autonomy, the university prepares 
programmes and activities, and then they prepare the financial aspects. So 
the university has the right to adapt its priorities and financial procedures 
to conform to the planned programme. Thus, autonomy is part o f the 
management system to reach good quality. ”
The Law of the Republic of Indonesia No. 17/2003, which was approved by the 
representative house, on state finance, brings a wind of change to budget management 
in the universities as well as in other public universities and all existing government 
institutions in Indonesia. Therefore, the studied universities have also changed budget 
allocation from a line item-based budget that is based on the previous year’s budget to
52 The Law details the process o f drawing up the plan in the following statement:
" A Strategic Plan is compiled by the Leader after he/she gets input from the Academic 
University Senate and it is proposed to the MWA to be discussed and approved. ”
218
an activity-based budget. A respondent in Didik University gave other reasons for why
the university budget should be changed:
“Today, the principle o f democracy (a state free from corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism) is in great public demand. A budget should be in 
accordance with this demand. Moreover, the last budget pattern was no 
longer appropriate. Therefore, that basic budget must be changed and 
referred to the desired performance. ”
Commenting on the use of an activity-based budget, a Deputy Rector in Ajar University
supported the use of activity-based budgeting and explained:
“Sure, there is an advantage in the allocation o f  an activity-based budget. 
People find it difficult to evaluate the allocation o f a line item-based 
budget because i t ’s related to materials like buying markers, paper, and so 
on. The result is not clear. I f  the allocation uses an activity-based budget, 
we can see the result. L et’s take education activity as an example. Ajar 
University has released a lot o f funds. We ask, what about the result? Has 
the GPA increased? Does the waiting list fo r students to get jobs become 
shorter? So, the relationship between the money we spent and the output 
quality can easily be seen. ”
Input is obtained from all working units concerning the budget plan for the funds 
obtained from SPP. The faculties receive a report from the financial unit on the amount 
of income resulting from SPP. The mechanism of income and expenditure in the 
universities is through a one-way policy under the control of the financial unit: income 
from SPP is collected by the unit. The faculty then delivers the income received from 
tuition fees (SPP) and the required budget plan to the budget centre. A few per cent of 
the income from private sources (such as tuition fees) that each faculty gains must be 
given to the university to be used for the routine budget for every unit in the 
university.53 Every faculty is given the freedom to determine for themselves the usage
53 Faculties in Didik University must give 10% of their income, while faculties in Ajar University must 
give 20% of their income
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of the remaining income.54 A manager in Didik University elucidated the budget-
making mechanism in detail as follows:
“In disbursing funds to finance university activities, the mechanism works 
as follows: after a 10% deduction is made by the university administration 
centre and another 10%) by the relevant faculty, the rest is given directly to 
the department which represents the executive unit — a department which 
will allocate the funds based on their requirements. They prepare the 
budget themselves and we, as faculty management, do not interfere at all. 
I t ’s up to them what they do with the money. ”
Interviews in Ajar University found similar answers except that the university, as the 
administration centre, deducts 30% of the budget amount received from the 
government.
When issuing a budget, the budget plan, agreed amongst the interested parties within the
university, is brought before the MWA to be approved. The MWA discusses it with the
Rector and corrects it, then approves and executes it. As a manager revealed:
“The MWA is the highest institution in the university. Before carrying out 
the programme, the Rector must first propose it to the MWA. ”
10.4.3. The Control of Budget Implementation
Since the award of autonomy, there are differences in perspective on the control of 
activities in each of the units of the universities. As a respondent in one university said:
“By autonomy we assumed that we should think o f the university as similar 
to a company. A company ought to find or spend money both as effectively 
and as efficiently as it can and in a controlled manner. Leakages o f funds 
occurred before autonomy, but now we must be able to control them and to 
figure out where the leak is. ”
The internal auditor has a duty to audit regularly all work units in the universities’ 
environment, which covers education and studentship, finance, and manpower. The
54 They should, however, follow the work plan. In Ajar University, they have eight items, namely: (1) 
Institution Programme, (2) Education Programme, (3) Research Programme, (4) Public Service 
Programme, (5) Human Resources Programme, (6) Studentship Programme, (7) Information Systems 
Development Programme, (8) Assets and Infrastructure Programme in the campus area.
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internal auditor reports on the implementation of duties to the top officers. The external 
auditor is the Financial And Development Supervisory Board (BPKP/Badan Pemeriksa 
Keuangan Pemerintah) or the Inspectorate General of the Department of National 
Education (IrJen Depdiknas), which is part of the government. The BPKP carries out 
the inspection of financial performance by inspecting all expenses. One of the Deputy 
Rectors in Didik University commented on the control of budget operation as follows:
“The MWA asks the head o f the university to report the budget realization 
once every three months by reporting how the budget is spent. ”
After autonomy, government regulations stated that the universities must have an 
institution called an Audit Board. The Board is formed by the MWA, and the Audit 
Board of the universities is therefore responsible to the MWA. The board itself has the 
duty only to evaluate the results of the internal and BPKP audit reports and to present 
their conclusions and proposed suggestions to the MWA. The Audit Board has recently 
arranged good university governance, an audit charter, and performance indicators of 
audits of finance, organization, education, and management. The Audit Board 
subsequently reviewed the effectiveness of the internal audit team. Therefore, through 
the formation of the board, it was expected that financial management in the universities 
would become more accountable as well as transparent and secure.
After autonomy, the universities changed the composition of the internal audit staff in 
order to be more efficient and to control the management of the implementation of 
financial activities. A respondent explained that:
“A long time ago, before autonomy, most internal audit staff were part- 
time lecturers. Today, the staff to whom the Rector appointed control o f  
university activities are from outside o f  the university. They are then able 
to concentrate on the job. ”
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Another respondent added:
“We should consider time correctly here. As lecturers, they take on great 
responsibilities, such as teaching and so on, which takes their time. They 
must also then control internal matters, which also require much time. Do 
they have sufficient time to do all these things? Besides, i f  the internal 
auditors were economic lecturers then they would not understand the 
terms in technology. ”
Government Regulation No. 153/2000 intended that the university should realize 
accountability and transparency in the management of finance. Therefore, to realise this 
goal, the university introduced the system of double-entry accountancy in compiling 
financial reports to replace the system of single-entry accountancy, which functioned 
before the bestowal of autonomy.
The decision to use the double-entry system is in accordance with a decision taken at a
routine meeting that was attended by the leaders of the universities with BHMN status
as one of respondents said:
“For the system o f accountancy o f PT BHMN, we agreed to use double 
entry, which refers to PSAK (Pernyataan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan /  
Statement o f  Finance Accountancy Standard), which is used for non-profit 
institutions ’financial reporting. ”
Today, the pattern of management liability is no longer only directed towards the 
government, but also to other stakeholders, including society/members of the public. 
This is reflected in Article 15 paragraph 1 of Government Regulation No.61/1999, 
which requires the autonomous universities’ heads to report to the MWA periodically 
(the members are representatives from the government, society, and the university) 
about the progress of the university. Besides the government, the management is also 
responsible to society and the students, since the funds to provide the services are
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received from society either directly (through tuition fund collection) or indirectly 
(through the State Budget from the government).
In the sector of finance, there have been changes in the financial reporting system. 
Before autonomy, at the end of the fiscal year, the remaining cash had to be deposited in 
the state’s account. Now, only a report is submitted to the government. The financial 
statements that have been audited by BPKP are reported to the government via the 
Minister of Education and the Minister of Finance and are then reported to the public.
The financial reporting system in the universities changed from output-finance report- 
based to an obligation to produce a Performance accountability Reports for government 
units (LAKIP). The same phenomenon also happened in other government institutions. 
The democratic era, as has occurred since the downfall of Soeharto from his reign of 
power, has brought a new spirit to the process of managing institutions in Indonesia. 
The demands to promote the principles of open and sound management are emerging 
from various circles. So as to respond to the demands of the community, the 
government has issued Presidential Instruction No.7/1999 as a legal means that 
regulates the Performance accountability Reports for government units (LAKIP). Based 
on Presidential Instruction No.7/1999, the management of any government agency is 
compelled to prepare a strategic plan and a LAKIP report for the agency under its
control. Due to the presence of such a Presidential Instruction, the two studied
universities, as part of the government, must change the control of their activities and 
their financial reporting, which is based on performance. Concerning the background of 
the issuing of the Presidential Instruction that manages LAKIP implementation, a 
participant stated:
“This use o f LAKIP is the government’s effort to create a clean
government that is transparent, able to attract public participation, and is
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publicly accountable. The background to its usage is as the result o f 
corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN) in Indonesia. Practitioners and 
academicians believe that the use o f LAKIP in an appropriate manner is 
one o f  the methods needed to eliminate KKN, which has occurred 
frequently in Government Institutions. ”
A Deputy Dean shared his thoughts on the implementation of financial control in his
university:
“The government audit team that usually inspects us is the Financial And 
Development Supervisory Board (BPKP). They usually examine the 
university and take only some faculties as samples, mainly the large 
faculties such as the Faculties o f Engineering, Medicine and Economics. 
However, according to government regulations, in 2005 the government 
audit board will not be involved in the control o f  university finances. At 
that time, the audit will be conducted by our internal auditor, and the other 
auditor will be from the Public Accountant’s Office (KAP). This KAP will 
be appointed by the Audit Council. We also undertake our own audit 
performed by some lecturers in the faculty who are professional 
accountants. Thus, before being audited, we have been audited by our 
internal auditors. ”
Regarding the role of Supervision and Internal Control (Supervisi Pengawasan
Intemal/SPI) in university control, he said:
“The SPI team has never checked us. The new scope o f  the SPI is only 
applied at the university level. Probably this is due to the lack o f  skilful 
staff at the university. In order to anticipate the situation, we use our 
internal audit system with the assistance o f  our local accountant. ”
The change was explained by a participant:
“One thing that has changed includes the form o f  accountability, which 
nowadays is more specific. Everything is transparent, like expenditure, 
jobs, who the implementer units are, and what the outputs are. ”
In the case of Didik University, according to the Articles of Association and Rules of
Association of the University:
“University management shall be responsible to MWA by submitting the 
annual report to MWA once a year, at least three months after the expiry 
o f the University Fiscal Year. The annual report shall comprise: (a) 
financial statement that comprises budget, cash current report, and net 
receivable account change report; (b) academy report, research, 
community service that comprises situation, performance, and results
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achieved by the university; and (c) university employment report that 
comprises situation, performance, and the achieved progress. ”
10.5. Setting the Tuition Fees
The two studied universities have several types of income from students, namely tuition 
fees from regular and non-regular Undergraduate programmes (SI), the three-year 
diploma programme, the master’s programme (S2), and the doctorate programme (S3). 
After autonomy, the government still determines tuition fees for the regular SI 
programme nationally, meaning that the universities still have no authority at all to 
replace the tuition fees. For SI Regular students, which are the majority of the students 
in the universities, even the government-applied tuition fees for the students are below 
the required level for the Indonesian state university to develop the student. A manager 
in Ajar University gives an example of this:
“The amount o f  money from the government to develop the student is very 
small. A few  days ago, I, together with the faculty and departments was 
asked to calculate the Unit Cost o f  Higher Education. We calculated that 
we need at least Rp 18 million per student per year, while the government 
has determined that we only need around Rp 4 million subsidy per student 
per year, which is not even 1/4 o f it. The government also decided that a 
student only has to pay Rp 2 million or 1/9 o f  the total required. ”
A Deputy Rector added this:
“Such great funds (Rp 18 million per student per year) would enable us to 
compete with other universities at the regional level. The problem is that it 
is not possible for the government fully to bear the cost. Moreover, the 
meagre budget is also distributed to the other 62 public universities (PIN). 
In fact, the development o f Ajar University as a research university does 
not merely demand excellent students but also requires qualified human 
resources. A qualified education also needs the research infrastructure 
including laboratories, a library, a centre o f  information technology, as 
well as highly qualified academicians. ”55
Before autonomy, the universities had no power to raise any costs, as a manager 
explained by stating:
55 Exchange Rate: 1 GBP (£) = 15,000 IDR (Rp)
“Before now, as a non-profit governmental institution, we were prohibited 
from finding our own funds outside o f the government’s control. At that 
time, to overcome this, illegal and unrecorded proceeds were obtained 
from the students. Today, through MWA approval, the university has the 
authority to gain legal proceeds from the students as long as the objective 
is to improve study-learning quality and the lecturers ’ standard o f living. ”
To overcome this matter, after autonomy the two studied universities determined 
various added costs for the students. Article 24 of Law No.20/2003 on the national 
education system allows the universities to collect public funds and manage themselves. 
At Ajar University, they introduced new ways to increase their funds, such as the 
entrance fee that is called as Donation to Academic Quality Improvement (Sumbangan 
Peningkatan Mutu Akademik/SPMA), and the Educational Operating Fee (Biaya 
Operasional Pendidikan/BOP). A respondent explained the reason for this as follows:
“Raising the tuition fees is very bureaucratic and such a long process. 
Hence, a reasonable way out is a policy to collect BOP from every 
student. ”
The Educational Operating Fee (BOP) is used for particular needs, including the
funding of matters related to education, such as honoraria for educational purposes, but
these must not be more than 20%. Concerning the mechanism of raising the Donation to
Academic Quality Improvement (SPMA) and the Educational Operating Fee (BOP), a
Deputy Dean said as follows:
“At that time, the Rector asked us to calculate the cost that a faculty 
incurred through everyday study and learning. I, as the 2nd Deputy Dean, 
did not get directly involved in the calculation; I  just called fo r  the heads 
o f department and the heads o f labs to send me details about the costs. The 
cost is variable. Indeed, there were one or two departments or labs that 
were reluctant to provide the information. Therefore we estimated their 
needs, which was better than nothing. We then sent it to the university. ”
The biggest influences in determining the fees (BOP), as well as SPMA, are from the
Rector and the MWA. The university has to ask for MWA approval first, before they
can decide on the BOP and SPMA amounts. Therefore, although it seems contradictory,
226
the university continues to carry out the policy since the MWA, as the highest body in
the university, ratifies it. Related to this matter, a respondent said as follows:
“There was no meeting between faculty parties and the university to 
determine the fees (BOP). The university asked fo r  MWA consideration as 
well as approval as the highest body right here. Both the Rector and the 
MWA had their own thoughts. As a result, the fees (BOP) are much higher 
than we had calculated. We, from the faculty parties, have no idea at all 
about the criteria that were used to calculate the released number. ”
The amount of BOP itself is different in science and non-science faculties. In science 
faculties, a student is obliged to pay a higher BOP than in the non-science faculties. All 
of the BOP funds obtained from the students are handed over to the faculty without any 
deduction being made by the university. As also happened in Didik University, Ajar 
University introduced a new policy by applying an "entrance fee" to new students.
10.6. Chapter Summary
The discussion above concludes that after deregulation, the role of central government 
bureaucracy in the two universities was weaker than before autonomy was granted. This 
chapter found that there are some areas in management control practices that have been 
changed in the universities after the granting of autonomy by the government, such as: 
industrial relations, strategic planning, budgeting, and financial reporting. In terms of 
industrial relations, the universities experienced some changes in employment status, 
organisational structure, and the appointment of managers in the universities or 
faculties.
In summary, deregulation gave the two studied universities the power to make decisions 
and manage their own governance. Table 10.6 and 10.7 summarise the activities in 
management control systems in the two studied universities before and after 
deregulation that have been detailed in Chapters Nine and Ten.
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The discussion in this chapter found that the selection of university Rectors is becoming 
more democratic as they are appointed by the stakeholders. In addition, the other 
managers in the universities are appointed according to their skills and also through 
selection process. Concerning budgeting practices, after deregulation, the universities 
have two kinds of budget, which are budgets that come from private sources and from 
the government. The universities have been allowed to manage the income they earn 
from private sources while the government still manages the budget that they provide. 
The budget control has become stricter than before. In addition, the government has also 
given more autonomy for the universities to develop their own missions, visions, goals, 
and organisational strategy in order to improve the quality of the universities. Finally, 
after the granting of autonomy, the universities have the independence to set the tuition 
fees for the students according to the needs of the universities.
After discussing the management control systems in the two studied universities before 
and after deregulation, this thesis is continued in the next chapter with an analysis of the 
factors that influence the changes to the MCS in the universities.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
11.1. Introduction
As presented in Chapter Three, the study uses the new institutional sociological (NIS) 
framework to explain why and how management control systems have changed in the 
organisations studied. The study also supplements the analysis of institutional forces 
with relations of intra-organisational power and market forces. To understand how and 
why management control systems change occurs, this chapter examines the process of 
change as well as the outcome of change. This analysis also describes how new ideas 
become legitimised within organisations.
There are several external and internal factors that shape the operations of the 
management control systems. In this chapter, a number of factors that influence the 
changes in MCS in the two autonomous universities are examined. This chapter 
examines a number of factors that influence the changes in the two universities studied 
using institutional isomorphism, and the interplay between institutional, organisational 
power relations and competitive forces.
This chapter is divided into six sections: the first section provides an introduction and 
overview of the chapter; the second section provides evidence to suggest that the 
external environment such as governments, headquarters, legislation, and agreements 
between countries would influence the operations of Management control systems in an 
organisation (Coercive isomorphism); the third section provides evidence to suggest that 
the willingness to maintain institutional stability and legitimacy from other
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organisations would bring an organisation to adopt certain management accounting 
control practices (Normative isomorphism).
The next two sections are provided to address the shortcoming of NIS identified earlier 
in Chapter Three of this thesis. The fourth section discusses the interplay between 
institutional forces and organisational power relations in facilitating the changes in 
management control systems of the universities; while the fifth section provides 
discussion on the interplay between institutional and market forces in facilitating the 
management control systems change in the universities. Finally, this chapter is closed 
with a section that provides the conclusion of the chapter.
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11.2. Coercive Isomorphism in Facilitating Changes in the Universities
As a result of fundamental changes in society, politics, and the Indonesian economy,
Indonesia’s universities today face a broader and more complex set of environments 
than a few decades ago. These environmental changes are seen as being able to provide 
bases for management accounting change (Burchell et al., 1980; Broadbent, 1999; and 
Hopwood, 1999). Coercive force itself can be particularly strong where deviations from 
institutional norms have legal, moral, or particularly, economic aspects (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). This section discusses the first type of institutional isomorphism 
identified in the study - coercive isomorphism - as an influencing factor in facilitating 
changes in the two universities studied.
11.2.1. Government Agencies, Laws and Regulations
This subsection describes how the government, including government entities, the laws, 
regulations and political situation, influences the studied organisation to implement new 
ideas. This study includes an examination of how the universities went beyond the need 
to satisfy the government as an institutional regulator. This section uses NIS in order to 
discuss the findings. NIS refers to the exertion of pressures for homogeneity by the state 
and other powerful actors as coercive isomorphism (see also DiMaggio and Powel, 
1983).
External dependencies are very prevalent in the Indonesian state higher education 
institutions (HEIs). These institutions are often subject to coercive pressures from 
government entities and regulations. Table 11.1. below summarises some of the reasons 
why the studied organisations should conform to government entities and regulations. 
This section will discuss this matter in more detail.
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W h y  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  s h o u l d  c o n f i r m  t o  g o v e r n m e n t  
e n t i t i e s  a n d  r e g u l a t i o n s :
-  T h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  a r e  p a r t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  u n i t s
-  O r g a n i s a t i o n  n e e d  r e s o u r c e s  f r o m  G o v
Table 11.1.: Pressures from government
In Indonesian higher education system, the government, represented by the Directorate 
General of Higher Institution (DIKTI), has a critical role to play in providing the 
regulatory environment and financial incentives. HEIs in Indonesia have become 
increasingly subject to central control through DIKTI. The Council used its authority to 
introduce mechanisms of accountability and control over both teaching and research. As 
the government representative in managing Indonesian higher education, the Council 
has immense power to steer the system in any direction. The Council retains punitive 
powers to discipline any institution which attempts to ignore necessary constraints. The 
government also has the power to punish university employees, whose status is that of 
civil servant.
Fieldwork in this study revealed that the government policies have led to changes in the 
activities of the two universities. Semiawan (1999) argues that governmental reforms 
and increased regulations have forced the practices in Indonesian universities to become 
dramatically different from what they were, and require organisational adaptation if the 
essential contribution of the universities to society is to be sustained. Llewellyn and 
Tappin (2003) provide empirical evidence about the existence of government pressure 
in public sector organisations. There are some factors that give power to the government 
in order to influence the organisations in establishing new practices. The power comes 
from the dependency of the organisations upon government funds and human resources, 
since public services are short of resources (Llewellyn and Tappin, 2003). This study 
also observes similar findings of coercive pressure from government entities on the 
adoption of new practices in the two organisations studied. This finding has been
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supported by Hoque and Hopper’s (1994) case study which found that many aspects of 
an organisation’s formal structure, policies and control procedures are shaped to accord 
with the institutionalised rules and expectations demanded by external constituents such 
as government agencies (see also Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). However, the government regulations result in the two studied universities being 
similar in most day-to-day management activities.
As has been explained in Chapter Two, DiMaggio and Powell (1983); and Dacin et al. 
(2002) identify the political and regulatory environment as key sources of institutional 
isomorphism. In the case of the Indonesian higher education sector, table 11.2. below 
lists the law and regulations that influence the activities in the state universities, 
including the two studied universities. The table below shows that regulatory elements, 
especially government policies, contribute to either promoting or inhibiting 
organisational change. The explanation in this chapter will provide further explanation 
about this issue.
Regulations and laws that support changes:
( a )  L a w  N o . 2 0 /  2 0 0 3  o n  t h e  S y s t e m  o f  N a t i o n a l  
E d u c a t i o n
( b )  G o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  N o . 6 0 / 1 9 9 9  o n  
U n i v e r s i t i e s  i n  I n d o n e s i a
( c )  G o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  N o . 6 1 / 1 9 9 9  o n  r e f o r m s  
i n  P u b l i c  U n i v e r s i t i e s
( d )  L a w  N o .  1 7 / 2 0 0 3  o n  S t a t e  F i n a n c e
( e )  P r e s i d e n t i a l  I n s t r u c t i o n  N o . 7 / 1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  S y s t e m  
o f  F i n a n c e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  I n s t i t u t i o n s
Regulations and laws as barriers:
( a )  A r t i c l e  3 1  p a r a g r a p h  1 o f  t h e  1 9 4 5  C o n s t i t u t i o n s
( b )  T h e  L a w  o n  F i n a n c e  o f  1 9 2 5  ( I n d i s c h e  
C o m t a b i l i t e i t  W e t / I C W ) ,  a  l e g a l  p r o d u c t  s i n c e  t h e  
D u t c h  c o l o n i a l  r u l e
( c )  L a w N o . 4 3 / 1 9 9 9  o n  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s
( d )  G o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  N o . 7 7 / 1 9 7 7  o n  t h e  
R e g u l a t i o n  o f  R e m u n e r a t i o n  f o r  C i v i l  S e r v a n t s
( e )  G o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  N o . 3 2 / 1 9 7 9  o n  d i s m i s s a l  
o f  c i v i l  s e r v a n t s
Table 11.2.: Influence of Government regulations and laws in Indonesia
The cases in this study show that changes in the public sector organisations studied have 
been coerced by government regulations. Accordingly, the cases in this study support 
the argument of DiMaggio and Powell (1983); and Dacin et al. (2002) that political and 
regulatory environment are key sources of institutional isomorphism. These regulations 
put pressure on the organisations to change their management control systems. Such
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pressure occurs because a public university in Indonesia is treated as a government 
bureaucratic unit and has to comply with the same regulations applicable to all units in 
the ministry. Indeed, this status does not provide the necessary autonomy for public 
universities to develop themselves. This is consistent with Collier’s (2001) findings that 
organisations need the support of governmental institutions where their operations are 
regulated.
Many aspects of an organisation’s structure and policies tend to demonstrate conformity 
with institutionalised rules expressed by external constituents such as society and the 
government. The universities had to conform to the law and regulations in order for 
them to gain external legitimacy, especially from the government and public. The 
changes are as a consequence of: (a) Law No.20/2003 on the System of National 
Education; (b) Government Regulation No.60/1999 on Universities in Indonesia; (c) 
Government Regulation No.61/1999 on reforms in Public Universities; (e) Law 
No. 17/2003 on State Finance; and (e) Presidential Instruction No.7/1999 on the System 
of Finance Report of the Government Institutions.
These regulations were introduced by the Indonesian government in response to 
pressure from the uncertain economic and political environment of Indonesia, including 
pressure from foreign donor institutes. As a consequence of the crisis, the Indonesian 
government found that it had to respond more directly to the advice of the international 
financial institutions and donors. As identified in Chapter Seven, the introduction of 
various laws and regulations by the Indonesian government was precipitated by the 
involvement of the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The 
Indonesian government’s decision to issue the laws and regulations was to achieve 
legitimacy from these foreign donor institutions in order to receive funds from them as
238
part of aid packages. This finding is consistent with the argument of DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991, p.7) who argue that nations, in an effort to realise joint gains, agree to 
bind themselves to international regimes that subsequently limit their freedom of action. 
In Indonesia, the IMF forced the government to reform its public sector institutions 
including public services so that they would become more efficient, cost effective and 
free from corruption, collusion and nepotism. Much research (such as Hoque and 
Hopper, 1994; Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Tsamenyi et al., 2002; Hopper, et al., 2003a) 
on management accounting also highlights the role of multilateral agencies in many less 
developed countries that have experienced financial crisis. Multilateral agencies often 
use their financial position to coerce domestic policy actors to adopt otherwise 
unacceptable reforms (see Tsamenyi et al., 2002).
11.2.2. Resource from Government, Political Situation and The University’s 
Council
This sub-section discusses the issues of the resources from the government, the political 
environment and the influence of the University’s Council in facilitating changes in the 
universities. As has been discussed in Chapter Seven of this study, the studied 
universities, being public universities, receive a large portion of funds from the 
government. Based on this funding, one could argue that the universities are particularly 
susceptible to the changes and demands of the government. The senior managers of the 
universities and of other public services must adopt government policies in order to 
secure on-going funding from the government. In other words, the reforms in the 
universities’ activities adopted an “outside-in” approach (Ma, 2003). The discussion in 
the previous chapter revealed that the design of performance indicators in the two 
organisations was linked to the DIKTI as a government body that manages all higher 
education institutions in Indonesia. The aid funds from DIKTI provide substantial
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assistance in the implementation of activities in the university. A manager in the
university commented that:
"The funds that were received from the government encouraged the 
university to improve the teaching quality o f  our lecturers. The funds have 
been used to do many activities to improve the performance o f the 
university such as to review performance continuously through 
questionnaires; improve a teaching method fo r  lecturer by giving them 
training or holding courses for example, to hold a course oh technology in 
teaching, like how to use PowerPoint, information technology, and so on; 
send the administration staffs to continue their studies to improve the 
quality o f learning, especially in technology, finance, etc".
This results of this study show that state intervention was effective in facilitating 
organisational change when it awarded funds directly to organisations to support their 
efforts to find and implement new practices. The view in this study that state or 
government bodies can impose change is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991) 
interpretation for explaining why an organisation changes. It is also consistent with the 
notion that changes can be exerted on other resource and support dependent institutions 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).
Over the last few years, however resource pressure has increase in the universities. As 
non-profit institutions, the universities require new revenue in order to compensate for 
government funding cuts. The reduced funding provides an explanation as to why the 
two universities increased student fees. When government funding is insufficient to 
meet the organisational objectives, the universities look for other ways to raise income 
through their own activities such as tuition fees from students and opening new 
programs of study. This is similar with finding from Lee (2001); Parker (2002) that 
argue that resource pressure brought an university to the idea to search for other sources 
of income apart from government funds.
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In addition, the reduction in government funding gave managers more sensibility to the 
deficiencies in the current model (such as the current budgeting systems).56 The funding 
cuts from the government following the economic crisis in Indonesia made it necessary 
for the universities to implement effective resource allocation to ensure that resources 
were being used efficiently. This gives the universities a reason to apply the new 
budgeting systems. These findings supported the study from Singh et al. (1991) that 
concluded that reduced government financial support for an organisation will force 
change in an organisation's systems.
Chapter Seven of this study found that the political climate in Indonesia is unstable. The 
crisis in Indonesia intensified and accelerated the process of change in economy and 
also in the social and political spheres. After the resignation of President Soeharto, 
Indonesia now has a democratic government that operates in a very different 
environment from the old autocracy. Indonesian people are demanding freedom and 
democracy and want to be able to influence policy through public debate, legislature, 
media and many non-governmental institutions of civil society. They participated in 
demonstrations and strikes called by different parties to pressure the government to 
create clean governance, free from corruption, collusion and nepotism that are the bases 
of a democratic system. This has been also argued by Grindle (1997) that in developing 
country, graft and corruption are normal modes of doing public or private business. The 
public demonstrations were very successful in exerting pressure on the government, and 
resulted in the resignation of President Soeharto after 32 years in power.
56 Further explanation o f this matter could be found in section 11.4.1.
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The introduction of a democratic system in Indonesia has resulted in changes in the
management control systems in Ajar and Didik university. This change was recognised by the
Rector of Ajar university in his speech at the appointment of the Deputy Rectors:
“This world is changing from the old pattern towards democratisation. It 
means that, in the process o f democratisation, the community may play a 
role in determining its own future. In the educational environment, the 
community may also take part in the role o f  determining the future o f  
educational institutions, like the one in this university. ”
As also has been stated by Lee (2001), reforms in the two universities have resulted in a 
restructuring of the relationships between universities, the government (including its 
bodies), and society. After the higher education reforms in Indonesia, the state 
universities are not only accountable to the Ministry of National Education but also in 
various ways to its stakeholders such as students, parents, and the general public. More 
information about the Indonesian political situation can be found in Chapter Seven of 
this paper.
This study provides evidence of coercion used by MWA (The Board of Trustees) to 
change the systems in the universities. Coercion by organisation owners and board 
members has also been recognised in previous studies by Fligstein (1996); and 
D’Aunno et al. (2000). In Didik University, the MWA demonstrated its coercion 
through the establishment of Rules of Association (ART) for the university57. ART 
itself has been used by MWA to establish the guidelines that should be followed by the 
university in order to manage its day to day activities. This can be interpreted as a form 
of coercive isomorphism. Example of this, section 10.2.2. describes that Ajar University
57 The university explains the meaning o f the Rules o f Association (ART) as follows: “The University 
Rules o f Association are the regulation and further identification o f the provisions mentioned in the 
Government Regulation regarding Stipulation of the University as a state-owned legal entity”. In other 
words, the university ART are the newly stipulated operational rules to regulate the new system due to the 
change o f university status. These ART are the follow up to the legal basis for the university to become a 
BHMN, namely Government Regulation (PP) No 152 o f 2000. It can also be said that these ART are the 
guidelines to the implementation of such PP, and so they technically regulate the system.
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has not implemented a new management structure because MWA in the university has 
not agreed the ART. In another side, Didik University has implemented a new 
management structure after MWA has approved the ART.
Another example is MWA, as the universities' stakeholders through the rules of
association (ART), demand that the university report its activities continuously to them.
For example, to meet the demands of the MWA, Didik University must report
continuously on financial matters. To comply with this demand, the university has
established a fibre optic network. Since the network has been in place it has helped the
University to improve the monitoring of the financial condition of all of the faculties in
the university. The university owns an intranet network on campus that covers all of the
institutions in the university. In every faculty, the network covers a minimum of three
areas, namely Dekanat, library, and the lecturers’ room. A respondent from the
Directorate of Finance of Ajar University said:
"The information technology systems help the university, as the 
administration centre for all faculties, to find the pattern offaculty finance. 
We can monitor the reports that the faculties send from here. It uses a one­
way system, which means that only the university has the authority to see 
all o f the faculties ’finance in the university. One faculty can’t see another 
faculty’s finance. ”
11.2.3. MCS Change because of Coercive Pressures
This sub-section further discusses some areas of practice in the universities that have 
been changed due to coercive pressures, such as: the university status; strategic 
planning; budgeting systems; financial reporting; setting of tuition fees; appointment to 
management positions; and organisational structure. Coercive factors which have 
facilitated the implementation of the new practices in the universities will be discussed 
in this sub-section.
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The first area that has been changed because of the coercive pressures is the status of the 
universities from government units to autonomous institutions. In this study, the grant of 
autonomy status from the government has been a foundation for the universities to 
change their existing systems. As has been described in Chapter Seven of this study, the 
Government Regulation No.61/1999 of reform in higher education was introduced by 
the Indonesian government in response to the pressure from the external environment of 
Indonesia, for example economics, politics, globalisation, and pressure from foreign 
donor institutions. This regulation can be seen as the formal assurance of the jurisdiction 
to execute management as self-management.
The decision by the Indonesian government to issue regulation No.61/1999 about the 
grant of autonomy status to the universities, presented an opportunity for the 
universities that were part of government units to become independent administrative 
entities. Interviews revealed that the higher education reform gave more freedom and 
opportunity to managers in the two studied universities to manage themselves.
11.2.3.1. Strategic Planning
As has been examined in previous chapters, after the grant of autonomy, the universities 
introduced strategic planning into the organisations. The higher education reform 
resulted in the universities having more freedom from the government in order to decide 
their own strategic planning, including their vision, missions and goals. Watts (1994) 
and Crebert (2000) made a similar finding in their study about the reforms in the 
Universities in Australia by saying that after the reforms the universities have been 
required to develop mission statements and strategic plans.
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As a result of reform, the studied universities were required to provide institutional 
vision, missions, business and strategic plans. This thesis identifies that the use of 
strategic planning processes has been strongly influenced by a number of government 
pressures. First, the pressure from government regulation No.61/1999. Government 
regulation No.61/1999 about the grant of autonomy status to the universities promotes 
diversification and differentiation since the regulation gives more freedom to the 
autonomous universities to set their own vision, mission and strategy (see also 
Yamamoto, 2004).58 Second, this study also identifies that the government, through 
DIKTI, requires the universities or their academic units to submit their vision, missions 
and operational plans in order to get the funds from the institution. Hence, there is no 
resistance from the employees to the universities' policy to introduce the use of vision, 
mission and operational plans in all the universities’ units, since this policy is required 
in order to secure funding from the government. D’Aunno et al.’s (2000) study supports 
this finding by saying that state intervention was effective in promoting change when it 
awarded funds directly to organisations. Beside that, the strategic planning has been 
introduced by the universities to satisfy their external constituents (i.e. wider society, 
industry and government) which they demand to create a more effective and open 
government unit.59 According to institutional theorists (such as DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) all the above factors provided coercive pressures for the implementation of 
strategic planning at the Universities.
As has been discussed in section 10.3, it appears that only universities’ leaders designed 
the universities’ strategic plans. They start by producing the organisational mission and 
vision which were translated into strategy. After this, faculties and departments 
prepared their own plans according to the universities’ plans. In this stage, the managers
58 More explanation about this law could be obtained in section 10.3.
59 As has been argued by Nelson et al. (1998) that strategic planning is a tool that can help ensure that an 
organisation’s activities will be effective.
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in the faculties and departments was not involved or consulted in the preparation of 
plans at any other faculties and departments. Faculties and departments in the 
universities run independently and there is no synergy between them to reach a common 
goal, vision, or mission. As a result, one could argue that the plans would not be 
effective since there is no synergy between the units. One could also argue that when 
plans are not linked between units in an organisation, there will be an implication for the 
usefulness of the plans. Cerbert (2000) supports this view by stating that to make plans 
effective, it is important for the plans at all levels to be cohesive and communicated. 
This discussion provides evidence that the use of strategic planning in the two 
universities is only to gain an acknowledgement from the external constituents (such as 
public opinion) that the universities have achieved good governance in their activities 
and to secure funding from the government, rather than for achieving efficiency. Similar 
findings have been made by Tolbert and Zucker (1983) that civil service reform in the 
study was adopted because it became symbolic of good governance rather than because 
it was efficient. This is consistent with Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) argument that 
gaining legitimacy can be a sensible approach because it implies responsible 
management, pleases others in the external environment, and avoids potential claims of 
negligence if  something goes wrong. For example, the universities while adopted 
Activity-Based Budgeting for efficiency also retained Line-Item Budgeting to comply 
with government regulation (thus to gain legitimacy).
11.2.3.2. Budgeting Systems
Interviewees in the universities commented that the new policy from government (e.g. 
Presidential Instruction No.7/1999 on the System of Finance Report of the Government 
Institutions and Law No. 17/2003 on State Finance) persuaded the universities to change 
their finance reports. These significant changes have already occurred since the new
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government came to power in 1999. The Indonesian government has embarked on an 
extensive clean-up of national legal frameworks. The implementation of these laws and 
regulations is an indication of the willingness of the Indonesian government to improve 
its corporate governance and to eradicate the culture of corruption, collusion and 
nepotism (KKN) to drive Indonesian society to greater transparency and accountability 
in both government and business (Dean, 2001). In addition, the Indonesian government 
has also been influenced by the IMF, which has been a donor for Indonesia. Since the 
Asian financial crisis, the IMF has begun to include transparency and anti-corruption 
measures as part of its loan conditions (see Carmichael and Kaufmann, 2001).
As has been explained in Chapter Nine, before the grant of autonomy, the two 
universities used figures from previous years with line item-based budget to prepare 
their annual budget. The interviews revealed that even though the universities’ 
managers realised that a line-item based budget were poorly suited to the universities, 
the managers of the two universities have been forced to adopt the approach since the 
law issued by the government -  the supplier of key sources - required the universities to 
do so. This is consistent with the argument of DiMaggio and Powell (1991); Meyer and 
Rowan (1991); and Collier (2001), that organisations adopt practices or structures - 
even though they are poorly suited for the task -  that have been mandated by external 
constituents (such as government) to ensure the universities survival for the resources.,
As has been discussed in Chapter Ten, since 1999 the two universities have used two 
different kinds of budgeting systems. The first system is used for the budget from the 
government (routine and development budget) and uses the system that the government 
applies according to a very old Law on Finance of 1925 (Indische Comtabiliteit 
Wet/ICW), a legal product of the Dutch colonial rule. The second system is used for the
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funds received from the private sources, and is applied according to Law No. 17/2003 
and Presidential Instruction No.7/1999 on the System of Finance Report of the 
Government Institutions.
According to the ICW 1925, the universities have no authority to manage the budget 
from the government.60 The routine budget is a commitment or allocation from the 
government for the area of education. One of the routine budget items is the salary of 
the lecturers and employees. Up to now, the government, through the Department of 
National Education, gave funds to the university fully equipped with an obligatory 
budget design: the university has no authority to change it. Therefore, the universities 
also have no authority to change the salaries of civil servant lecturers or employees of 
the universities. A further effect is that the universities/Rectors cannot manage or 
control their own funds. Commenting about this, one of the correspondents from Ajar 
University said:
“L et’s say that, even though the university already has BHMN status, it is 
still difficult for it to manage its own finance. There are other binding 
rules, such as the government not yet giving the freedom for the university 
to administer the funds from the government independently."
60 In the future, another effect caused by autonomy is that the contribution from the government has 
changed into block grants. The government gives a number o f funds, the use o f which is up to the 
university. The policy to practice this block grant system failed, resulting in a dispute between the 
Department o f National Education and the Department o f Finance concerning rules that manage state 
finance, which is as yet unsolved. For example, even though the university parties and the Department of 
National Education agreed to implement the block grant system, it was blocked by the Department o f  
Finance, which disagreed with the block grant system. The Department o f Finance has a great role to play 
in carrying out management activities in state universities because the Department o f Finance is the only 
institution that controls all o f the government finances.
This disagreement has arisen because of the approach to rules that managed the movement o f the 
Department o f Finance. An illustration of this is that, despite the bestowal o f autonomy being managed by 
government regulations, the regulations were overcome by a state finance law that hindered the 
Department o f Finance in giving full autonomy to the university. The Department o f Finance day to day 
activities is also limited by the Financial Audit Board (BPK), which has the right to inspect the 
Department o f Finance in order to prevent illegal activities. Though the government intends to give 
autonomy, in practice there are so many things to prevent the bestowal o f autonomy: there are also many 
legal devices that need to be changed, which will take a long time.
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After 1999, according to the Indonesian laws and regulations, the universities have been 
granted the power to manage their own incomes from private sources. The reform in 
Indonesian higher education has been a part of government plans to increase operating 
efficiency in government units. The changes of law and regulations (especially Law 
No. 17/2003 and Presidential Instruction No.7/1999) have forced the government units 
in general, and specifically, the universities, to restructure and adopt policies that are 
seen as promoting efficiency. Regulations create and reinforce routines in the two 
universities to make the universities reliable and accountable to their stakeholders for 
their performance. According to the law and regulations, to manage their income, all the 
government units including the universities should use budgeting that is based on 
activities. This is consistent with the research of Covaleski et al. (1985), who claim that 
organisations often change their budget systems to illustrate a commitment to 
efficiency. Hence, the universities applied this new budgeting system to meet 
governmental demands; indeed, the universities risk loosing their legitimacy and 
external support if  they fail to conform to such government regulations (see also Hoque 
and Hopper, 1997; D'Aunno et al., 2000).
In face of the change in the institutions’ status, the Indonesian government provides 
assistance on planning budgeting and financial management to the institutions. As has 
been discussed before, changes in the universities’ systems have been influenced by 
laws and regulations. However, changes effected in this university, including changing 
the line item budget to an activity-based budget, have also been influenced by the 
involvement of consultants from a government institute called the BPKP (Financial And 
Development Supervisory Board). The BPKP also serves as a consultant for all 
government units to assist in implementing an activity-based budget, which must be 
applied by all government institutions in accordance with government regulations. In
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addition to these consultancy, Pusdiklat BPKP (The Centre of Supervisory Education 
and Training) also holds seminars and workshops for the government units.
In order to apply the new system, the Indonesian Institute of Accountants (IAI)61 - the 
only accounting professional body in Indonesia - through its Public Sector Accounting 
Compartment provide advice about the upcoming public sector accounting issues to the 
BPKP. In other words, the accounting professional bodies only influence the changes 
in the universities in an indirect way. Figure 11.3. below shows the accounting 
professional body's role in the change in the universities' budgeting systems.
T h e  U n i v e r s i t i e s '  B u d g e t i n g  S y s t e m s
P r o f e s s i o n a l  B o d i e s  ( e . g .  I n d o n e s i a n  I n s t i t u t e  o f  A c c o u n t a n t s )
G o v e r n m e n t  A g e n c i e s  ( e . g .  S u p e r v i s o r y  B o d y  f o r  F i n a n c e  a n d  D e v e l o p m e n t )
Figure 11.3 : Role o f Professional Bodies in Changes in Universities' Budgeting Systems
Interviews conducted with some managers reveal that at the time of introducing the new
budgeting practice, administrative managers had a lack of adequate information about
the how the new practice was going to work. Hence, BPKPs influence was very strong
in this matter. Its role was interpreted by one of respondents as follows:
“We are sent on courses and receive training to learn how to use the 
activity-based budget applied by BPKP. However, we still have had 
difficulty in applying this as no one in this university has a good 
knowledge o f this method or has time to teach us about the new system, 
so we always have to ask for help from the BPKP. ”
The findings are consistent with DiMaggio and Powell (1983), that government bodies 
(e.g. DIKTI and BPKP) would influence the operations of management accounting
61 IAI is the only accounting profession association in Indonesia that coordinates various committees and 
four compartments (respectively for public accountants, management accountants, public sector 
accountants and academicians).
62 In the future, the government will delegate the authority to promulgate public sector accounting 
standards to IAI as the professional Body
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control systems in the studied organisations. This finding supports proposition 2a (see 
p. 152).
In order for external legitimacy to be achieved, the universities adopted the new 
budgetary practice in an effort to be consistent with other public sector organisations in 
Indonesia, who have adopted the activity-based budgeting. The universities adopted this 
budgetary practice to show consistent values with their institutional environment. As 
has been discussed in Chapter Seven, the Indonesian public sector experiences little 
faith from the public. In order to improve the public’s perception of the public sector, it 
was essential for the universities and other public sector institutions to adopt this new 
budgetary system. This is consistent with the argument of new institutional theorists 
such as DiMaggio and Powell (1983) that an organisation adopts new approaches to be 
consistent with the expectations demanded by external constituents (such as public 
opinion) in order to ensure its legitimacy and its chances of survival. Another reason for 
the introduction of the new budgetary system is that the managers in the universities 
were aware of the disadvantages of the system. More explanation about this can be 
found in section 12.2. In addition, this budgetary model was further legitimised by the 
fact that other Indonesian government units had used a similar model for some years.
However, there was a general belief from some scholars (such as Innes and Mitchell, 
1995; Crebert, 2000) that the plans in an organisation’s units should be linked to the 
plans at all levels in order to be effective. Innes and Mitchell (1995, p. 131) add that 
activity based budgeting is meaningful because it is based on activities which cross 
traditional departmental boundaries, rather than the traditional budgetary system based 
on departments. In these universities, the fieldwork found a lack of consultation,
63 Explanation about the disadvantage of the system could be found in Chapter Three
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consideration, and synergy between the units responsible for preparing the budgeting
plans. As further evidence of the lack of synergy, even the heads of departments in the
same faculty involved in the budget preparation were not involved or consulted in the
budget preparation at any other departments in the faculty. This lack of synergy has
occurred because the internal condition in the universities caused the universities not to
be seen as a university, but as ‘multiversity’ where each faculty and unit has the
authority to manage itself. Some of the reasons why this lack of synergy has been
occurred can be found in the section 11.4. about interplay between institutional forces
and intra-organisational power relations.
Based on the above arguments, it can be concluded that the new budgeting system was 
used at the universities as a highly visible symbol for demonstrating to external 
constituents (such as the community and government) their commitment to improve the 
environment of the universities. Further, the new budgeting system was used to earn 
legitimacy and continued support from external constituents, rather than for operational 
purposes (such as the use of resources effectively or efficiently) because the individual 
departments are allowed to undertake their own budgeting activities with no 
coordination between each other (see Boland and Pondy, 1983; Alam, 1997). A similar 
argument has also been applied in the use of strategy planning discussed before.
Furthermore, public influence to improve the universities’ efficiency, effectiveness and 
accountability is also evident in the introduction of the new financial reporting in the 
universities and in all government units. The use of the new financial reporting system 
in government units (including the studied universities) has occurred as a consequence 
of the Indonesian people wishing to create clean governance, free from corruption, 
collusion, and nepotism. The managers in the two universities argued that the post-
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President Soeharto political regime is giving more opportunities to members of 
Indonesiam society to participate in key decisions and also to manage and fulfil the 
needs of the community to achieve a satisfactory level of public services.64
The Indonesian government communicated their expectation for the new approach of 
financial reporting in the universities in legislation and policy (Law No. 17/2003 on 
State Finance and Presidential Instruction No.7/1999 on the System of Finance Report 
of the Government Institutions). In the government regulations that managed the 
bestowal of autonomy on the autonomous university, there were some articles about 
financial administration policy, which obliged the financial management of' the 
university to pay attention to efficiency, effectiveness, productivity, autonomy, 
accountability, and transparency.
The senior managers recognised the importance of financial reporting and budgeting 
systems for securing government funding for the institutions. The managers also have 
an obligation to follow government policy since their status is that of civil services. This 
is consistent with the institutional view that political pressure can provide the necessary 
momentum for organisations to change their routines (DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 1995). 
Hence, to satisfy their stakeholders (i.e. society and government), it is essential for the 
universities to lay down transparent systems to reduce inefficiencies within the system. 
As for the background of the issuance of the Presidential Instruction that regulates the 
implementation of Performance accountability Reports for government units (Laporan 
Akuntabilitas Kinerja Instansi Pemerintah / LAKIP), a correspondent explained:
64 The new political view o f the Indonesian people is that public sectors are public ownership which 
means that all citizens o f the nation have legal claims on an public institution's assets and profits. This 
new political view has changed the old view that only government (i.e. man in power) who has power to 
manage the institutions.
253
“The use o f  this LAKIP constitutes the government’s effort to establish a 
clean and transparent governance, which is able to attract community 
participation and public accountability. ”
Since the Presidential Instruction No.7/1999, which required universities to change their
financial reporting system to LAKIP, a correspondent has commented:
“We are obliged to obey any prevailing laws from the government and/or 
the House o f Representatives (DPR). We can’t avoid it. I t ’s our duty to 
execute the Instruction. ”
This is consistent with the institutional view that political pressure can provide the 
necessary momentum for organisations to change their routines (DiMaggio, 1991; Scott, 
1995; Scott and Christenses, 1995). Such views are also consistent with performance 
management literature (such as Holloway, 1999) that suggests that the political 
environment needs to be considered in order for systems to be successful.
11.2.3.3. Price Decisions
The next area that has been affected by the coercive pressures is the setting of tuition 
fees in the universities. For the last few years, pressure on resources in the universities 
has increased because of government funding cuts. The reduced funding provides an 
explanation for why the two universities increased their student fees. Hence, the 
universities have looked for other ways to raise income through their own activities 
such as tuition fees and admission fees from students. In addition to the funding cut 
from government, the government regulation No.61/1999 and Law No. 20/2003 also 
encourages the universities to generate extra revenue from students (e.g. the 
introduction of ‘admission fees’). For example, Article 24 of Law No.20/2003 on the 
national education system allows the universities to collect public funds and manage 
themselves.
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However, as state-owned institutions which operate in the educational field, any
universities’ decision related to the service price that a student is obliged to pay is also
connected to other laws and legislations that inhibit the universities’ decision to
generate extra revenue from students. As state-owned universities, they have to support
the government obligation to the public to provide education to all members of society,
as has been stated in article 31 paragraph 1 of the 1945 Constitution: “any citizen has
the right to receive an education”. Therefore, to support the government in meeting the
requirements of this statement, the universities have to attempt to set the tuition fee as
low as possible. Regarding the Government decree to impose prices for students, a
correspondent said:
"The 1945 Constitution o f the Republic o f  Indonesia itself explained that 
any citizen has the right to a appropriate education at a reasonable price, 
which means that the government should be on the people’s (students )  
side, particularly, in this case, this university only set a low tuition fees. ”
The discussion above provides evidence that laws and regulations would promote or 
inhibit the MCS change in the universities. These argument is consistent with 
propositions 2a and 2c (see p. 152 and p. 153).
11.2.3.4. Appointment of the Universities’ Managers
This study further discusses how coercive pressure facilitated changes in the 
universities’ appointment procedure. In Ajar and Didik Universities, the appointment of 
a management position (for example, Rector and Dean) has been influenced by the 
universities’ external environment changes (such as laws, regulations and public 
opinion) that have been discussed above. The appointment of the universities’ Rector 
follows the new Indonesian political view to give a chance to the members of the 
society to participate in key decisions, democracy, transparency and accountability.65
65 More explanation about the Indonesian political environment can be obtained from Chapter Seven
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The Rector is not appointed by the government but by all the stakeholders. The process 
of selection is open to all strata of society and is reported to the public. This new 
approach also has been supported by the availability of technology such as the use of 
CCTV, large screen television, and the internet.
It was noted in Chapter Ten that appointment of Deans of Faculties in Didik University 
is now very much considered part of the management process and a person is usually 
appointed rather than elected to the position. This finding is similar to the approach used 
by Australian universities after the universities reforms in Australia in 1988 (see Meek 
and Wood, 1998).
The introduction of new principles (democracy, transparency and accountability) in the 
Indonesian environment is also reflected in the appointment of administrative managers. 
With the coming of democracy to Indonesia, there are now new practices in the 
universities for the appointment of each management position. The process has changed 
from one of automatic promotions, based on seniority, which has been a fundamental 
characteristic of the Indonesian civil services, into promoting a culture of competition in 
order to appoint each position. Such competition for a position in public sector 
institutions was absent during the Soeharto era. Interviews revealed that when 
promotions are largely automatic, individuals have little incentive to compete by 
performing better. Hence, the poor performance of the universities can be interpreted as 
an unfortunate legacy of the lack of competition in the appointment of the management 
positions. This finding is consistent with DiMaggio and Powell (1988), Covaleski and 
Dirsmith (1988b), and Mizruchi and Fein (1999) that organisations experience pressures 
to conform to the expectations of the larger society -  to adopt new systems or practices.
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This finding further supports proposition 2b (see p. 152) that the political environment 
would influence the operations of MCS in the universities.
11.2.3.5. Organisational Structure
Finally, the coercive pressures also affected the universities’ organisational structures. 
As has been described in Chapter Ten, the significant change in the organisational 
structure of the universities has been the establishment of the new governing body 
(MWA) that has legal powers and responsibilities to manage the institutions. This 
system is similar to the governance practice in the context of Australian public 
universities, where, after the universities’ reforms in 1988, each university also has a 
new governing body that has more than 20 members (see Meek and Wood, 1998, p. 167- 
168; and Chapter Ten of this thesis).
In addition, the fieldwork in the universities found that a willingness to achieve new 
goals and improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability which are 
demanded by public and government was the real force behind the change in 
organisation structures in the universities. In Didik University, this willingness has also 
been aided by political support from the government, public and the MWA (such as: the 
grant of autonomy, law reforms and the issue of the Rule of Organisation by MWA) 
which has facilitated the reform of the university’s organisational structure. However, in 
Ajar University, MWA has not issued the Rule of Organisation which would give 
legitimacy to the leaders of the university to reform its organisational structure. As a 
result, in contrast to Didik University, Ajar University has not reformed its 
organisational structure.
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In the case of Didik University, there was no difficulty in convincing staff that the 
current structure was no longer suited to current conditions. The current structure itself 
has not been remodelled since 1989 after the government issued a regulation about the 
organisational structure in all Indonesian state higher education institutions. The 
previous organisational structures are considered to be ineffective since the universities 
autonomy status increased the span of the universities management from government 
units to be more dependent institutions which are more complex in their day to day 
activities. In addition, the competitive pressures and the reduction in government 
funding also rendered the current structure ineffective. This discussion leads to the 
argument that the external pressure for change created an awareness that the current 
structure was working ineffectively. DiMaggio (1991) supports this argument by noting 
that management in an organisation relies on the external pressures for change to help 
gain acceptance and legitimise the new structure.
The new organisation structure has been designed based on visions that have been 
created by the leaders of the universities.66 To support the universities’ visions, the new 
organisational structure established new institutions (such as Audit board). It is argued 
that by changing the structure, the organisation was seen to be improving its 
accountability and efficiency. According to Pfeffer (1981), organisational structure 
reforms have been influenced from two perspectives which are: to improve the 
efficiency of the organisation; and as a result of struggles for political legitimacy. This 
study has asserted that the changes in organisational structure in Didik university is for 
improving control of operations (e.g. efficiency and efficient) as well as gaining 
legitimacy from external constituencies (such as the public and politicians). This 
supports the arguments of Oliver (1991), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), and Meyer and
66 See chapter Eight for more explanation about the universities new visions and missions.
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Rowan (1977), who claim that the influence of both perceived legitimacy and efficiency 
gains are determinants of compliance with institutionalised practices. A similar 
assertion has been made by Covaleski et al. (1993) who claim that the changes in 
universities’ financial systems have been forced by coercive pressures to conform with 
efficiency.
The change of organisational structure can affect the balance of power and may incur 
resistance from the actors whose status has been threatened (Baldridge, 1971). In Didik 
University, resistance to the organisational structure reforms occurred at two levels: the 
academic units and administrative units. This topic will be explored further in the 
section 11.4. about interplay between institutional forces and intra-organisational power 
relations.
This section concludes that reforms in the universities have been influenced from two 
perspectives, which are: (i) to improve the efficiency of the organisations; and (ii) as a 
result of political struggles for control. The author has demonstrated in this case that the 
external environment, such as government entities and legislation would influence the 
operation of management control systems in an organisation. This again supports the 
study proposition 2a about the influence regulatory environment on the design and use 
ofMCS (see p. 152).
This study agrees with Fligstein (1996) and Dacin et al. (2002), who argue that the 
government is an important key driver in promoting changes in a government unit, since 
a government unit is organised and operated by the government, including what roles 
super-ordinate authorities (e.g. boards) should play in decision-making. This study also 
provides evidence that a change in the environment requires an organisational response
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or change if  an organisation is to survive. This means that management must be 
receptive to environmental changes as well as internal changes in the organisation. 
Hence, with a change to government legislation and policies, the universities have to 
respond to the change to continue operating as legitimate organisations (Deegan, 2002).
11.3. Normative Isomorphism
This section provides evidence to suggest that the willingness to maintain institutional 
stability and legitimacy from other organisations (e.g. professional bodies) and the 
willingness to comply with the national and organisational cultures would bring an 
organisation to adopt certain management accounting control practices (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Granlund and Lukka, 1998).
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Greenwood et al. (2002), professional 
associations are a key source of normative isomorphic pressures. However, in these case 
studies, MCS change has been more influenced by the national and organisational 
cultures (Granlund and Lukka, 1998). In the financial matters, as has been explained in 
section 11.2.3. before, the influence of IAI - Indonesia’s only accounting professional 
body - is only through their advice to government agencies. However, the IAI does not 
have enough political supports or resource power to influence the government agencies 
or universities to follow their standards. The accounting body only gives advice to 
government agencies (i.e. Finance ministry, National Education ministry, and BPKP) to 
force the universities to follow the accounting standards. The minimal influence of the 
professional bodies in the case as discussed above contradicts arguments developed in 
proposition 4a of the role of professional bodies as normative isomorphism (see p. 154).
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Hence, this study found that, in terms of normative isomorphism, national and 
organisational culture are the most important factors that facilitated the changes in the 
universities’ MCS. This phenomenon has been supported by the argument of Granlund 
and Lukka (1998) that in the context of normative pressure, national and organisational 
cultures have traditionally been seen as perhaps the most important drivers regarding 
management accounting practices. A large number of studies in management 
accounting (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Broadbent, 1999) also conclude that culture is 
one of the external influences on an organisation in the successful of implementation of 
new management control systems. This argument has been also supported by Gary et al. 
(2000), who argues that organisations should conform to the accepted norms of their 
population.
11.3.1. The Cultural Impact
It is very useful to analyse organisational cultures and the way in which they are 
created, kept alive, modified, used and destroyed (Cooper, 1981). Preston (1995) 
concludes that organisational cultures may sometimes impede or enhance creativity. In 
order to explain the adoption or evolution of control systems in organisations in Asian 
countries, culture and social relations must certainly be taken into account (Ansari and 
Bell, 1991). Hence, this study will highlight some of the crucial cultural issues that may 
well explain some managerial practices in the studied universities. To do that, this study 
relies on linguistic categories and idiom. In this study, a number of key Indonesian and 
Javanese idioms or phrases (such as: The main characteristics of Indonesia’s collective 
society are collective decision-making processes (musyawarah), unanimous decisions 
(mufakat), family atmosphere (Kekeluargaan), cooperation (gotong royong), Bapakism) 
are used to drive the explanations. More explanation of these phrases and idioms can be 
found in Chapter Ten of this study. This method has also been used by Ansari and Bell 
(1991) to study family owned business in Pakistan that used Urdu language to drive
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their explanations. The importance of family ties within the Indonesian context has also 
been identified by other studies (e.g., Rademakers, 1998; Dean, 2001).
Some of the changes in management activities in the organisation can be explained 
based on culture and social relations. Analysis in this study shows that culture is very 
important in the Indonesian context (Dean, 2001), as decisions are made on the basis of 
socio-cultural relations. For example, as the case illustrated, staff recruitment was based 
substantially on social relations. Preference is given to prospective employees who have 
relations in the organisation, or to those who have graduated from the University. This 
is very similar to Ansari and Bell’s (1991) findings in a Pakistani firm.
This section provides findings that although external parties such as government bodies 
provided the pressure for change, the initiation of change was made at the senior 
management level. Leaders were involved in explaining the archetype to their 
subordinates and managing the change. In these two case studies, changes in the 
universities’ systems have been initiated by the universities leaders by creating visions 
and missions of how they would like the organisation to look. In this study, there is 
evidence that the new universities’ systems were designed based on a vision created by 
the leaders of the universities such as: changes in organisational structure which follow 
the vision.
In these universities, the power of the leaders comes from the acceptance of national 
culture. In accordance with organisational culture in Indonesia, a leader is an extremely 
important figure in bringing change to an organisation. Organisations in Indonesia have 
developed a participation culture based on the consent principle and still look up to the
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top officers (in Javanese, this is called ing ngarso sing tulodo).61 Moreover, one factor 
that is also inseparable from organisational structure in Indonesia is the realisation of 
the paternalistic organisational culture, which always seeks a ‘patron’ figure to serve 
and protect their subordinates. According to Indonesian style of leadership, a leader 
should demonstrate musyawarah (mutual deliberation); mufakat (common unanimous 
decision); and kekeluargaan (family atmosphere) in the organisation that he or she 
leads. These are the principles that are used by the Indonesian people to run their daily 
activities. The national culture remains the most important process in management 
activities in Indonesia. Thus many decisions regarding the universities’ employees have 
been related to informal management control activities, such as those that have been 
discussed in previous chapters. This is consistent with Dean’s (2001) conclusion that in 
Indonesian organisations, decisions are made at the top (but by consensus) and are 
respected by those who are not in authority.
Employees in the universities, however, respect and accept the leaders’ position in the 
organisations, based on the Javanese cultural tradition. Javanese culture itself is the 
most influential culture in Indonesia (Dean, 2001). Dean (2001) argues that Javanese 
society is highly hierarchical, with great power distances between each level within a 
social structure. Subordinates are expected to respect those in authority and are not 
allowed to question such an authority. Status is strictly defined by obligations and 
responsibilities, which tend to limit movement within the network. As Dean (2001: 4) 
points out: “It will be very uncommon indeed for a person lower in the network to 
overtake their patron in terms o f rank or income In these universities and most of 
government units, subordinates experience a lack of general initiative which occurs as
67 Javanese is the most influential culture in Indonesia.
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part of the paternalistic approach to Indonesian corporate culture. More explanation of 
this could be obtained in section 11.4.1. in this chapter.
The influence of culture as a power for an individual is consistent with Bums’ (2000) 
findings. This is also consistent with the fourth dimension of power recognised by
Hardy (1996), which entails that power in an organisation lies in unconscious
acceptance of the values, traditions and cultures, that captures all organisational 
members in its web. With the factors discussed above, it therefore became difficult for 
the universities’ employees to reject the new systems applied in the universities.
Besides this, the “forgiving” culture, that is taught both in the culture and the religion of
Indonesia, affects management decisions in the university. A remark such as “even God
forgives His servant who has committed many mistakes, we as human being should do
that too” is the term that is frequently used when someone is found to have made a
mistake. As a correspondent said:
“The “Forgiving Culture ” results in a feeling o f reluctance to sanction to 
a guilty person. When the mistakes are not that big, they only get a written 
warning. ”
As has been discussed above, the appointment of new employees having civil servant 
status at this university was fully the right of the government (see Chapter Nine). 
Moreover, as also occurred in many other government agencies, the filling of a job 
vacancy in a government agency, including this university, was not always announced 
in the existing mass media, which is why the candidate usually originated from among 
those who were acquainted with one of the employees of that office. This situation 
added to the strong nuance of corruption, collusion and nepotism in Indonesia,
68 B um s, J (2000) The dynamics o f  accounting change inter-play betw een new  practices, 
routines, institutions, power and politics
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particularly when the government still had a role in the recruitment of employees in this
university. Further consequences of this situation were stated by one of the managers:
“I f  we look, there are a lot [of] employees in this university who originate 
from the same family. In other words father, son/daughter, nephew/niece 
and other relatives get together to work at the University. ”
As a result, the problems faced by the officials at the universities in regulating the
employees were difficult enough: because of the very high incidence of family
relationships between employees (kekeluargaan), it was hard for superiors to issue
warnings to their employees. Hence, all problems between the people in the two studied
organisations have been solved through collective decision-making process
(musyawarah) between them. As stated by one of the superiors:
“The warning given to an employee by me as a superior means that, at the 
same time, I  will become hostile to a number o f employees, who are friends 
or members o f the employee’s family. ”
Since the culture has a very strong influence on the universities’ activities, it is very
difficult for the universities to change their existing systems such as rewards and
punishment, and so on. As regards the change of status of Didik University, a
correspondent commented as follows:
“Regarding the period o f status change for a university, for it to really 
change needs a long time. This university needs to adapt the culture o f 
civil servants, who are used to working at ease. ”
The universities, in implementing the changes to the management system, were faced
with changing the civil servant (PNS) culture into a corporate employee culture. A
director at Ajar University stated as follows:
“Up to now, I  see the still-strong influence o f  the civil servant’s habits. I  
see we are not yet able to release ourselves from these habits. We may be 
able to overcome this little by little. ”
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In summary, the social relationship explains the actual power structure within the 
organisations. This study argues that individual and community cultural values are very 
powerful and are able to explain many control practices within organisations. The 
adoption and evolution of control systems in the organisation are significantly shaped 
by the Indonesian culture. However, this study also shows that the Indonesian culture 
has been a barrier for the universities to change their existing system. This study 
supports Preston’s (1995) argument that a culture may impede or enhance creativity an 
organisation. This finding is consistent with proposition 4b that culture would promote 
or inhibit the organisations to adopt certain management control practices (see p. 155).
The arguments in this study rely on two cases and the author does not wish to generalise 
these views to all settings. However, this case has highlighted some of the crucial 
culture issues that may well explain some managerial practices in Indonesian 
organisations especially and in less developed countries in general. Thus, this study 
adds to the small but growing body of empirical field research in this area. To 
summarise this section, table 11.4. below highlights some of the cultural factors that 
influence management control practice in the universities especially and in Indonesian 
organisations generally.
C u l t u r a l  f a c t o r s  t h a t  s u p p o r t e d  t h e C u l t u r a l  f a c t o r s  a s  b a r r i e r  f o r  t h e
o r g a n i s a t i o n  t o  c h a n g e : o r g a n i s a t i o n  t o  c h a n g e :
-  S t i l l  l o o k  u p  t o  t h e  t o p  o f f i c e r s  ( i n  J a v a n e s e ,  t h i s -  D e m o c r a c y  a n d  musyawarah p r i n c i p l e s
i s  c a l l e d  ing ngarso sing tulodo) -  F o r g i v e  e a c h  o t h e r
-  T h e  w o r d  Rukun t h a t  t e a c h  I n d o n e s i a n  p e o p l e  t o -  f a m i l y  r e l a t i o n s h i p s
a v o i d  c o n f l i c t  a t  a l l  c o s t .
-  R e s p e c t  a l l  t h e  l e a d e r s ’  d e c i s i o n s
Table 11.4.: Influence of national and organisational culture
11.4. The Interplay between Institutional Isomorphism and Power Relations in 
Facilitating Changes in the Management Accounting Control
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The following subsections examine the power relationship in the universities. This 
section is provided to solve the shortcomings of NIS identified in Chapter Four of this 
thesis -  i.e., its failure to recognise the relations of power between the different 
institutional actors and its inability to show the role of management and accommodate 
or reconcile the competing interest. NIS scholars (for example: Oliver, 1991; Goodrick 
and Salancik, 1996; and Kostova and Kendall, 2002) emphasise the role of interest and 
agency in analysing and understanding the impacts of institutionalised organisational 
processes.
Formal Control and Responsibility
The Board
The University
Academic Units Admin Units
Figure 11.5 : Industrial relations in the Universities
Actual Relationship
The Board
The University
Academic Units Admin Units
Figure 11.5. above shows the formal and actual relationship in the universities.
Formally, the Board acts as a supervisory board for the universities and the universities’
senior managers are the highest executive managers that look after all day-to-day
activities in the universities. All managers report directly to the senior manager of the
universities. However, in reality, the universities have trouble controlling the activities
of the faculties, such as the problems conveyed by a respondent:
“According to my observations, the faculties deem themselves as small 
kingdoms. The presence o f this autonomy adds freedom for them to govern 
themselves. This has made auditing difficult to carry out due to the lack o f  
accessibility. Even the Dean also feels that it is difficult to control the units 
within the faculty. ”
Hence, power relations between the internal units in the universities have the potential 
to be oppressive or to enable an organisation to adapt to its environment (or its problem) 
and also facilitate management reforms in an organisation (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1977).
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The next two sub-sections discuss the positive and negative aspects of power in 
facilitating the changes of MCS in the universities.
11.4.1. The Positive Aspect of Power
This sub-section further discusses the role of power in facilitating change in the studied 
organisations. This role of power, which is considered in Giddens’ (1976) analysis (see 
Collier, 2001), facilitated the implementation of the autonomy and the budgeting 
process that will be discussed in this sub-section.
As has been discussed in Chapter Nine, before the government granted autonomy status 
upon the universities, the managers felt as though they had little influence over the 
resources they managed, and had limited ability to run the universities to satisfy the 
public demand since all the decisions were in the hands of government. Before 1999, as 
a consequent of government control over the universities, the universities’ managers 
manipulated the use of the budgets. This finding is similar to the finding of Hoque and 
Hopper’s (1994) study of a large nationalised jute mill in Bangladesh. Hoque and 
Hopper’s (1994) study revealed that the organisation had little authority over its 
operational activities, and the government were prominent in organisational planning 
and control since the mill operated in regulated a environment.
In light of their lack of influence, all senior, middle and lower level managers in the two
universities accepted the government policy to grant autonomy status to the universities
because the managers believed that such status would reduce government control over
the universities and give more freedom and opportunity to the universities to manage
themselves. A Deputy Rector responded to this reality:
“We were fed  up for such a long time. We were not even allowed to 
manage our own money: they (the government) just gave us a budget that 
we must spend. From now on we should learn to manage by ourselves. ”
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Many managers in the universities recognised the benefits they would received from the
autonomy status as one of the managers argued:
“Three essential benefits will be received through autonomy. Firstly, 
initiatives will emerge to manage potential and ability. Secondly, the 
university will be able to increase the democratisation process and push 
fo r a more independent role through trusteeship to develop the university. 
Thirdly, an autonomous campus will enable the strengthening o f the 
capacity o f the institution to be able to plan, to implement and to take the 
benefit from it, as well as to develop continuously. ”
Because the managers believed that they would receive benefits from the grant of 
autonomy from the government, there were no resistance or conflict between the 
managers in the universities with the government decision to make the universities 
autonomous. A similar result has also been found by Collier (2001), who revealed that 
the willingness of the managers in the West Mercia police force to have more freedom 
to manage their day-to-day activities gave support to the decision to change of the 
organisation status. This is consistent with Giddens’ (1976) assertion that power is not 
necessarily conflipting in circumstances where interests coincide. This situation is why 
Collier (2001) describes power as a positive force.
Furthermore, in terms of budgeting process, a university's budget is an important 
component of its formal structure and its attempts to justify itself to key environmental 
constituents (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988). It has been argued in the previous Chapter 
that the power of sub-units (departments) is an important issue in budget allocations and 
activity changes within the universities. The above ‘bapakism ’ culture did not exist in 
the level of faculty or lower level units. The university sub-units have the ability to 
influence the resource allocation process.
269
\^nupicr Eleven analysis ana uiscusswn
As has been discussed in Chapter Nine and Chapter Ten, the universities’ budget 
preparations are different compared to the other Indonesian state universities. The 
budget lines were devolved to the lowest management level (departments). For a 
number of years, the universities have had a decentralised system of resource allocation, 
with faculties and departments having the autonomy to manage their financial resources. 
This difference in budget preparations is not an issue for the two universities studied, 
since they are highly prestigious organisations among the Indonesian higher education 
institutions, who are able to use this prestige to legitimise their actions (see Sherer and 
Lee, 2002).
As has been discussed in the previous chapter, government regulation demands that all 
government units, including these two universities, must change their budgeting system 
from existing line item budgeting to new activity-based budgeting. It has also been 
argued by Tolbert and Zucker (1996) and Greenwood et al. (2002) that institutional 
changes at universities require identification of failure of existing systems and the 
justification for a new innovation. This case study shows that the deficiencies in the 
existing model served to de-legitimise it (see also Miller, 1995). The managers in the 
universities supported the use of the activity based budgeting system since the existing 
system used by the universities was not perceived by managers to be a rational model to 
face the new environment. Senior, middle and lower level managers realised that the 
government funding was not enough to run the day-to-day activities of the university. 
Further, the reduction in government funding sensitised the managers to the deficiencies 
in the current model. Indonesian people in general and the employees of the universities 
specifically, realised that there was a lack of transparency and inequities in the 
government units’ day-to-day activities. The line item budgeting failed to evaluate the 
performance of the universities (Drury, 1996). It was clear that the existing management
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system of the universities, including the old budgeting systems, failed to avoid the 
activities of corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN in Indonesian phraseology) in 
the universities and also in all government units. In other words, all government units 
adopted this approach to improve the units' ability to avoid KKN.
Interviews show that the legitimisation of the use of the new budget system comes from 
the expectation of the managers that the new model would offer the possibility of more 
efficient use of resources and greater accountability. This accountability would be 
derived from the fact that the budgeting decisions would be based on the activities of 
the units, rather than on the previous years’ figures. These facts led the managers to 
reject unilaterally the old budgeting framework. Connolly and Ashworth (1994) argue 
that the activity based budgeting, which is now used by the universities, wins the 
support of managers because it is open, fair and highly participative.
Accordingly, the managers in the universities did not oppose the use of the new 
budgeting system, even though the implementation of the new activity based budgeting 
required the managers to learn some new concepts and tools since activity based 
budgeting is more complicated than the line item budgeting system that has been used 
by the universities for such a long time.69 Meanwhile, the issue of resistance did not 
arise in relation to the rest of the staff since they were not directly affected by the new 
systems.
69 While Babbini (1999) argue that the senior managers have to face the rather more difficult task o f  
making resource prioritisation decision based on customer demand rather than starting with the existing 
budget to build a new budget. He continues that operational managers have to get serious about adopting 
new approaches to budgeting since they would have to describe and quantify the relationship between 
their objectives, the activities that they will have to perform and how these will consume resources. In 
conclusion, they have to think how plans will be accomplished.
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This finding is consistent with the view that budgetary systems change when powerful 
individuals are dissatisfied with the system (Greenwood and Hinnings, 1996). This 
finding is also consistent with the Giddens' (1976) conception of power that was 
introduced in Chapter Four. The Giddens’ study emphasised that power does not 
necessarily imply conflict in circumstances where interests coincide.
At the same time, management in the universities understood that in order for the
reforms to be successful, they needed to engage in campaigns to persuade others both
inside and outside the universities to legitimate their reforms. The universities
management legitimised the new management control systems through different media
such as internal newspapers, internal bulletins, training and informal discussions. These
activities were appropriately used by the management, since new practices in an
organisation become diffused, embedded and legitimised only if they are presented as
more appropriate than existing practices and their superiority over the existing systems
is clear demonstrated (Suchman, 1995; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996; Greenwood et al.,
2002). In accordance with organisational culture in Indonesia, a leader is such an
important figure in the facilitation of change in an organisation. This is also the case in
the universities. For example, responding to this phenomenon, an interviewee from Ajar
University explained the role of the Rector in the university:
“The Rector is active enough in giving some ideas, like various 
reformative policies to face the university status, because the subordinates 
have less initiative. ”
The Rector revealed the reasons for this in the university monthly newspaper, as 
follows:
“We found a lot o f hindrance to the status change. The main one is 
because the thought process o f many campus people has become less 
responsive towards the new status. They still had the old frame o f mind 
that tends to depend on the higher officers or on the government.
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Therefore, the leader’s initiative was needed as the status changed. The initiative may 
be revealed in both the perspectives and the actions of the leader concerning the 
development of his/her institution. For instance, the Rector in Ajar University decided it 
was necessary to improve the status of the Public Relations Institution of the sub-section 
(the lowest institution) under the Rector directly, in order to anticipate negative 
responses from the public over the status change. The Rector viewed the public relation 
institution as being very important in order to engage in public relations campaigns. 
However, since there was no response from his/her staff concerning the implementation 
of the decision, the Rector took action by appointing the institution authoritatively. The 
Rector has the legitimacy to initiate this because of the prestige he has as an adviser of 
Indonesian President for administrative matter. He has been known as one of the most 
prominent experts in organisation and administration issues in Indonesia. This is 
supported Pfeffer and Moore’s (1980) argument that national prestige is one of the 
sources of power.
11.4.2. The Negative Aspect of Power
There are different responses for some individuals or groups over others as a basis for 
resistance to change (DiMaggio, 1991). In this thesis, resistance to reorganisation of the 
universities occurred from the lecturers in the departments and lower level managers, 
and also from the absence of Organisation Rules. In this case, after autonomy, no 
significant changes occurred in the appointment process for the Head of Department. As 
has been discussed in the previous section of this thesis, there are some sources of 
power that have been related to the resistance of the lower level managers, such as 
resources and historical background of the universities. The interviewees also revealed 
that the resistance which has occurred has been related to the democratic principle and 
musyawarah principle. Their opinion is consistent with the Indonesian culture that 
decisions arrived at through musyawarah have a very strong legitimacy in the
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community, as all parties have been consulted and involved in the process (Dean, 2001).
Since there was resistance from the lecturers, it was assumed that to change the
appointment procedure for the Head of Department to a system similar to that used in
the election of a Dean would break the democratic principle. A lecturer said:
“Based on the democratic principle, a leader is selected by the members 
through voting. This is in accordance with the democratic principle we 
accepted, in which the highest authority is in the lecturer meeting. ”
This finding is consistent with Collier’s (2001) study of management accounting change 
in the police force, which found that the resistance emanates from cultural element 
within the organisation. The argument of this thesis is consistent with the argument of 
other researchers (such as Collier, 2001) who argue that resistance from a strong culture 
slowed down managerial change.
As has been discussed in previous chapter that resistance to organisational change in 
Didik University also occurred in the administrative level which was most affected by 
the change. The interviews revealed that the resistance from the administrative 
managers was motivated by the perceived loss of their status, since most of the positions 
would be appointed to someone with masters or doctoral degrees, while most of the 
administrative managers only held graduate degrees. While for the other administrative 
staff, resistance to the new approach was based on the fact that the new system would, 
close an opportunity for them to improve their careers as managers in their units.
However, the changes in appointment of administrative managers hasn't occurred in 
Ajar University since the university hasn't have an Organisation Rule as a legal basis to 
adopt a new appointment approach. The ability of the administrative level managers in 
Didik University to resist change has been limited by the cultural acceptance of the 
Indonesian culture, such as a position in an organisation is a gift from God and He can
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take it from people anytime He wants. The managers also have to accept the accepted
code of behaviour among Indonesians, which embraces mutual deference and respect,
restraint, and politeness in order to produce harmony. In contrast to the managers at the
academic department levels, the administrative managers administrative occupied a
relatively weak position. This weak position has also been influenced by the
paternalistic culture accepted in Indonesian society ("bapakism") (Mulder 1989). This
paternalistic culture entails that it is very uncommon for a person with a lower rank to
question authority, and all employees have to obey decisions from the leader. Hence, the
administrative managers in Didik University do not have the ability to resist the
implementation of the new approach in the managers appointment since they lack the
resources and power to resist the decisions (see Chapter Four for more explanation
about resources of power in an organisation). This is consistent with Modell (2002);
Covaleski and Dirsmith, (1988a, 1988b); and Greenwood and Hinnings (1996)
arguments that the ability to resist the implementation of new practices can be expected
to be successful where the organisational actors can mobilise sufficient power for this
purpose. This finding is also supported by the Collier (2001) finding that resistance does
not always impede organisation change.
The discussion above demonstrates that intra-organisational power could either promote 
or inhibit changes in the organisations’ MCS. Thus, this is consistent with proposition 
5a (see p. 156).
From the interview results it was also found that while some form of resistance exists 
among certain managers, conflict is not shown on the surface due to the need to 
maintain the cultural values. Thus, employees try to conceal any conflicts and negative 
feelings, and therefore, dysfunctional behaviour is hardly demonstrated. In day-to-day
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activities, employees have been influenced by the word Rukun. Rukun is an important 
Indonesian word describing “a state in which all parties are at least overtly at social 
peace with one another". In other words, according to Indonesian culture, 
aggressiveness and conflict are avoided at all costs.70 More explanation about the 
impact of culture on conflicts can be found in section 11.3. that discusses normative 
isomorphism.
The cases in this study also provide us with evidence that power from the lowest units in 
Didik University works fundamentally against organisational change. As has been 
discussed in the previous section, there was resistance from employees in the university 
departments to the new approach of the appointment of heads of department and heads 
of program of study. The section discussed earlier shows that employees could accept 
change based on their cultural beliefs. However as discussed in this section, some 
cultural beliefs can also contribute to resistance as in the cases of Didik University the 
employees have the belief that they have power to decide the approach that is most 
suitable for them. The employees resist change for fear of loss of power and used their 
power to resist change, since their status, interest and belief were at stake. Covaleski 
and Dirsmith (1998) found that changes are less likely to occur if these changes threaten 
the powerful groups in an organisation. Coy and Pratt’s (1998) review supported this 
argument by concluding that a group who perceive a change as threatening may have 
initiative to subvert or divert the idea, while another group who may perceive benefit or 
gain may seek ways to enhance it. Hence, there was also evidence in this study to 
suggest that many employees had been threatened because of the uncertainty of 
expectations after the status change. This study shows that culture has two different 
impacts upon the resistance of the actors, in that culture could impede or facilitate a
70 For more explanation about Indonesian culture see Dean (2001) work
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resistance. Collier (2001) explains this by arguing that the success or failure of 
resistances depend on the relative strength of the culture.
This section provides evidence that the capability of the organisational actors to resist 
the implementation of the new approach to the appointment of the head department 
emanates from the fact that the employees in the department can mobilise and sustain 
the necessary resources, and cultural and political supports within the organisation as 
sufficient power for this purpose (see also Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988a, 1988b; 
Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Modell, 2002).
In this case, there are a number of reasons to explain why the lowest unit in the 
universities mobilise the power over the universities and faculties management. As 
could be seen in the previous chapter, the comments of the interviewee suggested that 
the power obtained by the lower level units emanates from the power related to 
resources (Salancik and Pfeffer,1974; Hardy, 1996); national and organisation culture 
(Hardy, 1996), knowledge (Hardy, 1996) and seniority. As a result, power has been a 
major influence on organisational change. The following subsection discusses the 
source of the units’ power that enables them to influence their superior.
11.4.3. Power Bases
This subsection examines the source of the units’ power. This examination is essential 
at this point in the thesis, because the power that the units have influences the day-to- 
day management of the universities. This study argues that six power bases are critical 
in the universities’ management: fund, historical background, professional, prestige of 
the individuals or institutions, seniority, national and organisational culture, and the 
civil servant status of the universities employees (see table 11.6 below, which shows the
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six power bases). The following examination provides a more in-depth description of 
the six power bases.
The source of units’ power
- The ability to obtain much more money from outside grants and contracts
- The historical background of the universities establishment which from the unity o f faculty into 
one single university.
- The knowledge o f the people
- The individual in the units have national prestige for their contribution to the environment. E.g. 
as high ranking officer in government (Ministers, etc)
- Power also emanates from national and organisation culture (e.g. Respect senior/elder people)
- The employees' status as civil servants
Table 11.6: The source of units’ power
11.4.3.1. Ability to Obtain Funds From Outside
The first source of power is the ability of an institution to obtain more money from 
outside grants and contracts. Chapter Three of this study found that many published 
articles assert that if  an individual or organisation has resources, it also has powers, and 
if an individual or organisation has resources, it can make decisions and exercise greater 
control (Pfeffer and Leong, 1977; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hardy, 1994). Similarly, 
this study shows that power is not always dependent on hierarchy. In this study, it was 
shown that even though an individual has a higher position (examples in this case are: 
between Counsellor and Deans; between Deans and Heads of Departments), the 
individual may hold less power once the resources are devolved. This is consistent with 
Salancik and Pfeffer’s (1974) and Pfeffer and Leong’s (1977) study that revealed 
similar findings. Their studies found that sub-units of the institutions have power in 
organisational activities which is derived from their ability to obtain resources.
Departmental power in the Ajar and Didik universities is found to be highly correlated 
with the department’s ability to obtain outside grants and contracts with prestige 
national institutions, open new profit program study, etc. Even the departments could
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earn much more money than the universities could earn. A top officer in a department in
Ajar University gives his opinion about this matter as follows:
“We will only obey the university i f  it indeed helps us to supply the funds 
fo r  our daily activities. Meanwhile, all this time we have given some o f our 
income to the university. So, it appears that the university acts as a “tax 
officer” who is eager to withhold our money. ”
One of middle managers in Didik University supported his counterpart’s opinion on the
inability of the university to unify its faculties by stating as follows:
’’How we can control and unify them in this university i f  the money is 
received by the administration centre come from them? Everything 
therefore relies upon money. I f  we are able to provide them with a 
sufficient amount o f  money, I  am sure they will observe all policies we 
make. ”
These results on resources are consistent with Salancik and Pfeffer’s (1974) findings 
that resources earned by departments from outside grants and contracts are very 
important for the organisation. This is also consistent with Pfeffer and Leong’s (1977) 
findings that the ability of agencies in the United Fund to threaten withdrawal from the 
Fund is determined by their ability to raise funds on their own outside the Fund.
The authorities of Ajar and Didik Universities are under constant pressure since the 
deregulation to search for external sources of finance in order to reduce the power of the 
individual University departments. This is because these departments have more power 
over the university through the funds they have. Therefore, for example, aware with this 
reality, since university autonomy, the authorities of Didik University establish a 
commission to take charge of fund support mobilisation in order for the university to 
reach the goals of autonomy and to have power over the departments. This reality also 
has influenced the way in which Rectors of the studied universities are appointed. The 
Rector, as the senior manager, is expected to have an ability to mobilise funds from 
outside the organisation. In summary, the power over resources (knowledge, money,
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and credibility) has been exercised by departments to influence decision outcomes (see 
also Hardy, 1996). This power gives the departments more power over the universities.
11.4.3.2. Historical Backgrounds of the Universities
Another source of power is the historical background of the establishment of the 
universities. The two cases studied in this thesis reveal that the power of the faculties 
and of the departments also emanates from the historical background of the universities 
that have been established as a collaboration of many faculties united into one single 
university.. This finding is supported by Eisendhardt (1988), who argues that 
organisations are ‘imprinted’ at their birth and their practices continue over time to 
become the standard way or traditions of doing things in the organisations. Eisendhardt 
(1988) and Oliver (1992) further argue that the force of habits, traditions and history 
may also make the organisational members highly resistant to change.
As can be seen in Chapter Eight, the two studied universities have similar historical
backgrounds. Both Ajar University and Didik University were formed as a collaboration
of many pre-existing faculties in different provinces united into one single university.
Hence, faculties and departments in the universities run independently and there, is no
synergy between them to reach a common goal, vision, and mission. As a result, it
appears to be more of a multiversity than a university. Accordingly, differences have
emerged in the management systems applied in the faculties of the universities. For this
reason a manager stated:
“Multiversity in the university makes it difficult fo r the institution to 
change its commitment into BHMN. It has rendered the university as the 
administration centre that manages the faculties, especially in 
administration, finance, or financing inter-faculty cross-subsidies. ’’
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11.4.3.3. Knowledge
Furthermore, in these universities, power accrued to the departments because the
departments as the lowest units in the universities possessed the knowledge of the area
being taught in the departments. As has been confirmed by one interviewee:
"The departments have more knowledge in order to allocate the budget and 
to produce curriculum. They know what things they need to run the day-to- 
day activities and the knowledge what they should teach to their students."
The use of professional resources as a base of power has been recognised by Baldridge 
(1971) in his research about power and conflict in New York University. He argues that 
professionals/actors in the university could influence decision-making because they 
have knowledge that other actors lack and other actors allow this influence because they 
believe that the powerful actors have information that the other actors lack. Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1974) also revealed similar findings in their study.
11.4.3.4. National Prestige
Another source of power comes from the individuals in the departments who have 
gained national prestige for their contribution to the education environment. Pfeffer and 
Moore (1980) argue that national prestige and research reputation is another possible 
source of power for an individual or institution in the higher education environment. 
This case study of Ajar and Didik universities supports this argument. From the 
interviews, this study found that a source of power of individuals or departments in the 
universities also emanates from the reputation and national prestige of the individuals or 
departments. Since these two universities are regarded as the finest and largest 
universities in Indonesia, many of individuals in the departments are high-ranking 
officers in the Indonesian government or politics such as: ministers, ex-ministers, expert 
staff of the Indonesian President, right hand staff of the President, and those holding 
high positions in government and political parties. These people did not agree with the
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university opinion that all the managers should be appointed by the universities leaders,
since such an approach is against democratic principle. The section 11.3. on 'normative'
influences explains more about this principle. Leaders in the universities do not have the
ability to go against certain individuals in order to control the academic departments
because of the political connections that the individuals have. A lower level manager in
Didik University commented on this by giving an example of his faculty:
"It will be difficult fo r the leaders in this university or also the new council 
to influence the individuals in academic departments. For example, I  don't 
think the university leaders have a will to face (name o f the person has 
been deleted) who has been a minister for three times or also face (name o f  
the person has been deleted) who is one o f  the Indonesian President's trust 
mans. The leaders or the council will be reluctant to face these people."
The power that emanates from the ability of the individual to maintain his or her 
political connections has also been found to exist by Hoque and Hopper (1994). Their 
study found that the managers in the state-owned companies failed to take disciplinary 
action against the leader of the trade union and his associates because of his strong links 
with the president of the country and the relevant minister.
11.4.3.5. National and Organisational Cultures
This case study found that a source of power for some actors in the universities also 
stems from the acceptance of some national and organisational cultures. This study 
identifies that the power of an individual in an organisation can also be obtained from 
his or her seniority. This is related to the acceptance of the Indonesian culture that have 
been discussed in the previous section. Interviewees commented that the system of 
governance and accountability at the universities is such that each university cannot be 
viewed as a whole, but rather as a collection of multiple faculties where each faculty has 
the authority to manage itself. The comments of the interviewees are based on the fact 
that there are no additional regulations from the government or MWA concerning
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selection guidelines for the Dean of Faculty, or concerning the role of seniority, which 
is still deep-rooted in the two universities. The Rectors of the Universities are incapable 
of making any changes, though, since they cannot confront the resistance to seniority in 
faculties without a legal basis. This can be interpreted in the context of Indonesian 
cultural values, where age and position are sometimes seen as a basis of power 
(Rademakers, 1998; Dean, 2001). Indonesian people always follow the guidance given 
by Indonesian culture and Islamic teaching to always respect older people (Dean, 2001). 
Eisenhardt (1988) explains this issue by saying that a lack of conformity to change 
norms may arise because the structures and processes of organisations are sometimes 
tied to strong traditions that are deeply rooted in their formation and development. Some 
scholars (such as: Young et al., 2000; Collier, 2001) add that the traditions of these 
organisations can be a major source of inertia when organisations are confronted with 
external pressures to change their behaviour.
However, the issuance of Article 45 and 46 of Didik University’s Organisation Rules by 
the MWA (the representative council for the university’s stakeholders, which manages 
the selection process for Deans) has enabled the Rector in Didik University to change 
the selection system in accordance with the university’s new paradigm. In contrast, Ajar 
University has not applied this new system of the appointment of Deans since the MWA 
of the university has not agreed with the bill of University Organisation Rules.
This finding is consistent with the views of Fligstein (1996) and D ’Aunno et al. (2000) 
that organisational change is more likely occur if it is supported by an organisation’s 
owners and/or board members, who have the authority and power to make substantial 
changes in an organisation’s template. In the case of Didik University, the university's 
owners are the members of the MWA. This finding is also consistent with the view that
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organisational change only occurs where there is political support for the change 
(Hardy, 1991).
Although external parties such as government bodies provided the pressures for change 
at Didik and Ajar universities, the initiation of change was made at the senior 
management level. The senior managers were able to use their power to redefine the 
attitudes and perceptions of staff. In accordance with national culture in Indonesia, 
leaders are such an important figure in the bringing of change to an organisation.
However, this situation puts the lower managers in a difficult situation since in the 
studied universities -  and indeed, most state universities -  every top officer also holds a 
secondary position. For example, the Head of a Major, Dean, Deputy Dean, Rector and 
Deputy Rector also undertake teaching, practising and research. As a result, these top 
officers have little time to do their job as a managerial top officer, which is required to 
improve the quality of daily activities in the university. One of the bureau heads stated 
that this situation has indeed had effects because the discussion of an agenda cannot be 
carried out without the senior staff. The power of leaders in this particular university 
also comes from the acceptance of certain values, traditions and cultures by all 
organisational members. More explanation about the cultures can be found in the 
section on normative factors.
This study found that power may result in resistance and conflict between managers in 
the universities. This finding is consistent with the definition of power that has been 
provided by Pfeffer (1992). This finding is also consistent with the conclusion reached 
by Collier (2001) that power may be a negative influence where it causes conflict where 
interests do not coincide. However, resistance in the universities is not corporate
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conflict; on the contrary, the conflicts in the universities were minimised due to the 
impact and acceptance of the Indonesian culture. More explanations of the influence of 
national culture in the two universities can be found in section 11.3. on normative 
isomorphism.
11.4.3.6. Employees’ Status
The final source of power that has been discovered in this study is the status of the 
universities’ employees. This study has found that the poor industrial relations within 
the universities are caused by the fact that university employees are civil servants, over 
which the universities have no disciplinary powers. Further, as can be seen in Chapters 
Nine and Ten, the universities’ managers do not have the ability to reward or discipline 
their subordinates, who, as civil servants, are only responsible to the government. This 
finding is similar to that of Hoque and Hopper’s (1994) research, in which the managers 
of a mill were unable to exert discipline over their workforce of trade union officers 
without first seeking permission from headquarters.
Because of their civil servant status (PNS), it is almost impossible for the related
universities to dismiss a lecturer or an employee. As has been discussed in previous
chapters, civil servants are regulated by Law No.43/1999 on civil servants, Government
Regulation No.77/1977 on the Regulation of Remuneration for Civil Servants,
Government Regulation No.32/1979 on dismissal of civil servants. The effect of these
Regulations and Decrees is that there is a long bureaucratic process which must be
followed in order to punish a civil servant. The systematic application of sanctions for
the employees has been described by some interviewees as follows:
“As civil servants, there is a procedure in applying the sanction; first by 
giving them a rebuke, then a warning, until finally reporting to the 
Minister. So as to avoid the involvement o f  a lengthy bureaucratic line 
through the Minister’s involvement, based on experience, it is usually the
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Rectorate that applies social sanctions such as reprimands. This is 
initiated from the Rectorate itself or from the department from where the 
employee originates. This method turns out to be quite effective. Usually, 
they feel embarrassed and some o f them voluntarily resign. In contrast, for  
an employee involved in criminal act, the settlement is conducted through 
legal processes. ”
One of Deputy Deans of Ajar University supported the above description and added:
"It’s been so tough to dismiss or cut or even to stop the salary o f a civil 
servant (PNS) since i t ’s connected with very lengthy bureaucracy. Even for  
a fourth-rank employee we ought to get the President’s permission. 
However, supposing we found any violation by an employee or lecturer, 
and the faculty warned them and reduced the incentive income in the form  
o f money that the faculty gives each month. For non-civil servants (PNS) a 
top officer can take action against them directly by firing the related 
individual. In supervision, i t ’s easier to watch the non-civil servant 
because they are legally bound by a contract as an employee. ”
Hence, until now there have not been many changes to employee performance that 
relate to the punishment of them in the universities, as explained by a manager from 
Ajar University:
“It would be so tough to punish them as long as the majority are civil 
servants. It takes such a long time as well as exhaustive red tape. ”
In addition, a Director in Didik University responded to the treatment of their
employees as follows:
“Since our organisation and our employee status is civil servant (PNS), we 
can’t give rewards and punishments as we should be able to. As long as 
they don’t do something silly, they don’t have to be afraid o f getting 
dismissed though their ordinary performance. ”
This study also found that the existing laws and regulations for civil servants do not 
recognise the award of bonuses to civil servants. The laws and regulations only manage
71the salary of civil servants. The government has not changed the laws and regulations;
accordingly, Ajar and Didik universities, who employ mostly civil servants, must obey
the government regulations. As a result, it is almost impossible for the universities to
71 See Government Regulation No. 77/1977 on the Regulation o f Remuneration for Civil Servants, Law 
No. 43/1999 on civil servants (Civil Service Law), and Government Regulation No.32/1979
change their performance evaluation systems, including reward and punishment, 
especially when there is no support from the government as a regulator body. This 
finding is similar to that of Hoque and Hopper (1994), who found that the state owned 
companies studied did not have bonuses for employees, and that little action was taken 
against any employees who failed to achieve set targets because compensation and 
punishment was decided by the government.
As a result, there is little motivation for university employees to develop their skills. 
Further, the managers in the universities face a problem with the capabilities of their 
subordinates, as has been stated by one of managers in Didik University:
"O f 30 persons working in my office, only less than 20% can do the work.
I f  the 20%o have the skill required to finish the work assigned to them and
the remaining 80% improve their skills, I  am sure the working
performance o f my directorate would improve
As government units, organisational power relations in the universities are linked to 
government laws and regulations. These laws and regulations have resulted in a. lack of 
managerial autonomy and the inability of managers to respond to problems relating to 
their subordinates (such as rewards and sanctions). Fieldwork has revealed that the 
managers in Didik and Ajar universities use social or informal control mechanism to 
cope with the complex and varied situations confronting them that have been discussed 
above (such as the continued use of outdated laws and regulations). From the findings 
discussed in previous chapters, the managers in the universities believe that in the 
present environment, informal controls have been substituted for formal controls, since 
the informal controls are more effective than the formal ones. A similar finding also has 
been made by Hoque and Hopper (1994) that the studied managers have to rely on 
informal and social controls because of the complex and turbulent situations in the
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company's environment. These findings have also been supported by Hopper and Berry
(1983) and Thomas (1983).
The discussion above provides evidence to support the argument that the uses of MCS 
in the universities are shaped by the interplay between institutional forces (e.g. 
government laws and regulations) and intra-organisational power relations (see 
proposition 5b, p. 156). To conclude this discussion, figure 11.7. summarises the inter­
relationship between regulation, as institutional isomorphism, and power in the 
universities decision to use informal control.
The Use of 
Informal Control 
in the Universities
Institutional Isomorphism:
- Laws and Regulations
Power:
- Employees have power over their superiors because 
of the employees' status as civil servants. Superiors do 
not have power to punish the civil servants
Figure 11.7 : Inter-relationship between Regulation as Institutional Isomorphism 
and Power in the Universities decision to use Informal Control
In addition, fieldwork has revealed that the two universities faced serious financial 
problems that made them unable to give satisfactory salaries to their employees. Hence, 
when the universities proposed changing the status of employees from civil servants to 
university employees, most of the employees interviewed stated that they would only 
accept the change in status if their salaries also changed. This change in employee 
status would result in the universities having more control over the employees.
As discussed above, the management of the universities could not reduce the number of 
civil servants in the universities due to their status as government employees whose 
dismissal process involves lengthy bureaucracy and regulation. Hence, to overcome this
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problem the universities will not accept new civil servants as employees. This stance is 
supported by government regulation. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, in 
order for the universities to achieve a complete change in the status of their employees, 
the universities will have to wait for all the civil servants in the universities to retire. A 
projection of the change of employee status in the universities is illustrated in the Figure 
11.8. below.
Non-tenured 
univ staffNo of person
^  Civil 
Year Servant
0 Year
Figure 11.8: Projection o f employees o f the universities in the future 
11.4.4. The Power of the Universities
As has been discussed in both Chapter Four of this study and in the previous section, 
institutional theorist (such as: DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991) assert that 
there is an inter-relationship between an organisation and its environment. This study 
provides evidence in support of this assertion. For example, figure 11.9. shows the inter­
relationship between the studied universities and the government.
The government influence the organisation:
-  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  a r e  p a r t  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  u n i t s
-  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  e m p l o y e e s  i s  c i v i l  s e r v i c e s
-  O r g a n i s a t i o n s  d e p e n d  o n  r e s o u r c e  t o  g o v e r n m e n t
The Universities influence the government:
-  T h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  a r e  t h e  o l d e s t  a n d  t h e  b e s t  
u n i v e r s i t i e s  i n  I n d o n e s i a  w h i c h  h a v e  h i g h - s t a t u s  
( p r e s t i g e ) .
-  M a n y  t h e i r  a l u m n i  b e c o m e  t h e  t o p  p e o p l e  i n  
I n d o n e s i a .
-  S o m e  o f  t h e  U n i v e r s i t i e s '  e m p l o y e e s  a r e  t h e  
h i g h - r a n k i n g  p e o p l e  i n  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  o r  
g o v e r n m e n t
Figure 11.9: Government and organisation relation
As shown in Figure 11.9. above, the studied universities are able to negotiate with the 
government in the introduction of regulations. Leaders of Ajar and Didik universities
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with BHMN status, leaders of the other public universities and government
representatives take part in routine meetings to discuss the issues concerning the
implementation of reforms in public higher education institutions. When the
autonomous universities held these meetings, they decided on various matters relating to
their own situation; for instance, laws and regulations, and finance (including reporting
system, accountancy, and finance management). These meetings can be regarded as the
cause of the similarities in management implementation in the autonomous universities.
At one of the meetings, several top officers in the universities committed themselves to
sharing information and experiences periodically, in writing, on finance, auditing,
employment, management and academic matters. Regarding the co-operation of the four
universities that have been granted autonomy, a senior manager said:
“The universities that have been granted autonomy are cooperating and 
sharing information with each other to solve various problems. For those 
problem that are formal, once a month all o f the universities that have 
been granted autonomy conduct a meeting with the Directorate General o f  
Higher Learning (DIKTI) to discuss various matters related to the 
implementation o f the universities’ activities in facing this change o f  
status. ”
This statement is consistent with the Indonesian culture, that Indonesian people prefer 
deliberation or face to face encounters (musyawarah) in settling a problem. More 
explanation about cultural issues will be provided in the next section about normative 
isomorphism.
These meetings have resulted in a number of positive outcomes for the future of higher 
education reforms, such as a Bill of Laws for Universities on the State-Owned Legal 
Board Programme. In addition, as has been explained in Chapter Ten, the meetings lead 
to a decision to use the double entry system of accounting in the autonomous 
universities. Another example which demonstrates the inter-relationship between the 
universities and government is the negotiations which took place between the
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universities and the government in determining whether autonomy status should be 
granted to the universities. The universities used case studies of autonomous universities 
in other countries as justification in their negotiations with the government to show that 
autonomous status would lead to better conditions in the Indonesian educational 
environment.
The power of Didik and Ajar universities emanates from the fact that the universities are 
two of the oldest and the best universities in Indonesia which have high-status (prestige) 
in the environment and therefore have power relative to the government agencies. This 
finding is consistent with the argument of Sherer and Lee (2002) that high-status 
(prestige) of an organisation is important in the initiation of change in the organisation’s 
systems. Indeed, prestige gives an organisation the legitimacy to act as an initial and 
early adopter (Roger, 1983).
In summary, similar to Dacin et al. (2002), this study found that organisations or 
individuals have the ability to influence the regulatory and normative environments. So, 
beside the external constituencies, this study asserts that organisations or managers can 
influence the process of institutionalisation through interactions with the institutional 
environment (Brignall and Modell, 2000, p.288).
11.5. The Interplay between Institutional Isomorphism and Competitive Forces in 
facilitating Changes in Management Control Systems
A second shortcoming of institutional theory identified in Chapter Four of this thesis is
the interplay between institutional and competitive forces. As has been argued in
Chapter four, market forces help explain managerial change in an organisation. Sherer
and Lee (2002) argue that competitive pressures drive organisations to be different and
without competitive forces, there is no reason for an organisation to change. This
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subsection examines how market pressure influences the studied universities to change 
their existing systems.
The world market has created global competition for higher learning institutions. Higher 
learning institutions are not only faced with the implications of this global competition, 
but also with the graduates of the higher learning institutions who also have to compete 
strongly: they have to grab any available employment opportunity, as their competitors 
are not only from their own country but also from the international circle. Therefore, to 
face this issue, an educational institution has to show its superiority.
In this case study, Chapter Seven concluded that the two universities face local and 
international competition. In terms of international competition, in the year 2000, of the
tli78 universities in Asia, the universities both ranked below 60 position. To comment
about this competition, a manager of Ajar University said:
“I f  we wish to chase those who surpass us in ASEAN, even in Asia, there’s 
no choice for university but to produce qualified graduates and gain the 
recognition o f Asian society. ”
One of the Deputy Rectors of Ajar University believes that a good system results in 
improved quality in the university. He also added that a number of PTN in Indonesia 
were lower placed in the rankings of Asian-Pacific universities. He hopes that the 
altered system will improve the ranking of Ajar University. The other managers in the 
two studied universities also agreed with him that with more freedom in their operations 
in comparison to the past, the universities are expected to be more internationally 
competitive in chasing their international counterparts in Asia or other parts of the 
world (see also Yamamoto, 2004).
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In terms of local competition, the universities face two kinds of competition: (i) 
competition from the other local and overseas universities; and (ii) competition from the 
graduates produced by other local and overseas universities. The process of 
globalisation, economic liberalisation and the introduction of new laws and regulations 
has reduced the role of the state. In Indonesia, this reduced role is not only evident in 
economics and politics, but also touches social sectors such as education, and especially 
higher education.
The ideas of globalisation and liberalisation have been established and operating in 
Indonesia since the 1970s (Kompas, 29/04/02, p.33). The free market phenomenon and 
the policy of privatisation of the government’s various assets has affected the policies of 
autonomous universities by reducing the subsidies for public universities and 
encouraging the search for independent funds through the many government funding 
programmes. Furthermore, the universities are faced with open markets brought about 
by government reforms to regulations. The Indonesian government introduced 
competition into the sector by introducing a new regulation (Government Regulation 
No.61/1999 on reforms in Public Universities) that reduced government funding for the 
universities and gave more freedom to universities to find other sources of income. The 
reduced funding from the government provides an explanation as to why the universities 
increased the students’ tuition fees. Indeed, the reduced funding gave legitimised the 
universities decisions to increase the tuition fees.
In addition, competition at a local level is getting tougher since there is also the impact 
of political institutions (the state, in this case) as regulators. Government laws and 
regulations contribute to the introduction of competitiveness in local markets in the 
Indonesian higher education sector. The IMF, as one of major donor institution for the
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Indonesian government, has forced the Indonesian government to introduce a
competitive market in higher education area through the introduction of the laws and
regulations. As an example, Law No.20/2003 about national education is directed to
such competition among public universities that allowed foreign institutions to establish
branches in Indonesia, and stipulates that:
"Overseas universities and/or other institutions may establish new 
universities in Indonesia through a joint venture with Indonesian partners 
by following the educational system as well as requirements and 
procedures for each establishment applicable fo r  Indonesian Higher 
Learning”
This stipulation has also been added in Chapter XII Government Regulation No.60/1999 
over financing, article 114 verses (1), which states that “University financing can be 
obtained from government resources, society, and foreign parties”. The rules imply that 
any foreign institution is allowed to conduct higher education in Indonesia, and 
encourage universities in Indonesia to prepare themselves to compete against such 
foreign institutions.
The Minister of National Education, Abdul Malik Fadjar (Kompas, 19th April 2002), 
said that it is difficult to reject any foreign education institution wishing to enter 
Indonesia. Moreover, this issue is related to one of the mandates of the National 
Development Programme (Propenas) in educational affairs, which states that education 
ought to practise democratisation, decentralisation, and also educational diversity for all 
Indonesian people. This reform of laws reduced the barriers to entry making the new 
higher educations in Indonesia (especially the ones with links with overseas institutions)
79to challenge the more established ones.
72 These universities include: Universitas Pelita Harapan (UPH), the Swiss German University, Monash 
College at Jakarta (MCJ), and the Gandhi Institute o f Business and Technology (GIBT).
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In summary, the reform in Law No.20/2003 and Government Regulation No.60/1999 
increased the level of competition that organisations face in the local market (see also 
Fligstein, 1996). The increase in competition in the Indonesian environment motivates 
the universities to consider changing their existing systems. The discussion in this 
section also supports the opinion of D’Aunno et al. (2000) that pro-competition 
regulations will promote change in organisations. This study found that regulatory 
policies promote changes in organisations by increasing market competition (see also 
Dobbin and Dowd, 1997). As a result of stronger competition in the market, the 
universities were motivated to consider changing their existing systems. Government 
induced competition meant that the universities required effective management systems 
capable of monitoring and matching their operating function with the external 
environment.
From the explanation above, this study also provides evidence that there is an inter­
relationship between regulatory policies and market forces. The regulatory policies 
promote the changes in the organisations by increasing market competition. This finding 
has been supported by Dobbin and Dowd (1997) who also made a similar observation. 
The above argument supports proposition 6b that the uses of MCS are shaped by the 
interplay between institutional forces (e.g. government regulations and policies) and the 
level of competition that the organisations face (see p. 158). Figure 11.10. below shows 
the relationship between government laws and regulations and the competitive forces in 
Indonesia that promote MCS changes. The figure also identifies the role of government 
laws and regulation in promoting new MCS .
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Changes in MCS
Laws and Regulations
Competition (in Higher education institutions)
-  L a w  N o . 2 0 / 2 0 0 3  o n  t h e  S y s t e m  o f  N a t i o n a l  
E d u c a t i o n
-  G o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  N o .  6 0 / 1 9 9 9  o n  
U n i v e r s i t i e s  i n  I n d o n e s i a
-  G o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  N o .  6 0 / 1 9 9 9  o n  
U n i v e r s i t i e s  i n  I n d o n e s i a
-  G o v e r n m e n t  R e g u l a t i o n  N o . 6 1 / 1 9 9 9  o n  r e f o r m s  
i n  P u b l i c  U n i v e r s i t i e s
-  L a w  N u m b e r  1 7  Y e a r  2 0 0 3  o n  S t a t e  F i n a n c e
-  P r e s i d e n t i a l  I n s t r u c t i o n  N o . 7  Y e a r  1 9 9 9  o n  t h e  
S y s t e m  o f  F i n a n c e  R e p o r t  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t  
I n s t i t u t i o n s
Figure 11.10 : Relationship of Regulation, Competition and MCS Change
In addition, globalisation has also encouraged open competition among Indonesian
workers and expatriates. Indonesian industries continue to develop and expand, and the
domestic job market is becoming more and more competitive. It is no secret that in
Indonesia, university graduate who have studied at overseas universities or universities
that use an international standard curriculum are perceived to be more marketable and
have stronger bargaining power in the job market than graduates of national
universities. As a result, the number of students from Indonesia studying in other
countries has increased year to year. These conditions are factors affecting the changes
to university policy. This finding has been also supported by many interviewees. As one
of the interviewees stated:
“ Universities in Indonesia must improve the quality o f  their education so 
the result is high qualified graduates that are expected to have high 
academic qualifications, enabling them successfully to enter the job  
market. This is connected to more open opportunities fo r  expatriates to 
work in Indonesia. All this time, Indonesian graduates always loss when 
compete with the overseas expatriates. ”
In summary there are a number of ways in which competitive forces can influence the 
universities’ decisions to change their existing systems. Table 11.11. below summarises 
the three key factors.
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-  C o m p e t i t i o n  i n  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  e n v i r o n m e n t
-  T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  r e d u c e  i t s  f u n d i n g  t o  p u b l i c  s e c t o r s  i n c l u d i n g  e d u c a t i o n
-  T h e  I n d o n e s i a n  G o v e r n m e n t  o p e n  t h e  s e c t o r  m a r k e t  ( L a w s  a n d  R e g u l a t i o n s  r e f o r m s )  /  l o c a l  c o m p e t i t i o n
Table 11.11: Competitive forces that influence the change of Universities existing systems
The findings of the fieldwork in the previous chapter have demonstrated that market 
forces in the Indonesian environment have influenced the two universities. This study 
reveals that the market forces lead the universities to change their existing systems such 
as the universities’ vision and missions, budgeting systems, and Rector appointment 
procedures. The first existing system identified in this study is the universities’ mission. 
The influence of the competitive forces, especially in the job market, has affected the 
two universities' missions. For example: Ajar University's mission is to provide 
graduate and postgraduate education o f an international standard; while Didik 
University's mission is to produce highly qualified graduates, who are able to compete 
in the global market and meet its demands.
The reality of the low ranking of the universities compared with the other universities in 
Asia (see Chapter Seven for more explanation) brought about the willingness of the 
universities’ academics to improve the quality of the universities in order to catch up to 
the other Asian universities. This is has been stated in the universities’ new missions 
after the reform, which are: to become an international reputable research university 
that oriented to the interest of the state (Ajar University’s vision) and to become an 
autonomous, modem research university, and to gain an internationally reputable 
academic standard (Didik University’s vision).
The second existing system that has been identified to be changed is the universities’ 
budgeting systems. As part of the influence of competitive pressures and government
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policies, new financial reporting and budgeting systems have also been emphasised as a 
critical tool for making organisations more effective in the competitive environment. 
However, the previous section has argued that the managers in the Ajar and Didik 
universities were confronted with both high market competition and strong political and 
industrial relations turbulence (See Hoque and Hopper, 1997). In the two universities, 
there are two conflicting sets of demands upon the managers between legitimating and 
operational purposes (such as the use of resources effectively or efficiently). The 
universities applied the new budgeting system and the vision, mission, and strategic 
plans in order to provide an image of the university to external constituents (such as 
community and government) for their continued support, rather than for operational 
purposes to face a competitive market. This conflict between legitimating and 
operational purposes occurred as a result of the lack of coordination between the parties 
in the universities in preparing the new approach. Indeed, there is no synergy between 
university departments in reaching a common goal, vision, or mission. This lack of 
synergy has occurred in the universities since the faculties deem themselves to be small 
kingdoms and have freedom for them to govern themselves. This finding is consistent 
with the conclusions of Hoque and Hopper (1997) that institutional and market forces 
may be in conflict under conditions of high political and industrial relations turbulence.
The third existing system which underwent change in the universities was the procedure 
used to appoint the Rector. The findings suggest that competitiveness and the reduction 
of government funding lead the MWA to appoint a Rector that has the entrepreneurial 
skills necessary to face a tighter competitive environment and meet costs. The 
universities must be more creative in finding more income opportunities. The findings 
in this study are also consistent with the findings of Hoque and Hopper (1997); Brignall 
and Modell (2000); Hussain and Hoque (2002); Modell (2002) that greater competition
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plays an important role in changing an organisations’ systems. This finding is also 
supported by Powell’s (1991) argument that competition and politics is supplement each 
other.
The discussion above shows how competitive forces influence the MCS in the two 
studied universities. This is consistent with arguments developed in proposition 6a that 
the competitive environment of an organisation influences its practices including the 
MCS (see p. 158).
11.6. Chapter Summary
The discussion in this chapter supports the view from other researches that the change 
of an organisation's system depends on institutional forces (e.g., the government and its 
agencies; laws and regulations; and national and organisational cultures). This chapter 
found that regulatory elements, especially government policies, contribute to either 
promote or inhibit organisational change (see also study from Wade et al., 1998). The 
discussion provided in this chapter lend support for proposition 1 that changes in the 
universities’ status from government control to autonomous would lead to changes in 
MCS (see p. 150).
To conclude this chapter, this study argues that university reform has been an integral 
part of the radical change in the Indonesian environment, which has included 
decentralisation, deregulation, democracy, and market economy. The analysis of data 
revealed a significant relationship between these environmental factors and the decision 
to implement a new MCS. The analysis highlights the fact that the environment in 
which the universities operated has changed in recent years, and that many of these 
changes have inspired the government to issue new regulations and authoritative advice.
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This environmental change has in turn affected the universities’ strategy, structure and 
process. In summary, reforms in the two studied universities’ activities adopted an 
“outside-in” approach (Ma, 2003) since the universities were part of a government unit 
that did not have the independence to choose the best practice for them.
From the discussion above, this study has found that the two universities have similar
activities and processes of changes. These similarities have occurred since the
autonomous public universities, together with their fellow PTNs that will be granted
autonomy status, hold frequent, routine meetings to discuss activity implementation
after autonomy. When the universities and PTNs hold these meetings, they decide on
various matters relating to their own situation; for instance, law and regulation, finance
(including reporting system, accountancy, and finance management), and higher
education quality assurance. These meetings can be regarded as the cause of the
similarities in management implementation in the autonomous universities. At the
meetings, several top officers in the universities committed themselves to sharing
information and experiences periodically, in writing, on finance, auditing, employment,
management and academic matters. Regarding the co-operation of the universities that
have been granted autonomy, a correspondent said:
“The universities that have been granted autonomy and the other state 
owned universities are cooperating and sharing information with each 
other to solve various problems. For those problem that are formal, at 
least once a month all o f the universities conduct a meeting with the 
Directorate General o f Higher Learning (DIKTI) to discuss various 
matters related to the implementation o f the universities' activities in 
facing this change o f status. ”
The similarity of the activities between the organisations has also been influenced by 
government agencies, public interest groups, laws and government regulations, which 
many scholars, such as Oliver (1997); Granlund and Lukka (1998), have argued are a 
factor that limit diversity across organisations in the same industry. The argument in this
thesis is also consistent with the arguments of DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991); Scott 
(1987); Oliver (1997) that organisations which operate in similar environments or 
industries experience comparable demands over what is generally regarded as being 
‘acceptable’ behaviour -  and, consequently, will have similar structures and activities.
The results of this chapter support the conclusions of other researchers that the change 
of an organisation's system depends on institutional forces (government, including the 
agencies; laws and regulations; and national and organisational cultures), political 
power of individuals or/and units, and market forces (such as competition with other 
international or national universities; and funding scarcities).
This study argues that the units within the organisation that have power play an 
important role in the institutional environment and have the potential to influence 
managerial reform in an organisation (Pfeffer, 1992; Abernathy and Chua, 1996; 
Vaivio, 1999). As has been argued by Meyer and Rowan (1977); and D’Aunno et al. 
(2000), institutional actors have multiple and often inconsistent interests. Accordingly, 
the study of Ajar and Didik universities has revealed contradictory views of the 
importance of politics and power, as well as laws and regulations in the organisations’ 
MCS changes. This study has highlighted that the universities experienced difficulties in 
changing their existing systems when faced with power from their academic 
departments and employees (Covaleski and Dirsmith, 1988a; Bums, 2000). However, 
power was also an important factor in facilitating accounting change (Bums, 2000; 
Collier, 2001). In addition, regulatory elements, especially government policies, either 
promote or inhibit the universities MCS changes. This finding has supported the
73 Oliver (1992); Davis et al. (1994); Kraatz and Zajac (1996); Brignall and Modell (2000); D'aunno et al. 
(2000); Hussain and Hoque (2002) studies have emphasised the the interplay between market forces and 
institutional forces in causing changes in an organisation. Collier (2001) studies have emphasised the 
interplay between organisational power relations and institutional forces in causing changes in an 
organisation.
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conclusions of other researchers that government policies produce contrary effects on 
the organisations' systems (see Wade et al., 1998).
This study also found that the national and organisational culture may either promote or 
impede the universities’ MCS changes. For example, the paternalistic culture at Didik 
University has been an important factor in promoting the restructure of middle level 
management in administrative departments. However, the culture has failed to promote 
the restructure of lower level management in academic departments since the managers 
in the departments have successfully mobilised other national cultures/traditions and 
power to resist change. This finding supports Collier’s (2001) argument that the success 
or failure of resistance depends on the relative strength of the culture and the concerns 
of management with the norms, values and beliefs inherent in that culture (p.482). 
Hence, this discussion further argues that the systems in the organisations are more 
likely to change when the changes themselves do not violate the organisations’ cultural 
values, and also do not threaten the power of the organisations’ key actors. In other 
words, this study supports the argument that the power of individuals or units can be 
oppressive and constraining, but also has the potential to enable system changes in an 
organisation (see Giddens, 1976; Scapens and Roberts, 1993; Collier, 2002). It will be 
difficult to change a system in an organisation if  the change is inconsistent with the 
organisation’s historical, cultural or political context (see also Oliver, 1997).
This study argues that in Ajar and Didik universities, there are two conflicting sets of 
demands upon the managers between legitimating and operational purposes (such as the 
use of resource as effectiveness or efficiency). The universities use the new budgeting 
system and the vision, mission, and planning statement to provide an image of the 
university to external constituents (such as community and government) for their
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continued support rather than for operational purposes (such as the effective or efficient 
use of resources). This argument is reinforced by the fact that there is no coordination in 
budgeting between the various University departments.
In summary, the changes in many aspects of the two universities' formal structures, 
policies and control procedures have been influenced by the external and internal 
environments. This study recognises the interplay between institutional pressure, 
competitive pressures and power in understanding organisational change . In the two 
universities, the study found that there were often interrelated and multiple pressures for 
change (see also Deegan, 2002). Figure 11.12. below provides an overview of the 
salient findings of the thesis. It could be observed that institutional, competitive forces 
and intra-organisational power relations influence the changes in MCS change of the 
two studied universities.
After examining the interrelationship between institutional isomorphism, intra- 
organisational power and market forces and how the studied universities designed new 
systems to deal with the pressures, this thesis is continued in the final chapter which 
discusses the conclusion of this thesis.
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY
12.1. Introduction
This is the final chapter of the thesis and provides the conclusions of the study. This 
chapter is divided into six sections as follows: the first section provides an introduction 
of the chapter, followed by a section on the summary of the major findings of the thesis. 
The third section discusses the contributions of the study to knowledge, whiles the 
fourth section discusses the strengths of the study. The fifth section identifies the 
limitations of the study, and the chapter ends with a section on recommendations for 
future research.
12.2. Summary of the Study
This study has examined the processes of Management Control Systems (MCS) change 
in two Indonesian higher education institutions in an attempt to obtain a better 
understanding of how the systems are designed and used and how they change over 
time. The analysis presented in this thesis has demonstrated that changes in the MCS in 
the universities were highly influenced by a number of institutional forces in the 
universities’ environments. This study reinforced the findings of other researchers that 
social, political, economic, and institutional context governs the way management 
accounting control systems operate in organisations (Hopwood, 1987; Hoque and 
Hopper, 1994; Uddin and Hopper, 1998; Hoque and Alam, 1999). The evidence of the 
case study shows that organisational changes and the introduction of new management 
accounting systems can be understood in terms of the interplay between institutional 
isomorphism (coercive, mimetic, and normative), competitive/market forces, and intra- 
organisational power relations. Hence, this study argues that serious consideration
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should be taken of institutional forces, competitive forces, and power relations issues 
where an organisation proposes to implement new approaches.
Coercive forces have been identified in the analysis in previous chapters to be 
particularly influential in the development of new systems in the universities. Coercive 
isomorphic pressure for the organisations comes from the government through its 
bodies, laws, and regulations. These regulations put pressure on the organisations to 
change their management control systems such as strategic planning, budgeting 
systems, financial reporting, setting of tuition fees, appointment of individuals to 
management positions, and also organisational structure. This government pressure 
occurs because a public university is treated as a government bureaucratic unit and has 
to comply with the regulations applicable to all government units. Essentially, the 
universities are forced to conform to laws and regulations in order to gain external 
legitimacy, especially from the government and the public. DIKTI, as a government 
body in the Indonesian higher education sector, and BPKP, as a supervisory body for 
finance and development for all government units, also forced the universities to apply 
new systems such as strategic planning and budgeting systems. There are a number of 
factors that allow the government to exert influence over the organisations to establish 
new practices, including the fact that the organisations are dependent upon the 
government for funding and for human resources
This study argues that culture, as one of normative explanatory factors in this study, is 
very powerful and able to explain many control practices at the Universities that are the 
results of individual and community cultural values (see Granlund and Lukka, 1998). 
Normative isomorphism (especially influence from national and organisational cultures) 
also has been identified to be influential in the decision to adopt new systems in the
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universities (Granlund and Lukka, 1998). In order to analyse MCS in an Indonesian 
organisation, a researcher should consider the main characteristics of Indonesian culture 
which are: collective decision-making processes {musyawarah)', unanimous decisions 
{mufakat); co-operation (gotong royong); respect of a leaders decisions (in Javanese, 
this is called ing ngarso sing tulodo or in Indonesian, this is called Bapakism); the 
avoidance of conflict at all cost (Rukun); and loyalty. The influence of Indonesian 
culture on the MCS change in the studied universities is clearly evident. For example, 
cultural influence can be seen in situations where the administrative managers do not 
have the ability to resist the implementation of new approaches because they are bound 
to accept Bapakism, where the managers must obey the decisions of leaders; {Rukun), 
where the managers are obliged to avoid conflict at all cost; and {musyawarah), where 
conflicts are resolved through deliberation and negotiation. Further examples of cultural 
influence within the universities include the fact that staff recruitment is based 
substantially on social relations; and appointment of managers occurs according to 
seniority. These findings are consistent with those reported by Ansari and Bell (1991).
This study also revealed that the complex and varied situations confronting the 
managers in the two studied universities (such as the continued use of old laws and 
regulations; and the acceptance of the national and organisational cultures) necessitate 
the use of informal controls in many areas, including performance evaluation and 
decisions for reward and punishment. The managers believe that in these environmental 
conditions, it is more effective to use informal controls than formal controls. This 
argument is supported by the findings of Flopper and Berry (1983) and Hoque and 
Hopper (1994) that managers tend to rely on informal and social controls when 
confronted with complex and turbulent situations in the organisation's environment.
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This study further found that the role of professional bodies such as the Indonesian 
Accounting Association (IAI) is not direct. Rather, professional bodies act only as 
advisors of government agencies (e.g. BPKP) that influence the changes of the 
universities’ MCS. The IAI, Indonesia’s only accounting professional body, does not 
have enough political or resource power to influence the universities to follow its 
accounting standards. The accounting body only provides advice about upcoming public 
sector accounting issues to government agencies (i.e. Finance ministry, National 
Education ministry, and BPKP) to force the universities to take the accounting issues 
into consideration.
This study has provided limited analysis on mimetic isomorphism and has concentrated 
largely on coercive and normative isomorphism. However, the lack of attention given to 
mimetic isomorphism is not considered as a limitation of this study since previous 
literature has identified that it is possible for a study to draw on only one or two 
dimensions of isomorphism. For example, Mizruchi and Fein (1999) identified that over 
75% of studies using the new institutional sociology (NIS) that were published in major 
American journals have focused on only one of the isomorphisms.
Furthermore, as identified in Chapter Four, some recent institutional and accounting 
studies have begun to study the role of power in institutional change (such as 
Covalevski and Dirsmith, 1988; Abernathy and Chua, 1996; Collier, 2001; Modell,
2002). Similarly, this thesis also studies the role of power to explain managerial change 
in the two studied universities. The findings in this thesis are also consistent with the 
argument presented in Collier (2001) that power relations between the internal agencies 
in the universities has the potential to facilitate management reforms in the universities 
(positive aspect of power) and also to enable the universities to adapt to their
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environments (negative aspect of power). An example of a positive aspect of power is 
that the managers in the universities supported the use of a new activity based budgeting 
system since the existing systems of the universities were not perceived by managers to 
be rational models to face the new environment affecting the universities with BHMN 
status. In terms of negative aspects of power, this study has provided us with evidence 
that power from the lowest unit in the universities works fundamentally against 
organisational change. There was resistance from university employees, the lowest units 
in the university, to the new approach of appointing the head of department and 
program of study. However, this study also found that resistance does not always 
impede organisation change (Collier, 2001). For example, managers in the universities 
failed to resist a new policy about the appointment of certain positions. This lack of 
resistance occurred because the administrative managers occupy a relatively weak, 
position. This weak position has been caused by the culture of paternalism or 
“bapakism ” accepted by Indonesian society (Mulder, 1989) where it is very uncommon 
for a person with lower rank to question authority. In other words, all employees must 
obey decisions that come from the leader. This finding shows the interplay between 
institutional and power relations.
In addition, this thesis has shown that the interplay between institutional and 
competitive forces helps to explain managerial change in an organisation. This study 
shows that the deregulation of the higher education sector contributed to the 
introduction of competition in the Indonesian higher education sector. As a result of the 
influence of competitive pressures and government policies, new financial reporting and 
budgeting systems have been emphasised as critical tools for making organisations 
newly effective in the competitive environment. However, consistent with Hoque and 
Hopper (1997), this thesis suggests that institutional and market forces were in conflict
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under conditions of high political and industrial relations turbulence in the environment 
of the studied universities. For example, the universities applied the new budgeting 
systems and strategic plans in order to provide an image of the university to external 
constituents (such as community and government) for their continued support, rather 
than for the operational purpose of facing a competitive market (such as the use of 
resource as effectiveness or efficiency). This conflict between institutional and market 
forces occurred because there was no coordination between the parties in the 
universities in preparing the new systems. Hence, this study reinforced the opinion of 
previous researchers (such as Meyer and Rowan, 1977; and DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) that the willingness of an organisation to confirm with rules and requirements is 
based not only on achieving effectiveness and efficiency in a competitive market, but is 
also based on achieving legitimacy from external constituents in order to secure 
resources and also maintain survival capabilities.
12.3. Contributions to Knowledge
The thesis makes the following contributions to theory and practice. First, since this is 
the first major study to focus on deregulation and MCS in universities in the context of 
Indonesia, the results of this study will further develop our understanding of the nature 
and purposes of MCS in the studied organisations as a response to the conditions 
imposed by the new environment. Hence, this study will further bridge the gap between 
accounting theory and practice in the context of Indonesia. With in-depth research, the 
results of this study help to explain the role of management control systems within the 
context of Indonesia.
The thesis will also contribute to explaining how MCS change occurs in response to a 
university gaining autonomy. The thesis will contribute to the limited pool of 
knowledge existing on MCS in less developed countries (LDCs), especially Indonesia,
which has been a neglected area of accounting research (see Varma and Chand, 2002). 
Hence the thesis will be a pioneer in this area and provide an important step for other 
researchers to develop this topic further. Consequently, the study will contribute to any 
future research on the area, especially in Indonesia.
The third contribution of the thesis relates to the use of NIS. The analysis of the 
interplay between institutional, competitive isomorphism and organisational power will 
contribute to expanding institutional analysis. This thesis thus supplements previous 
studies that have used interplay between institutional and organisational power (such as 
Covalevski and Dirsmith, 1988; Abernathy and Chua, 1996; Collier, 2001, Modell,
2002) and interplay between institutional and competitive forces (Oliver, 1991; 
Fligstein, 1996; Rraatz and Zajac, 1996; Hoque and Hopper, 1997; D’Aunno et al., 
2000; Gary et al., 2000; and Sherer and Lee, 2002).
This thesis suggests that NIS could be improved by studying the interplay between 
institutional, market forces and organisational power relations. The analysis of the 
interplay is found to be valuable in understanding change in Indonesian higher 
educational institutions and provides a useful conceptual tool for analysing and 
understanding change in management control systems in organisation. The interplay 
gives a more complete explanation of the organisational change and also offers an 
opportunity for institutional, market forces and organisational power to support and 
complement each other in building stronger explanations to the questions of how and 
why organisational change is able to occur in the universities. This study identifies that 
while NIS focuses more specifically on the pressures and constraints of the institutional 
environment (e.g. government agency, laws and regulations, professional bodies, social 
and culture), competitive analysis is used to provide an explanation for why an
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organisation changes in the context of competitive market force. The analysis of power 
in this thesis has complemented the institutional and competitive analysis by providing 
explanations of the role of individual actors in an organisation in the process of change.
In terms of methodology, this research provides significant contributions to the use of 
case study and qualitative methodology in management control research. Such an 
approach would provide an in-depth understanding of the way MCS operates in 
organisations. Several researchers (Knight and Weigenstein, 1993; Modell, 1996; 
Abemethy and Brownell, 1999; Jazayeri and Hooper, 1999; Marginson, 1999; Brignall 
and Modell, 2000; Lind, 2001; Uddin and Hopper, 2001; Saravanamuthu and Tinker, 
2003; Wickramasinghe and Hopper, 2005) have called for such a study. However, the 
majority of these studies have been focused on developed countries’ environment. 
Hence, this study contributes to the use of case study as a research strategy in studying 
the MCS in developing countries context. In terms of methodology, this study further 
contributes to the use of multiple case designs in MCS research through the cross case 
analysis of the two universities.
The thesis will also contribute to future management accounting research and research 
in higher educational institutions, especially in Indonesia and in other less developed 
countries. The study is expected to be useful for the Indonesian public universities in 
decision and policy matters involved in higher educational sector reforms. The findings 
could also be used as a comparison to enable the management of the universities to 
develop effective control systems in the universities. The results of the study would 
provide understanding to the managers of the two universities of the realities faced by 
the universities, and will encourage the managers to develop the management systems.
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This would help the universities to design better management controls to support the 
new organisation form.
As identified at the beginning of this study, Indonesia is embarking on reforms in the 
higher education sector, designed to give greater autonomy for a number of public 
universities. The research gives an opportunity for government officers to learn from the 
experience of the two studied universities. Therefore, the research is expected to 
become one of the inputs and also a source of basic concepts in the establishment of 
policy to make related rules concerning higher education sector deregulation. Finally, 
this thesis has concluded that institutional elements can either promote or inhibit change 
in organisational systems. This is consistent with the opinion of D’Aunno et al., (2000).
12.4. Strengths of the Study
The strengths of the thesis are recognised in this section. The thesis has the following 
strengths. First, the use of the interplay between institutional, market forces, and power 
relations as a theoretical framework allows this study to obtain richer research findings 
and provides a useful framework to analyse and understand the complexities of 
accounting change.
The study has been designed to examine multiple cases with two universities 
researched. Using two universities in this study allows the researcher to investigate the 
subjects in depth to provide a fuller description and understanding. The multiple cases 
allow this study to use cross-case analysis and comparison, and to investigate a 
particular phenomenon in diverse settings (Darke et al., 1998). Comparative research 
may identify whether organisations have different management control activities to each 
other, or whether the organisations have different management control activities to each 
other through isomorphic processes (see Collier, 2001). The multiple cases used in this
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study strengthen the results of the study by replicating the pattern matching, thus 
increasing confidence in the results of the research findings.
Finally, this thesis uses a significant number of resources such as formal and informal 
interviews with the universities’ employees from various levels; large amounts of 
documentary evidence; and observation of the universities’ situations. Data 
triangulation involving interviews, documents, and observation facilitated the validation 
and cross checking of the data collected for the analysis. In addition, the use of direct 
quotations and citations of interviews and documentary evidence in the findings and 
analysis chapters has strengthened the presentation of the study and increased the 
reliability and validity of the study.
13.5. Limitations of the Study
This section discusses the limitation of the study. The first limitation is that the study 
did not involve any interviews with government officers. Even though the author has 
made significant efforts to interview government officers to obtain a better 
understanding of the government’s influences in the universities, these efforts were 
unsuccessful. However, this limitation has been mitigated through the use of 
government documentation from websites, government policy documents, and 
interviews of university managers which may be used to understand the government’s 
influence.
A second limitation of this study is the obstacles encountered by the writer in 
conducting the fieldwork in the two studied universities. Many participants cancelled 
their interviews with the researcher or failed to turn up to the interviews on several 
occasions due to unexpected official meetings or other personal reasons. Some 
interviewees explained to the author that invitations to official meetings are often
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received only several hours prior to the commencement of the meeting. Dean (2001) 
explains that patience is certainly required in the Indonesian environment, especially 
when engaging with corporate or government bureaucrats, because being late or failing 
to turn up at all is very common.
Furthermore, the fact that most of the correspondents hold at least two offices 
concurrently, even in different cities or islands, made it more difficult for the researcher 
to conduct the interviews. For example, there is a lecturer who is also concurrently 
acting as a consultant for the government, as a high officer in another private university 
and also as president of the board of commissioners of a state owned company. There is 
also a participant who is concurrently on the expert staff for both the President of the 
Republic of Indonesia and for one of the government Ministers. The holding of multiple 
positions results in the person concerned rarely being available at his/her office and 
having very little spare time.74
The third limitation of this thesis is that the case study only focuses on two 
organisations. Accordingly, the findings in this thesis cannot be generalised to other 
organisations in the public sector including the higher education sector. However, from 
the outset, it was identified that generalisation was not a main concern of the thesis. A 
case study approach is adopted in this study because it is consistent with the aim of this 
research, to explore, describe and explain the reasons for the change of management 
control systems in the studied organisations.
74 For example of this, o f 2,226 lecturers in the Ajar university, the university local magazine in year 2003 
has received data stating that as many as 2,180 lecturers work outside the University. 200 staff members 
participate in 16 political parties, either as chairman or legislative candidate. Another 200 also work as 
state officials, 80 o f them assumed the office o f leader o f a private-run university (PTS) and another 1700 
work there as associate lecturers.
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Finally, as has been identified in Chapters Two and Three, there is a lack of literature on 
research on management controls in public sector institutions in developing countries, 
especially in Indonesia. This has affected the results of the study. As a result, the 
literature review in this thesis is predominantly based on Western experiences. This lack 
of specific literature is a limitation because the review of literature from different 
environments is less likely to provide an appropriate comparison to analyse the case 
results of the thesis. Indeed, the literature reviewed in this thesis has been based on the 
different environmental conditions that may not be applicable within the context of 
Indonesia.
12.6. Directions for Future Research
This section identifies some areas of future research. First, this study argues that the 
reforms of higher education institutions results in universities becoming more corporate 
and acting in parallel with private companies. Hence, there is an opportunity to leam 
more about this issue by conducting a comparative study of an autonomous university 
and a private corporation using NIS. The autonomy status gives more freedom for the 
state-owned universities to manage their own activities. Hence, a comparative study 
between autonomous universities and private universities will give an opportunity for 
the universities to leam from each other. In addition, there is also an opportunity to 
study the impact of the design and operation of the new systems that have been applied 
in the universities (for example in terms of financial matters).
Second, although Chapter Three of this thesis identified that higher education reforms 
not only influenced the practice of a university’s MCS but also a university’s 
curriculum (see Ma, 2003), no study has been conducted to explore and explain the 
affects of deregulation on curriculum development. Hence, future research needs to 
investigate the extent to which deregulation has changed the universities’ curriculum,
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especially the accounting curriculum, within the context of Indonesia or other 
developing countries.
Third, from the outset of this thesis, it was identified that there are some countries such 
as the Czech Republic, Australia, China, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Indonesia who have reformed their higher education institutions (Meek 
and Wood, 1998; Minxuan, 1998; Crebert, 2000; Svecova, 2000; Lee, 2001; Couturier, 
2003; Ma, 2003). Based on this, there is an opportunity for undertaking a comparative 
study of management control systems between the higher education institutions in the 
countries to leam from each other.
Finally, there exists an opportunity for future studies to use the interplay between 
institutional, market forces, and intra-organisational power relationships that have been 
examined in this thesis to study the use of accounting in organisations in other sectors in 
other countries. In the case of the Indonesian environment, beside deregulation in the 
higher education sector, Indonesia is also experiencing deregulation in other public 
sectors. For example, there are many state owned companies (such as banks, 
telecommunications, water, etc) or other state institutions (such as hospitals) which are 
currently being privatised. Privatisation entails that these companies will change from 
government controlled companies to privately controlled companies, giving rise to an 
opportunity to investigate the extent to which their original management control 
systems have been changed using NIS.
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Appendix 5.1: Indonesian state philosophy, the coat of arms, 
and the 1945 Constitution
1. Pancasila -  The State Philosophy
Pancasila, pronounced Panchaseela, is the philosophical basis of the Indonesian state. 
Pancasila consists of two Sanskrit words, "panca" meaning five, and "sila" meaning 
principle. It comprises five inseparable and interrelated principles. They are:
1.1. Belief in the One and Only God
This principle of Pancasila reaffirms the Indonesian people's, belief that God does exist. 
It also implies that the Indonesian people believe in life after death. It emphasizes that 
the pursuit of sacred values will lead the people to a better life in the hereafter. The 
principle is embodied in article 29, Section 1 of the 1945 Constitution and reads: "The 
state shall be based on belief in the One and Only God".
1.2. Just and Civilized Humanity
This principle requires that human beings be treated with due regard to their dignity as 
God's creatures. It emphasizes that Indonesian people do not tolerate physical or 
spiritual oppression of human beings by their own people or by any nations.
1.3. The Unity of Indonesia
This principle embodies the concept of nationalism, of love for one's nation and 
motherland. It envisages the need to always foster national unity and integrity. Pancasila 
nationalism demands that Indonesians avoid superiority feelings on ethnical grounds, 
for reasons of ancestry and color of the skin. In 1928, Indonesian youth pledged to have 
one country, one nation and one language, while the Indonesian coat of arms enshrines 
the symbol of "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" which means "unity in diversity". Social 
differences in daily life should never affect national unity and integrity. Referring to this 
question, President Soeharto once remarked: "What we should do is to have these 
differences blend us together in perfect harmony like the beautiful spectrum of the 
rainbow."
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1.4. Democracy Guided by the Inner Wisdom in the Unanimity Arising Out of 
Deliberations Amongst Representatives
On this type of democracy, President Soeharto said: "The democracy that we practice is 
Pancasila democracy of which the basic principles and legal basis are laid down in the 
1945 Constitution." Pancasila democracy calls for decision-making through 
deliberations, or musyawarah, to reach a consensus, or mufakat. It is democracy that 
lives up to the principles of Pancasila. This implies that democratic right must always be 
exercised with a deep sense of responsibility to God Almighty according to one's own 
conviction and religious belief, with respect for humanitarian values of man's dignity 
and integrity, and with a view to preserving and strengthening national unity and the 
pursuit of social justice.
1.5. Social Justice for the Whole of the People of Indonesia
This principle calls for the equitable spread of welfare to the entire population, not in a 
static but in a dynamic and progressive way. This means that all the country's natural 
resources and the national potentials should be utilized for the greatest possible good 
and happiness of the people. Social justice implies protection of the weak. But 
protection should not deny their work. On the contrary, they should work according to 
their abilities and fields of activity. Protection should prevent willful treatment by the 
strong and ensure the rule of justice. These are the sacred values of Pancasila which, as 
a cultural principle, should always be respected by every Indonesian because it is now 
the ideology of the state and the life philosophy of the Indonesian people.
Source : "INDONESIA 1996 : AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK", Department of 
Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Services, Perum Percetakan 
Negara RI, 1995/1996
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2. The Coat of Arms
The Indonesian coat of arms consists of a golden eagle, called 
"GARUDA," that is a figure from ancient Indonesian epics. It is also 
pictured on many temples from the 6th Century. The eagle is a 
symbol of creative energy. Its principal color, gold, suggests the greatness of the nation. 
The black color represents nature. There are 17 feathers on each wing, 8 on the tail and 
45 on the neck. These figures stand for the date of Indonesia's independence 
proclamation: 17 August, 1945.
The motto, "Bhinneka Tunggal lka" (Unity in Diversity), is enshrined on a banner held 
in the eagle's talons. This old Javanese motto was introduced by Empu Tantular, a saint 
of the Majapahit Kingdom, in the 15th Century. It signifies the unity of the Indonesian 
people despite their diverse ethnic and cultural backgrounds. The shield symbolizes 
self-defense in struggle or and protection of oneself. The red and white colors on the 
shield's background denote the colors of the Indonesian national flag. The five symbols 
on the shield represent the state philosophy of Pancasila, the foundation of the 
Indonesian state. The bar across the center indicates the equator which passes through 
the islands of Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Halmahera. This is a reminder of the 
fact that the Republic of Indonesia is the only tropical country in which the people have 
built a free and sovereign state by their own hands. The golden star on the black 
background in the center of the shield represents the first principle of Pancasila, belief 
in the One and Only God. The chain symbolizes successive human generations. The 
round links represent women and the square ones men. It is the symbol of the second 
principle, just and civilized humanity. The "beringin," or banyan tree, symbolizes the 
third principal, the unity on Indonesia. The head of the "banteng," or wild bull (bos 
javanicus), which is black on a red background, represents the fourth principle, 
democracy guided by the inner wisdom of deliberations of representatives. The fifth 
principle, social justice for all Indonesian people, is symbolized by the gold and white 
paddy and cotton ears.
Source : "INDONESIA 1996 : AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK", Department of 
Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Services, Perum Percetakan 
Negara RI, 1995/1996
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3. The 1945 Constitution
The Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia is usually referred to as the 1945 
Constitution. This is partly because the constitution was drafted and adopted in 1945 
when the Republic was established, and partly to distinguished it from two other 
constitutions, which were introduced in free Indonesia. Furthermore, the articles of the 
1945 Constitution spell out the ideals and the goals for which independence was 
proclaimed on August 17, 1945, and defended thereafter. I reflects the spirit and vigor 
of the time when the constitution was shaped. It was inspired by the urge for unity and 
for the common goals and democracy built upon the age-old Indonesian concepts of 
gotong royong (mutual assistance), deliberations of representatives (musyawarah) and 
consensus (mufakat).
Preceded by a preamble, the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia consists of 37 
articles, forum transitional clauses and two additional provisions. The preamble is 
composed of four paragraphs and includes a condemnation of any form of colonialism 
in the world, a reference to Indonesia's struggle for independence, a declaration of 
independence and a statement of fundamental goals and principles. It further states, inter 
alia, that Indonesia's national independence shall be established in the unitary state of 
the Republic of Indonesia with sovereignty vested in the people. The state shall be 
based upon the following philosophical principles: Belief in the One and Only God, just 
and civilized humanity, the unity of Indonesia, democracy guided by the inner wisdom 
of deliberations of representatives, and social justice for all the 
Indonesia people.
Guided by these fundamental principles, the basic aims of the state are to establish an 
Indonesian Government which shall protect all the Indonesian people and third entire 
motherland, advance the public welfare, develop the intellectual life of the nation, and 
contribute toward the establishment of a world order based on freedom, peace and social 
justice.
Source : "INDONESIA 1996 : AN OFFICIAL HANDBOOK", Department of 
Information, Directorate of Foreign Information Services, Perum Percetakan 
Negara RI, 1995/1996
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Appendix 5.2: Indonesian Profile
Introduction
Background
Geography
Location
Geographic
coordinates:
Map references: 
Area:
Area - comparative: 
Land boundaries:
Coastline:
Maritime claims:
Climate:
Terrain:
Elevation extremes: 
Natural resources:
Land use:
Irrigated land: 
Natural hazards:
Environment - 
current issues: 
Environment - 
international 
agreements:
Geography - note:
People
Population:
Age structure:
Median age: 
Nationality: 
Ethnic groups:
Religions:
Languages:
Government 
Country name:
The Dutch began to colonize Indonesia in the early 17th century; the islands 
were occupied by Japan from 1942 to 1945. Indonesia declared its 
independence after Japan's surrender, but it required four years o f intermittent 
negotiations, recurring hostilities, and UN mediation before the Netherlands 
agreed to relinquish its colony. Indonesia is the world's largest archipelagic 
state. Current issues include: alleviating widespread poverty, preventing 
terrorism, continuing the transition to popularly-elected governments after four 
decades o f authoritarianism, implementing reforms o f the banking sector, 
addressing charges o f cronyism and corruption, holding the military and police 
accountable for human rights violations, and resolving armed separatist 
movements in Aceh and Papua.
Southeastern Asia, archipelago between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean 
5 00 S, 120 00 E
Southeast Asia
total: 1,919,440 sq km; land: 1,826,440 sq km; water: 93,000 sq km 
slightly less than three times the size o f Texas
total: 2,830 km; border countries: East Timor 228 km, Malaysia 1,782 km, 
Papua New Guinea 820 km 
54,716 km
measured from claimed archipelagic straight baselines
territorial sea: 12 nm; exclusive economic zone: 200 nm
tropical; hot, humid; more moderate in highlands
mostly coastal lowlands; larger islands have interior mountains
lowest point: Indian Ocean 0 m; highest point: Puncak Jaya 5,030 m
petroleum, tin, natural gas, nickel, timber, bauxite, copper, fertile soils, coal,
gold, silver
arable land: 11.32% ; permanent crops: 7.23% ; other: 81.45% (2001)
48,150 sq km (1998 est.)
occasional floods, severe droughts, tsunamis, earthquakes, volcanoes, forest 
fires
deforestation; water pollution from industrial wastes, sewage; air pollution in 
urban areas; smoke and haze from forest fires
party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Desertification, Endangered Species, 
Hazardous Wastes, Law o f the Sea, Ozone Layer Protection, Ship Pollution, 
Tropical Timber 83, Tropical Timber 94, Wetlands; signed, but not ratified: 
Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Marine Life Conservation 
archipelago of 17,508 islands (6,000 inhabited); straddles equator; strategic 
location astride or along major sea lanes from Indian Ocean to Pacific Ocean
238,452,952 (July 2004 est.)
0-14years: 29.4% (male 35,635,790; female 34,416,854)
15-64years: 65.5% (male 78,097,767; female 78,147,909)
65 years and over: 5.1% (male 5,308,986; female 6,845,646) (2004 est.) 
total: 26.1 years; male: 25.7 years \ female: 26.6 years (2004 est.) 
noun: Indonesian(s); adjective: Indonesian
Javanese 45%, Sundanese 14%, Madurese 7.5%, coastal Malays 7.5%, other 
26%
Muslim 88%, Protestant 5%, Roman Catholic 3%, Hindu 2%, Buddhist 1%, 
other 1% (1998)
Bahasa Indonesia (official, modified form o f Malay), English, Dutch, local 
dialects, the most widely spoken o f which is Javanese
conventional long form: Republic o f Indonesia ; conventional short form: 
Indonesia
local long form: Republik Indonesia ; local short form: Indonesia; former: 
Netherlands East Indies; Dutch East Indies
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Government type: 
Capital: 
Administrative 
divisions:
Independence:
National holiday: 
Constitution:
Legal system:
Suffrage: 
Executive branch:
Legislative branch:
Judicial branch:
republic
Jakarta
27 provinces (propinsi-propinsi, singular - propinsi), 2 special regions* (daerah- 
daerah istimewa, singular - daerah istimewa), and 1 special capital city district** 
(daerah khusus ibukota); Aceh*, Bali, Banten, Bengkulu, Gorontalo, Jakarta 
Raya**, Jambi, Jawa Barat, Jawa Tengah, Jawa Timur, Kalimantan Barat, 
Kalimantan Selatan, Kalimantan Tengah, Kalimantan Timur, Kepulauan Bangka 
Belitung, Lampung, Maluku, Maluku Utara, Nusa Tenggara Barat, Nusa Tenggara 
Timur, Papua, Riau, Sulawesi Selatan, Sulawesi Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, 
Sulawesi Utara, Sumatera Barat, Sumatera Selatan, Sumatera Utara, Yogyakarta*; 
note - with the implementation of decentralization on 1 January 2001, the 357 
districts or regencies became the key administrative units responsible for providing 
most government services
note: following the 30 August 1999 provincial referendum for independence that 
was overwhelmingly approved by the people o f Timor Timur and the October 
1999 concurrence o f Indonesia's national legislature, the name Timor Leste (East 
Timor) was adopted as the name for the political entity formerly known as 
Propinsi Timor Timur; East Timor gained its formal independence on 20 May 
2002
17 August 1945 (proclaimed independence)
note: on 27 December 1949 the Netherlands recognized Indonesian independence 
Independence Day, 17 August (1945)
August 1945, abrogated by Federal Constitution o f 1949 and Provisional 
Constitution o f 1950, restored 5 July 1959
based on Roman-Dutch law, substantially modified by indigenous concepts and by 
new criminal procedures and election codes; has not accepted compulsory ICJ 
jurisdiction
17 years o f age; universal and married persons regardless o f age 
chief o f  state: President MEGAWATI Sukarnoputri (since 23 July 2001) and Vice 
President Hamzah HAZ (since 26 July 2001); note - the president is both the chief 
of state and head of government
head o f  government: President MEGAWATI Sukarnoputri (since 23 July 2001) 
and Vice President Hamzah HAZ (since 26 July 2001); note - the president is both 
the chief o f state and head of government 
cabinet: Cabinet appointed by the president
elections: president and vice president previously were elected separately by the 
People's Consultative Assembly or MPR for five-year terms; next election to be 
held 5 July 2004; in accordance with constitutional changes, the election o f the 
president and vice president will be by direct vote o f the citizenry 
election results: MEGAWATI Sukarnoputri elected president, receiving 591 votes 
in favor (91 abstentions); Hamzah HAZ elected vice president, receiving 340 votes 
in favor (237 against)
note: the People's Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or 
MPR) includes the House o f Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or DPR) 
plus 195 indirectly selected members; it meets every five years to approve broad 
outlines o f national policy and also has yearly meetings to consider constitutional 
and legislative changes; constitutional amendments adopted in 2001 and 2002 
provide for the MPR to be restructured in 2004 and to consist entirely of  
popularly-elected members who will be in the DPR and the new House of 
Regional Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah or DPD); the MPR will no 
longer formulate national policy
unicameral House o f Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR) (550 
seats; members serve five-year terms)
elections: last held 5 April 2004 (next to be held in April 2009) 
election results: percent o f vote by party - Golkar 21.6%, PDI-P 18.5%, PKB 
10.6%, PPP 8.2%, PD 7.5%, PKS 7.3%, PAN 6.4%, others 19.9%; seats by party - 
Golkar 128, PDI-P 109, PPP 58, PD 57, PKB 52, PAN 52, PKS 45, others 49 
note: because o f election rules, the number o f seats won does not always follow  
the number of votes received by parties
Supreme Court or Mahkamah Agung (justices appointed by the president from a 
list o f candidates approved by the legislature); a separate Constitutional Court was 
invested by the president on 16 August 2003; in March 2004 the Supreme Court 
assumed administrative and financial responsibility for the lower court system
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Political parties 
and leaders:
Political pressure
groups and
leaders:
International
organization
participation:
Flag description:
Economy
Economy - 
overview:
GDP:
GDP - real growth 
rate:
GDP - per capita: 
GDP - composition 
by sector: 
Investment (gross 
fixed):
Population below 
poverty line: 
Household income 
or consumption by 
percentage share: 
Distribution of 
family income - 
Gini index: 
Inflation rate 
(consumer prices): 
Labor force:
Labor force - by 
occupation: 
Unemployment 
rate:
Budget:
Public debt: 
Agriculture - 
products: 
Industries:
Industrial 
production growth 
rate:
from the Ministry o f Justice and Human Rights
Crescent Moon and Star Party or PBB [Yusril Ihza MAHENDRA, chairman]; 
Democratic Party or PD [Budi SANTOSO, chairman]; Functional Groups or 
Golkar [Akbar TANDJUNG, general chairman]; Indonesia Democratic Party- 
Struggle or PDI-P [MEGAWATI Sukarnoputri, chairperson]; National Awakening 
Party or PKB [Alwi SHIHAB, chairman]; National Mandate Party or PAN [Amien 
RAIS, chairman]; Prosperous Justice Party or PKS [Hidayat NUR WAHID, 
chairman]; United Development Party or PPP [Hamzah HAZ, chairman]
NA
APEC, ARF, AsDB, ASEAN, BIS, CP, FAO, G-15, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, 
ICC, ICFTU, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, IHO, ILO, IMF, IMO, 
Interpol, IOC, IOM (observer), ISO, ITU, MONUC, NAM, OIC, OPCW, OPEC, 
UN, UNAMSIL, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNMIL, UNOMIG, UPU, WCL, 
WCO, WFTU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WToO, WTrO
two equal horizontal bands o f red (top) and white; similar to the flag o f Monaco, 
which is shorter; also similar to the flag o f Poland, which is white (top) and red
Indonesia, a vast polyglot nation, faces economic development problems 
stemming from recent acts o f terrorism, unequal resource distribution among 
regions, endemic corruption, the lack o f reliable legal recourse in contract 
disputes, weaknesses in the banking system, and a generally poor climate for 
foreign investment. Indonesia withdrew from its IMF program at the end o f 2003, 
but issued a "White Paper" that commits the government to maintaining 
fundamentally sound macroeconomic policies previously established under IMF 
guidelines. Investors, however, continued to face a host o f on-the-ground 
microeconomic problems and an inadequate judicial system. Keys to future 
growth remain internal reform, building up the confidence of international and 
domestic investors, and strong global economic growth, 
purchasing power parity - $758.8 billion (2003 est.)
4.1% (2003 est.)
purchasing power parity - $3,200 (2003 est.)
agriculture: 16.6%; industry: 43.6%; services: 39.9% (2003 est.)
19.7% of GDP (2003)
27% (1999)
lowest 10%: 4%; highest 10%: 26.7% (1999)
37 (2001)
6.6% (2003 est.)
105.7 million (2003)
agriculture 45%, industry 16%, services 39% (1999 est.)
8.7% (2003 est.) 
revenues: $40.91 billion;
expenditures: $44.95 billion, including capital expenditures o f NA (2003 est.) 
72.9% of GDP (2003)
rice, cassava (tapioca), peanuts, rubber, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, copra, poultry, 
beef, pork, eggs
petroleum and natural gas, textiles, apparel, footwear, mining, cement, chemical 
fertilizers, plywood, rubber, food, tourism 
3.7% (2003 est.)
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Electricity - 
production: 
Electricity - 
consumption: 
Electricity - 
exports:
Electricity - 
imports:
Oil - production:
Oil - consumption: 
Oil - exports:
Oil - imports:
Oil - proved 
reserves:
Natural gas - 
production:
Natural gas - 
consumption: 
Natural gas - 
exports:
Natural gas - 
imports:
Natural gas - 
proved reserves: 
Current account 
balance:
Exports:
Exports - 
commodities: 
Exports - partners:
Imports:
Imports - 
commodities: 
Imports - partners:
Reserves of foreign 
exchange & gold: 
Debt - external: 
Economic aid - 
recipient:
Currency:
Currency code: 
Exchange rates:
Fiscal year:
Transnational Issues 
Disputes - 
international:
95.78 billion kWh (2001)
89.08 billion kWh (2001)
0 kWh (2001)
0 kWh (2001)
1.451 million bbl/day (2001 est.)
1.045 million bbl/day (2001 est.)
NA (2001)
NA (2001)
7.083 billion bbl (1 January 2002)
69 billion cu m (2001 est.)
36.2 billion cu m (2001 est.)
32.8 billion cu m (2001 est.)
0 cu m (2001 est.)
2.549 trillion cu m (1 January 2002)
$7.336-billion (2003)
$63.89 billion f.o.b. (2003 est.)
oil and gas, electrical appliances, plywood, textiles, rubber
Japan 22.3%, US 12.1%, Singapore 8.9%, South Korea 7.1%, China 6.2% (2003 
est.)
$40.22 billion f.o.b. (2003 est.)
machinery and equipment, chemicals, fuels, foodstuffs
Japan 13%, Singapore 12.8%, China 9.1%, US 8.3%, Thailand 5.2%, Australia 
5.1%, South Korea 4.7%, Saudi Arabia 4.6% (2003 est.)
$36.25 billion (2003)
$135.7 billion (2003 est.)
$43 billion Indonesia finished its IMF program in December 2003 but still 
receives bilateral aid through the Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI), which 
pledged $2.8 billion in grants and loans for 2004. (2003 est.)
Indonesian rupiah (IDR)
IDR
Indonesian rupiahs per US dollar - 8,577.13 (2003), 9,311.19 (2002), 10,260.8 
(2001), 8,421.77 (2000), 7,855.15 (1999)
calendar year; note - previously was 1 April - 31 March, but starting with 2001, 
has been changed to calendar year
East Timor-Indonesia Boundary Committee continues to meet, survey and delimit 
land boundary, but several sections o f the boundary remain unresolved; Indonesia 
and East Timor contest the sovereignty o f the uninhabited coral island o f Palau 
Batek/Fatu Sinai, which hinders a decision on a southern maritime boundary; 
numbers of East Timor refugees in Indonesia refuse repatriation; the Australia- 
East Timor 1999 maritime delimitation establishes partial maritime boundaries 
over part o f the Timor Gap, but temporary resource-sharing agreements over an 
unreconciled area hamper creation o f a shared maritime boundary with Indonesia; 
ICJ's award o f Sipadan and Ligitan islands to Malaysia in 2002 prompted 
Indonesia to assert claims to and to establish a presence on its smaller outer 
islands; Indonesian secessionists, squatters and illegal migrants create repatriation 
problems for Papua New Guinea
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Appendix 6.1: Interview Questions
FIELD STUDIES OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL SYSTEMS CHANGE 
IN TWO LARGE INDONESIAN UNIVERSITIES
IB* SheffieldHallam University
Irvan Noormansyah
Faculty of Organisation and Management 
Sheffield Hallam University 
Sheffield, SI 1WB, UK
Introduction
The questions will be focused on the participants’ interpretations of the operation of 
control systems before and after higher education reforms, and their perceptions of the 
institutional factors that influence the management control practice. All responses will 
be treated in the strictest confidence and only summarised results are published. Your 
time and cooperation is very much appreciated.
The Participants
The participants will be about 20 people in each organisation and will be selected based 
on several criteria:
i. The participants should have some knowledge or involvement in control 
systems before or / and after higher education reforms
ii. Senior and non-senior managers in accounting and non-accounting 
departments.
iii. Managers who left the university but were there before reforms will also be 
interviewed where necessary
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Part A: Background of Participants
All responses will be treated in the strictest confidence and only summarised results are 
published.
1. Gender: □  Male □  Female
2. Age Group: □  Below 30 □  3 1 -4 0  □  4 1 -5 0  □  5 0 -6 5
3. Your position is : ......................................................................................................
4. Your department i s .................................................................................................
5. Your responsibilities are :........................................................................................
6. No of people you are currently supervising:.........................................................
7. Your highest educational qualification
D  Diploma D  Bachelor degree D  Postgraduate Diploma
D  Masters degree □  PhD □  Any other (please state)..................
8. Do you have any professional qualification: □ Y es  □  No
9. If yes, please what profession(s):.........................................................................
10. How long have you been working in this university:..................................... ;....
11. How long have you been working in your current position:...............................
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Part B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
I. Formal and Informal types of controls
1. Briefly describe how the following activities operate in the university as a 
formal procedure before and after autonomy?
i. How managers monitored and evaluated subordinate (lower level
managers) performance
ii. How managers monitored and evaluated the development of new
services and business expansions
iii. . How managers monitored and evaluated managerial personnel
(middle/senior managers)
iv. How managers monitored and evaluated allocation of the budget
among alternate use
v. How managers monitored and evaluated pricing decision
vi. How managers monitored and evaluated scheduling of
services/operations
vii. How managers monitored and evaluated distribution of
services/outputs
viii. How managers' salaries/rewards are determined
ix. How costs are controlled or managed
x. How service equalities are controlled
2. Could you describe with some examples of how your decisions in managing 
your organisational unit had been affected by the autonomy of the university?
3. What do you perceive as the main aims of the university's budgetary control 
system?
4. How do you perceive the aims of the university's budgetary control systems 
being achieved in practice?
5. How will you describe the use of informal control in your organisation 
management process before and after autonomy? (Informal controls include 
accounting and control practices that are the result of organizational norms,
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values, social (self and group control), and culture. They are including less 
reliance on standard operating procedures, programs and plans, accounting 
performance measures, behaviour control; more personal control, clan controls, 
etc.)
II. Issues with Power/Control/Influence
1. How will you describe your influence in the following?
i. Determining goals, policies, and causes of action
ii. Capital budget/capital investment decisions
iii. Annual budget allocations and monitoring
iv. Appointment of directors and executives
v. Appointment of other managers
vi. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for executives/directors
vii. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for other managers
viii. Performance monitoring / Jobs monitors
ix. Types of services to be provided
x. Work scheduling
xi. Cost control and cost management
xii. Business expansion decision
xiii. Service quality control
2. How would you describe the Chief executive's influence/power in the following
decisions?
i. Determining goals, policies and cause of action
ii. Capital budget/capital investment decisions
iii. Annual budget allocations and monitoring
iv. Appointment of directors and executives
v. Appointment of other managers
vi. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for executives/directors
vii. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for other managers
viii. Performance monitoring / Jobs monitoring
ix. Types of services to be provided
x. Work scheduling
xi. Cost control and cost management
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xii. Business expansion decision
xiii. Service quality control
3. How would you describe the government/ministry of education or the sector 
ministry's influence/power in the following decisions?
i. Determining goals, policies and cause of action
ii. Capital budget/capital investment decisions
iii. Annual budget allocations and monitoring
iv. Apppintment of directors and executives
v. Appointment of other managers
vi. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for executives/directors
vii. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for other managers
viii. Performance monitoring / Jobs monitoring
ix. Types of services to be provided
x. Work scheduling
xi. Cost control and cost management
xii. Business expansion decision
xiii. Service quality control
4. How would you describe the stakeholder(s) influence/power in the following 
decisions?
xiv. Determining goals, policies and cause of action
xv. Capital budget/capital investment decisions
xvi. Annual budget allocations and monitoring
xvii. Appointment of directors and executives
xviii. Appointment of other managers
xix. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for executives/directors
xx. Determining salary/remuneration/rewards for other managers
xxi. Performance monitoring / Jobs monitoring
xxii. Types of services to be provided
xxiii. Work scheduling
xxiv. Cost control and cost management
xxv. Business expansion decision
xxvi. Service quality control
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5. Is there any competition and conflict between variously constituted and powerful 
interest groups in relations to how the university's activities are carried out? 
How have such competitions and conflicts affected the implementation and 
operation of the university's management control systems?
6. How would you describe the participation or influence of lower level managers 
in the following decisions?
i. Determining goals, policies and cause of action
ii. Capital budget/capital investment decisions
iii. Setting annual budget targets
iv. Monitoring or controlling budgets
V . Determining manager's salary/rewards
vi. Performance monitoring / Jobs monitors
vii. Types of services to be provided
viii. Work scheduling
ix. Cost control and cost management
X . Business expansion decisions
xi. Service quality control
III. Impacts of Institutional Factors
1. How will you describe the influences of the following factors on your 
university's operations and management control systems such as budgets / 
performance evaluation / reward structure (For example, are they forces for 
change, facilitators of change, or barriers to change?; Which are the most 
important factors?; How and why has the influence of these factors changed over 
the years)?
i. Change in organisation status from government institution to 
autonomous institution
ii. Recent economic crisis in Indonesia/Asia
iii. Increase market competition
iv. Professional Bodies
V . Educational Institutions
vi. Technology
vii. Culture, religion and beliefs
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viii. Consultancy industry
ix. Regulation and legislation (e.g. international and national accounting
standard, standard quality certification (ISO))
x. The influence of other successful universities in Indonesia and
abroad
xi. The other organisations (such as Government, labour unions,
financial institutions, etc)
Part C. Additional information that could be collected through documentary 
evidence
The historical development of the universities and the control practices.
1. The university’s history.
i. When was it established?
ii. When was it reformed?
iii. How it has been reformed?
iv. Why it has been reformed?
The background of the organisation
1. Organisational chart and the chart of the accounting / finance department before, 
and after autonomy
2. How are positions in executive and lower levels filled before and after 
autonomy?
3. Share ownership before and after autonomy
4. University’s annual report (financial situation) (before and after autonomy)
5. Number of senior managers, middle level managers, junior managers, and 
operating staff before and after autonomy
6. What are the criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, placing, transfering 
and retirement in the university before and after autonomy?
7. How is the managers appointed before and after autonomy? (including how 
many members)
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Appendix 10.1 JJidi/c University (UU)'S necior jziecuon n o w  uj rruvtm
SAU PROCESS MWA PROCESSBEGINNING PROCESS
Announcem ent on R ector 
Elect (August 14)
SAU Report 
(July 27)
UA Professorship Board 
Interview (July 29)
D esk Evaluation 
(July 27, August 1)
S tage  3 Election 
(August 14)
Community R esponse  
(July 19-24)
Voting 
(July 18)
Fit and Proper T est 
(July 16-17)
Desk Evaluation 
(July 4)
Public C am paign 
(August 1)
Public D ebate 
(August 13)
Fit and Proper T est 
(August 4-5)
S ta g e l Election 
(August 6)
UA’s  Election Committee 
Report (July 1)
Verification and find 
selection of UA’s  rector 
candidate (July 25)
Presentation  and S tag e  
2 Election 
(August 12)
UA'S Rector Election 
Committee P ress  
C onference (May 6).
Internal and external 
m edia publication 
(m ay 7-9)
UA’s  R ector C andidate 
Registration
Verification and  public 
opinion on UA’s  Rector 
Election Com m ittee toward 
the UA’s  R ector C andidate 
(June 9-22)
Appendix 10.1: Didik University (DU)’s Rector Election Flow of Process 2002
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Appendix 10.2 Didik University (DU)’s Rector Election Process scneauie
Appendix 10.2: Didik University’s Rector Election Process Schedule
April 1
FINAL RECRUITMENT
April 19 A dvertisem ent 
May 6
FINAL RECRUITMENT 
(R ector Election 
Committee)
FINALIZATION RECTOR
O F CANDIDATE ELECTION 
(SAU) (MWA)
CANDIDATE 
REGISTRATION DEADLINE
Explanation 
M eeting -  June  1
Community 
Clarification July 27 
(Advertisement)
Aug 16
June  29
June  8
f 1 1
S equence  
Of W eek
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Preparation and 
Confirmation on 
MWA & SAU 
Criteria
Preparation 
Period of 
R ector 
Election 
Committee
C andidate
Registration
Period
Verification & 
Recruitment 
by R ector 
Election 
Committee
' h r *  V
Interview (Fit P ro cess  & 
and P roper Finalization 
Test) Interactive
Dialog
Dialog with
R ector
Candidate
"Y" A Y
CANDIDACY & RECRUITMENT PR O C ESS 
by Rector Election Committee
CANDIDATE RECTOR
ELECTION PR O C ESS ELECTION
by SAU PR O C ESS by MWA
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